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ABSTRACT 
What happened in the planning and development of secondary 
education in Swaziland can be seen as representing a common 
African experience, and exemplifying a general paradox which 
characterised the aid process. 	 What donors regarded as 
persistent weaknesses in planning and management in recipient 
countries was, in varying degrees, a way of protecting an 
African view of education against donor intervention. 	 The 
development of secondary education was shaped by an African approach 
and the variety of societal institutions across African countries, 
rather than by the acceptance or imposition of international 
models and the responsible interventionism of donor agencies. 
The exceptionally well protected nature of the Swazi case stems 
from a distinctively Swazi paradox. 	 Extreme dependence on 
South Africa provided a form of security within which the Swazi 
monarchy was enabled to give full expression to a remarkably 
homogeneous traditional system, a system which had broken down 
elsewhere in Africa. 	 The functioning of a powerful traditional 
monarchy and the persistence of traditional institutions and 
processes gave Swaziland a rare degree of autonomy in protecting 
the Swazi model of education against external pressures brought 
to bear by a substantial array of donor agencies. 
The Swazi experience provides support for the view that education, 
far from being a powerful instrument for economic and social 
change, has only a limited role to play in the development process. 
The particularity of the Swazi experience, and the reason it was 
an extremely heightened case of a more general phenomenon, arises 
out of the features that imposed fundamental restrictions on 
alterations in existing societal structures. 
	 These features were 
those that form the two sides of the Swazi paradox, the functioning 
of a powerful traditional monarchy and extreme dependence on 
South Africa. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Discussion of the international aid approach to educational planning 
is focused on donor assistance in developing countries in English 
speaking Africa. 	 It provides a frame of reference for the Swazi 
case study of the planning and development of secondary education, 
with particular reference to Swaziland's Third National Development  
Plan 1978/79-1982/83. 
The international aid approach to educational planning  
Aid to education is shaped to a large extent by the separate traditions 
and corporate styles of the various donor agencies, and there is 
considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within 
the donor community. 	 At the same time, there is a sense in which 
the various bilateral and multilateral agencies see themselves, and 
are seen by others, as an international aid community. 	 Strong 
similarities in policy and common concerns for the most effective 
use of the aid they provide have shaped an international aid approach 
to educational planning. 
The international aid approach is based on two closely linked assump- 
tions. 	 The first is that education, as an investment in human 
resource development, is a central element in economic growth and 
national development. 	 The second is that educational planning 
can direct and control the development of education, and gear it 
to the promotion of economic growth and national development. 
Chapter 1 describes the main features of this approach in the 1960s, 
with reference to the manpower approach. 
	
Chapter 2 describes the 
main features in the 1970s, with reference to the education for 
rural development strategy. 
Chapter 3 describes the common concerns and similarities in approach 
which characterised the responsible interventionism of donor agencies, 
and indicates that aid to education was designed to have an influence 
in the planning and development of education in African countries, 
whether or not this intention was made explicit. 
	 It examines the 
restrictions imposed on donor intervention by inadequacies in planning 
and management on the donor as well as the recipient side, and by 
critical limitations in the international aid approach to educational 
planning. 
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Chapter 4 describes an African approach to educational planning 
which was at variance with the international aid approach, and which 
imposed fundamental restrictions on the influence donor intervention 
was intended to exert. 	 It refers to critiques which suggested 
that educational development depended upon rather than brought about 
economic and social change, and it suggests that the planning and 
development of education in African countries was shaped by an 
African approach and the variety of societal institutions across 
African countries, rather than by international models and the respon-
sible interventionism of donor agencies. 
A final section in chapter 4 refers to the persistence of the main 
assumptions that underpinned the international aid approach. 	 In 
spite of the general air of scepticism that surrounded most commenta-
ries on educational planning and aid to education in the late 1970s 
and 1980s, donor rationale for aid to education remained virtually 
unchanged. 
The planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland  
There are broad similarities between conditions, in Swaziland and 
in other African countries. 	 While chapter 5 recognises these simi- 
larities, the account of Swazi political, social, and economic 
structures draws attention to the combination of features which 
gives Swaziland its distinctive character: 	 the homogeneity of the 
Swazi people, the unchallenged authority of the traditional monarchy, 
the persistence of traditional institutions and customs, the monarchy's 
participation in the modern economy, and Swaziland's over-all depen-
dence on South Africa. 
Chapter 6 describes the Swazi education and training system, the 
array of donors that provided aid to education, and the various 
forms of aid they provided. 	 The Swazi model of education, described 
in chapter 7, was based on the principle of education as an inalienable 
right and Government preparedness to respond to popular pressures 
by making education available to all who wanted it. 	 The Swazi 
model was linked with a largely non-interventionist approach to 
educational planning, as evidenced in the financing and adminis-
tration of secondary education. 
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Chapter 8 examines donor intervention in the planning and development 
of secondary education in Swaziland, with particular reference to 
aid for educational planning, the part played by donor assistance 
in the preparation of the third education plan, and the projects 
various agencies were prepared to provide in support of a donor 
view of 'what was best' for Swaziland. 	 Donor intervention was 
designed to have an influence, and appeared to exert considerable 
influence in the planning and development of secondary education, 
but its impact was restricted by limitations in planning and co-
ordination on the donor as well as the Swazi side. 
The influence aid to education was intended to exert was restricted 
more critically by lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies and 
lack of support for donor projects, the persistence of the Swazi 
approach, and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor 
intervention. 	 Chapter 9 describes the dominant influence of the 
Swazi model of education in the preparation of the education plan, 
and the ways in which the operation of educational planning and 
the implementation of donor projects were neutralised. 
The account of plan implementation in chapter 10 indicates that 
the development of secondary education was shaped by the Swazi model 
of education, not by donor .policies incorporated into the plan. 
Had donor policies been implemented, there was little if any chance 
that implementation would have brought about the kind of economic 
and social change envisaged in the international aid approach. 
Existing economic and social structures were shaped by the vested 
interests of a powerful monarchy and Swaziland's over-all dependence 
on South Africa, and the secondary education and training system 
played little part in this process. 
A final section in chapter 10 describes the persistence of popular 
pressures for the expansion of secondary education, continuing conflict 
between the Swazi and international approaches to secondary education, 
and the persistent dominance of the Swazi model of education. 
What happened in the planning and development of secondary education 
in Swaziland can be generalised in varying degrees across other 
African countries. 	 But, as indicated at various points in the 
main text and in the conclusion, the persistence of the Swazi 
approach, the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to donor inter-
vention, and the marked degree of protection afforded the Swazi 
model of education were ultimately shaped by the combination of 
distinctively Swazi characteristics referred to in chapter 5. 
Documentation 
Description of the international aid and African approaches to educa- 
tional planning makes use of donor agency documentation. 	 This 
includes policy statements, reports of international conferences 
and seminars, and studies commissioned or supported by various donor 
agencies. 	 It draws on critiques of the international aid approach 
and commentaries on aid for education written by expatriate observers. 
Where possible, this material is supported by reference to accounts 
of educational planning and aid for education from the recipient 
side. 
Description of the Swazi background and the planning and development 
of secondary education in Swaziland makes use of official Swazi 
documentation and commentaries by Swazi and expatriate observers. 
It draws on project documentation, sector reviews, and reports of 
analytical surveys prepared by donor 'experts' and visiting missions. 
Where donor agency documentation is restricted or classified, it 
cannot be referred to directly. 	 Documentation which is unclassified 
or no longer restricted has been cited. 	 In some instances, Swazi 
documentation was prepared with donor assistance and reflected donor 
views, in others reports and reviews prepared by 'experts' and visiting 
missions were 'ventriloquised' as Swazi documentation. 	 The status 
of the various kinds of Swazi documentation is referred to in the 
main text. 
Supporting 'collateral' evidence is provided in the form of reference 
to analysis of the international aid and African approaches to educa- 
tional planning, particularly in chapters 3 and 4. 	 In addition, 
the Swazi case study is informed by what has been described as 
'anecdotal' evidence based on "private knowledge" and available 
through the formal and informal contacts of the trade (1), and the 
"unavoidable reference to daily, ordinary, occupational workings" 
(2). 	 In this case, it is grounded in the writer's participation 
in educational planning in Swaziland as adviser to the Ministry 
of Education for four years from 1980 to 1984. 
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Footnotes follow immediately after the chapter to which they refer. 
Charts and tables are collected together and placed after the conclu- 
sion. 	 The bibliography is placed at the end of the thesis. 
Footnotes 
1 Taylor W 	 The Contribution of Research to the Study and Practice of 
Educational Administration, 1975, p 211. 
2 Garfinkel H 	 Studies in 	 Ethnomethodology, 1967, pp 13-14. 
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I EDUCATION FOR DEVELOPMENT 
The international aid approach to educational planning is based 
on two assumptions, which are closely interlinked. 	 The first is 
that education is a central element in economic and social progress. 
The second is that educational planning is capable of directing 
and controlling the development of education, and gearing it to 
the demands of economic and social development. 
This chapter examines the main features of this approach in the 
1960s. 	 It describes the influence of the theory of human capital 
and modernisation theories of economic development, the emergence 
of what was regarded as a new 'science' of educational planning 
(1), the widespread application of the manpower approach in African 
countries, and donor rationale for aid for education. 	 It concludes 
with reference to the disillusion with the consequences of the interna-
tional aid approach when it had become clear by the end of the 1960s 
that initial expectations had not been realised. 
The theory of human capital  
The international aid approach was firmly based on the notion of 
education as human resource development. 
	 It was shaped and directed 
by what Coombs referred to as "a new recognition of the critical 
role which education and human resources had to play in the process 
of economic growth and over-all national development" (2). 	 This 
recognition stemmed from the remarkable interest in the early 1960s 
in the economics of education (3) and the rediscovery of the importance 
of education to the development process (4), and in particular from 
what Bowman described as "a core concept that has come as something 
of a revolution in economic thought, that of investment in human 
beings" (5). 
Schultz, who was largely responsible for the formulation of this 
concept, argued that education constituted an investment (private 
and societal) in human beings and that an increased investment in 
human capital "predominantly accounts for the productive superiority 
of the technically advanced countries". 	 As long as assistance 
to underdeveloped countries to help them achieve economic growth 
concentrated on (non human) capital aid and neglected the need to 
invest in human beings, their rate of growth would be seriously 
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limited. 	 It simply was not possible "to have the fruits of modern 
agriculture and the abundance of modern industry without making 
large investments in human beings" (6). 
In a background paper delivered at the ECA/UNESCO Conference of 
African States on the Development of Education in Africa held at 
Addis Ababa in 1961, Singer pointed out that there had been a fundamen-
tal shift in thinking about the problem of economic growth and develop- 
ment. 	 The basic problem was no longer considered to be the creation 
of wealth but rather the creation of the capacity to create wealth. 
The capacity to create wealth "resided in the people of a country" 
and, once a society had acquired this capacity, the creation of 
wealth itself became almost incidental. 	 Progress in underdeveloped 
countries was based on "human investment" and, although it could 
be "nursed, assisted and stimulated from abroad", it would and "must 
always be a domestic product" (7). 
Once it was accepted that progress depended on 'human investment', 
it was a short step to the idea that money spent on education, as 
a direct investment in human resource development, was a precondition 
for economic growth and modernisation in underdeveloped countries. 
The background papers at the Addis Ababa conference, written by 
UNESCO staff and influential Western academics, left African member 
states in no doubt that the development of education, and in particular 
secondary and post-secondary education, was an essential element 
in any plan for economic and national development. 
	 The conference 
resolutions and recommendations emphasised that education was "a 
gainful economic investment" and that economic and social progress 
was "indissolubly linked" with the development of education. 
	 Educa- 
tion "should be given its due weight as a productive investment 
and as a basic factor in economic and social development" and the 
planning of education should be integrated with over-all economic 
planning (8). 
There was a sense in which the widely held notion that underdeveloped 
countries were caught up in a vicious circle of poverty and stagnation, 
summed up bluntly by Nurkse in the proposition that "a country is 
poor because it is poor" (9), seemed to have been turned upside down. 
Now it could be argued that no country need be poor if it could 
make a large investment in the development of its educational system. 
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For example, Curle (10) followed Myrdal's argument (11) that circular 
causation, given an initial push to start a cumulative process of 
development, could move in an upward as well as a downward spiral. 
A crash programme of investment in education, supported by external 
aid , would provide a launching pad for 	 "a leap forward from the 
past", enabling underdeveloped countries to break out of Lhe vicious 
circle of poverty and stagnation into a progressive circle of change 
and modernisation. 
The international aid approach to educational planning was shaped 
by borrowings from the modernisation theories of economic development, 
current in the late 1950s and early 1960s, which maintained that 
underdeveloped countries were at an early stage of the same trajectory 
of economic growth as more advanced countries. 	 Underdeveloped 
countries were, in fact, 'developing' countries. 	 Rostow's theory 
of economic growth (12) assumed the existence of an economic growth 
path which all countries must follow. 	 It identified five stages 
of economic growth and, although a country could not miss out a 
stage, it could emulate and catch up with more advanced countries 
by accelerating the transition from one stage to the next. 	 What 
was needed was a massive injection of capital aid and technical 
assistance for the modern sector of the economy to support "a take-
off into sustained growth". 
Harbison and Myers (13), basing their theory on what appeared to 
be a positive correlation between a country's level of economic 
development and enrolment rates at different levels of schooling, 
argued that there were four stages of educational growth (roughly 
comparable to Rostow's stages of economic growth) through which 
all countries had to pass as their economies grew, and suggested 
that underdeveloped countries could accelerate their economic growth 
by accelerating the transition from one stage of educational growth 
to the next. 	 An underdeveloped country that wanted to emulate 
and catch up with more advanced countries would need to give "absolute 
priority" to the expansion and improvement of second-level education, 
which would provide the high-level manpower indispensable for the 
development of the modern sector of the economy through the secondary 
school system itself or by providing an avenue of access to vocational 
training programmes or professional training at the university. 
The limited availability of second-level education was the greatest 
'bottleneck' in the modernisation of underdeveloped economies and 
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"an initial heavy investment in human resource development is necessary 
to get a country started on the road to self sustaining growth". 
The priority given to the expansion of secondary and post-secondary 
education and the provision of high-level manpower for the development 
of the modern sector of the economy was rationalised in terms of 
the 'trickle down' theory of economic development, in which Lewis 
suggested that the effects of modernisation would spread downward 
throughout the economy, bringing employment opportunities and social 
benefits to the whole population (14). Coombs, in a survey of educational 
planning in the 1960s, argued that: 
"it made sense to give initial priority to educating the 
most needed types of manpower for economic growth, for 
without such growth the desired long run expansion of 
education and other major social objectives would simply 
not be possible" (15). 
In a lecture on ways to improve United States foreign educational 
aid, Coombs described education as "a direct and essential investment 
in development", and argued the need for a strong commitment in aid 
programmes to the idea that "educational investment was a basic 
prerequisite to economic growth and over-all development" on the 
grounds that: 
"only by massive educational effort can the developing 
nations develop their human resources, and only by develo-
ping their human resources can they achieve economic 
growth and social advancement.... 	 It is clear that 
industrialisation and the whole modernisation process 
cannot proceed far without the development of human 
resources, and for this a major investment in education 
is required" (16). 
It was also clear that this major investment would depend, to a 
considerable extent, on the availability of foreign aid. 	 In a 
discussion of problems and prospects for United States aid in African 
countries, Bigelow pointed out they had "limited - very limited 
- financial and skilled human resources" and, however valiant their 
own efforts might be, they could not hope 
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"out of their own resources, to pay for anything like 
the educational system that is required if they are to 
advance at anything like the rate to which they aspire". 
Given these conditions, "their only hope lies in outside assistance 
and the immediate investment must be massive if'the hoped-for conse-
quences are to ensue" (17). 
The idea that a substantial investment in secondary and post-secondary 
education was a prerequisite for economic growth and over-all national 
development became "almost a slogan", one that had gained "universal 
acceptance", and which was rarely, if ever questioned (18). 	 The human 
capital theory had provided what was seen as a plausible, almost 
axiomatic, justification for allocating substantial assistance for 
education in developing countries. 	 But the manpower for economic 
growth slogan overlooked the fact that, though it might be true 
that economic growth required prior investment in education, it 
did not follow that investment in education would bring about economic 
growth (19). 
Educational planning  
Coombs argued that the need to harness education to economic growth 
called for a new kind of educational planning to replace old ideas 
and practices that would no longer suffice. 	 What was needed was 
a much more complicated and extensive kind of educational planning 
than that which had been acceptable in dealing with what were described 
as the relatively simple problems of the past. 	 According to Coombs, 
there was, in the early 1960s, a general agreement among leading 
educationalists and economists that this new kind of educational 
planning must be comprehensive in order to embrace and co-ordinate 
all the main components of the education system, it must be effectively 
linked with the requirements for economic growth and social progress, 
it must take account of a much longer time perspective, and it must 
be an integral part of education management (20). 
Although not always stated explicitly in the literature, the notion 
that the development of education was 'plannable' leaned heavily 
on the assumption that there was a general 'science' of educational 
planning. 	 Coombs suggested the existence of a body of generalised 
knowledge (admittedly still imperfect and in need of further 
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development) and a set of methods and techniques (already often 
highly sophisticated though still capable of further refinement) 
that could be applied in a 'rational' and 'systematic' way by appro-
priately trained 'experts' to the process of educational development. 
The basic logic, concepts, and principles of the new 'science' 
of educational planning were seen as universally applicable and 
its methodologies and techniques as sufficiently flexible and adaptable 
to be applied in a variety of diverse settings and different 
conditions (21). 
What Coombs described as the 'young science' of educational planning 
encompassed planning, policy making, and implementation within the 
same framework. 	 In theory, they were seen as inseparable elements 
of a single determining and controlling process capable of systemati-
cally shaping and directing future developments in education. 
What was supposed to happen was that the 'scientific' application 
of new methods and techniques would lead to the formulation of 
'rational' policy decisions, which would be incorporated into an 
educational development plan, and systematically implemented within 
a given time span. 	 Education, it was assumed, would respond to 
and be controlled by the plan and develop according to its declared 
intentions and objectives (22). 	 Educational planning as described 	 in 
a 1968 UNESCO report, was "the application of a rational and scientific 
approach" which was "vital to the orderly and efficient development 
of education",(23). 
Once it had been accepted that economic and social progress was 
"indissolubly linked" with the development of education and that 
the planning of education, at least in theory, was an integral part 
of national development planning, it was a short step to the notion 
that educational planning was capable of determining and controlling 
not only educational development but economic and social development 
as well. 	 Seen in these terms, educational planning was a form 
of social engineering directed towards solving the most pressing 
economic and social problems in underdeveloped countries. 
	 Although 
this was not always stated explicitly in the literature, much of 
it was couched in terminology which appeared to suggest that the 
prevailing international model of educational planning, by determining 
and controlling the development of education, was expected to exercise 
substantial control over economic and social development as well (24). 
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The manpower approach  
The manpower approach to educational planning was an attempt to 
link the development of education to the high-level manpower require-
ments of the economy and to integrate the planning of education 
with over-all economic planning. 	 As described by Parnes (25), it was 
'essentially economic in its orientation". 	 It started from the 
proposition that educational planning must give priority to economic 
development. 	 The production of manpower was the most important 
function of the education system, and the development of education 
could, and should, be determined by a quantitative forecast (matching 
levels and types of schooling to broad occupational categories) 
for the requirements of educated manpower necessary to support the 
pace of economic development. 	 The long lead time needed to produce 
manpower through the education system meant that forecasts of future 
manpower requirements should be long-term forecasts, covering a 
span of ten to twenty years, 
Parnes argued that manpower forecasts, derived from targets for 
economic growth, 
"do not, or at least should not, purport to be pure uncondi- 
tional forecasts. 	 That is, they are not so much predic- 
tions of what will happen in the manpower field as indica-
tions of what must happen if certain targets for economic 
growth are to be realised" 
and, in this sense, they were "technologically determined" (26). Forecasts 
of future manpower requirements would determine the rate of educational 
expansion, providing the basis for calculating the enrolments in 
each level and branch of the education system necessary to achieve 
the required annual outputs of educated manpower. The required expansion 
in enrolments in the various components of the education system 
would then be used to estimate the requirements for additional 
facilities and teachers, which, in turn, would provide the basis 
for estimating the costs of the required expansion (27). 
The conventional rationale for the use of the manpower approach 
in developing countries was straightforward. 	 The development 
of human resources through the education system was a prerequisite 
for economic growth and over-all national development. 	 The 'whole 
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process of modernisation' was being held back by 'conspicuous shortages 
of all kinds of specialised manpower' . The education system, therefore, 
should be geared to the production of manpower for development. 
Forecasts of manpower requirements would provide the basis for a 
'rational' programme of investment in education and ensure the 
'efficient' and 'productive' use of scarce resources. Seen in these 
terms, it seemed 'logical' to give 'absolute priority' to the develop-
ment of secondary and post-secondary education and to the production 
of the high-level manpower that was regarded as indispensable for 
the development of the modern sector of the economy (28). 
There was no universally accepted method of estimating manpower 
requirements. 	 An early attempt in Tanzania consisted of asking 
employers to estimate their requirements for two to five years ahead 
(29). 	 This was superseded by the adoption of the method used in 
the OECD Mediterranean Project (30), in which forecasts of manpower 
requirements were related to the patterns of growth estimated in 
the different sectors of the economy and laid down in a national 
economic plan (31). 	 Manpower forecasting in Kenya, based on the 
Harbison rule of thumb (32), and in Uganda, based on what Rado and 
Jolly described as the "cautious" use of the Tinbergen equation 
(33), were also derived from, and aimed at, target rates for economic 
growth laid down in a national economic plan. 
The over-riding assumption was that the development of secondary 
and post-secondary education could be geared to the achievement 
of a required rate of economic development. 	 The Harbison rule of 
thumb, which was also used in manpower forecasts in Nigeria (34), 
East Africa (35), and South East Asia (36) in the early 1960s, was 
based on the assumption that a target rate for economic growth of 
x per cent a year could be 'achieved' by increasing the stock of 
'top-level' manpower (university graduates) by 2x, 'second-level' 
(School Certificate plus two or three years training) by 3x, and 
total employment by ix per cent a year. 	 Tinbergen argued that 
"the desired acceleration of economic growth requires a corresponding 
acceleration of the education system" (37). 
	 The setting of target 
rates for economic growth, from which manpower forecasts were derived, 
appears to have been an arbitrary process (38). 	 In a critique of 
the manpower approach in African countries, Foster pointed out that 
the bases on which high-level manpower estimates were made were 
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"sometimes not clear" and some of the assumptions about the rate 
of growth in the economy "seem to be questionable" (39). 
The practitioners of the manpower approach acknowledged the difficul-
ties in estimating future manpower requirements and the limitations 
of the methods that were used, particularly in developing countries 
where there was little reliable information about manpower and employ- 
ment (40). 	 Rado and Jolly, describing the preparation of manpower 
forecasts in Uganda, referred to the speculative nature of the assump-
tions they had made, the crudity of the procedures they had employed, 
and the possibility of considerable margins of error at almost every 
stage of the forecasting process (41). 	 The case for manpower fore- 
casting rested largely on the assumption that all decisions relating 
to investment in education, if they purported to be 'rational', 
involved manpower forecasts of one kind or another, and that a 
'systematic' attempt to forecast future manpower requirements (however 
broadly based and liable to error) was better than guesswork or 
no attempt at all (42). 	 Rado pointed to serious weaknesses in 
the theory and methodology of the manpower approach but concluded 
that developing countries like those in East Africa in which "the 
supply of educated manpower is sure to be one of the principal cons-
traints in economic growth" had "no option but to attempt manpower 
planning. 	 This would appear to be the only basis for framing a 
rational programme of investment in education" (43). 
Critiques of the manpower planning approach (44) argued that it 
rested on shaky empirical foundations, that its procedures were 
"hazardous" and characterised by "large doses of sheer guesswork", 
and that it would not produce the results expected of it - instead 
of maximising, it was more than likely to slow down the rate of 
economic development. 	 The production of large numbers of educated 
people would not at the same time create employment opportunities 
for them and the application of the manpower approach in developing 
countries was likely to lead to a large-scale misallocation of 
resources, over investment in secondary and post-secondary education 
and training, and a growing army of unemployed and disaffected 
secondary school leavers. 
The manpower approach was confined to high-level manpower and the 
production of skills for the modern sector of the economy through 
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the planned expansion of the formal system of secondary education, 
post-secondary technical and vocational education, and professional 
training at the university. 	 It paid no attention to primary education, 
which accounted for half the total expenditure on education, suggesting 
by implication the curbing of its expansion until the production 
of high-level manpower had created the wealth necessary for its 
future development.. 	 It paid no attention to the part that non- 
formal education and training could play in the supply of critical 
skills and the generation of employment and self employment opportu- 
nities. 	 It ignored the educational and manpower requirements of 
the traditional rural economy, where over 90 per cent of the population 
lived and worked, and which would have to be taken into account 
in any plan for economic growth and over-all national development 
(45). 	 In addition, it seldom considered the contribution of training 
provided in the work place and on the job. 	 'Manpower requirements' 
were equated to the numbers achieving educational or training qualifi-
cations, with little or no consideration being given to the quality 
of the 'manpower' concerned or their experience on the job, or lack 
of it. 
In a number of instances, critiques of the manpower approach centred 
on arguments for the use of cost-benefit (or rate-of-return) analysis 
in educational planning. 	 These critiques argued that the "essential 
single-mindedness" and the "technologically determined rigidities 
and inflexibilities" of the manpower approach left no room for the 
"realistic appraisal" of alternative forms of investment, an appraisal 
which was central to any investment decision theory. 	 The manpower 
approach gave no indication that there might be limits to what could 
be considered 'worthwhile' investment in education as compared to 
other sectors of the economy, or that there might be limits to what 
could be considered 'worthwhile' investment in one level or one 
kind of education and training as compared to other levels and other 
kinds of education and training. 	 It conveniently overlooked the 
obvious fact that "what is spent on education is not spent on something 
else, and that what is spent on one educational sector is not spent 
on the others" (46). 
Smyth and Bennet pointed out (47) that it was a short step from 
the assumption that an increase in the stock of educated manpower 
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was necessary to 'achieve' a 'desired acceleration' in the rate 
of economic growth to the idea that the faster the stock of educated 
manpower grew, no matter what its rate of growth, the faster the 
economy would grow. 	 The proposition was no longer stated in terms 
of a shortage of educated manpower as a constraint on economic growth 
so much as in terms of the production of educated manpower as a 
source of economic growth - the idea that the expansion of secondary 
and post-secondary education and training, no matter what its rate, 
would, of itself, guarantee economic development. In a paper presented 
at the 1972-74 Bellagio conferences, Blaug argued that the manpower 
approach "constituted an open-ended invitation to expand secondary 
and higher education without limits" and that, by necessarily 
committing the bulk of educational expenditures to the expansion 
of secondary and higher education, "it leaves the educational planner 
with virtually no choices to make" (48). 
Cost-benefit analysis made little or no impact on the international 
aid approach to educational planning. 	 It served mainly as an 
intellectual focus for scepticism about the manpower approach (49). 
The manpower approach to educational planning "spread around the 
world" during the 1960s and "certain enthusiasts saw in it the answer 
to all educational planning problems" (50). 	 One of the main reasons 
for its widespread application in developing countries was its advocacy 
by donor agencies and their concern for an education plan based 
on manpower forecasts as a basis for negotiations for aid for 
education. 
Aid for education 
The rationale for aid for education rested squarely on the theory 
of human capital and the promotion of economic growth. 	 While there 
might be the occasional token reference to education as "a fundamental 
human right" or as "a desirable social service" (51), donors tended 
to regard education almost exclusively in terms of human resource 
development, and they were concerned primarily with strategies for 
maximising education's contribution to economic growth. 
British Government policy for the assistance of development in overseas 
countries subscribed to the view that education was "an indispensable 
condition of development" (52). 	 United States aid programmes 
committed increasing proportions of total aid budgets to educational 
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development on the grounds that: 
"education is not something which is a luxury which can 
be afforded after development has occurred; 	 it is an 
integral part, an inescapable and essential part of the 
development.process itself" (53). 
Presidents of the World Bank justified the Bank's decision to involve 
itself in aid for education on the grounds that nothing was more 
vital than education to economic progress in underdeveloped countries 
(54), and that education was of central importance in the whole 
development process (55). 
In an explanation of Bank lending policy in a paper presented at 
a UNESCO seminar in 1964, Tobias argued that: 
"we have come to the point where the benefits of education 
for economic development are universally recognised. 
The propriety of long-term financing of education growth 
is accepted. 	 The availability of external aid for such 
financing increases" (56). 
In a paper on the international financing of educational investment 
Ripman (57) made it clear that such aid was available to countries 
that had accorded a high priority to education and training, and 
that the Bank was prepared to consider requests for aid for education 
designed to meet the needs implied by economic and social development 
and, in particular, requests for projects which could be shown to 
have "a rapid effect on economic growth". 
Donors advocated the use of the manpower approach as a 'rational' 
basis for the planning of educational development and for negotiations 
for aid for education (58). 	 The Ford Foundation representative 
for East and Central Africa indicated that donors looked for situations 
in which their aid would be effective and in which it could be seen 
to be effective. 	 As long as there were manifest deficiencies in 
the supply of high-level manpower and the scale of the need appeared 
to be within reach, the policy for aid to education appeared straight-
forward and the manpower approach was a "natural first for foreign 
aid" (59). 
	 The World Bank's lending policy was based on the manpower 
approach, and the Bank gave priority to education projects geared "to 
produce trained manpower for economic development"(60). Donors attached 
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the highest priority to secondary education, followed by post-secondary 
technical and vocational training and university level professional 
training (61). 	 Between 1963 and 1971, 72 per cent of Bank financing 
for education was spent on secondary education and 23 per cent on 
post-secondary training and universities (62). 
As described more fully in chapter 3, donors provided substantial 
assistance in educational planning and in the preparation of manpower 
plans. 	 National education plans in African countries drawn up 
with advice and assistance from international 'experts' and reports 
of education commissions made up almost entirely of expatriate 
'authorities' were based on the manpower approach and presented 
in terms of the development model of educational planning advocated 
by donor agencies. 
In 1960, the commission on post-school certificate and higher education 
in Nigeria, under the chairmanship of Sir Eric Ashby, presented 
its report with the title Investment in Education. 	 Its recommenda- 
tions were based solely on estimates of high-level manpower require-
ments, prepared by Harbison especially for the commission, on the 
grounds that "economic advance depends on skilled manpower, and 
the manpower must come first". 	 The report took little account 
of estimates of what Nigeria could afford to spend. 	 It argued 
that investment in Nigerian education was an investment in its economic 
future and the commission deliberately rejected "cautious, modest 
and reasonable ways in which the educational system might be improved 
within the limits of our budget" in the expectation of substantial 
amounts of foreign aid (63). 
The 1967 Uganda manpower plan was drawn up by international 'experts' 
and based on the estimates of high-level manpower requirements 
prepared for the Uganda Governement by two British economists at 
Makerere University. 	 It was based on the idea of manpower for 
economic growth and the 'trickle down' theory. 	 It attached the 
highest priority to the rapid expansion of secondary education "to 
provide the trained manpower necessary for rapid economic development" 
in the expectation that this would "provide more resources for future 
development" and that: 
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"from the increased wealth more and more education will 
be provided so that the whole population will have the 
chance to participate in the modern society, and lead 
more productive and fulfilling lives" (64). 
It appeared that the international aid approach to educational planning 
fitted with and supported the aspirations in newly independent African 
countries for economic growth and modernisation (65). 	 Convinced 
that the brake on development applied by colonialism in the past 
had been released (66), directed by an overwhelming sense of urgency 
(67), and encouraged and supported by the prevailing model of educa-
tional planning and the availability of substantial external aid, 
they embarked on what Foster later described as "ambitious programmes 
of educational expansion in the hope that the provision of more 
schools would in itself constitute the 'royal road' to economic 
development " (68). 
By the end of the 1960s, it had become increasingly clear that the 
international aid approach to educational planning had not been 
able to exert the kind of leverage which had been confidently expected 
of it in attempts to gear the development of education in African 
countries to economic growth and modernisation. 	 In spite of attempts 
to integrate the planning of education into comprehensive national 
development plans, and in spite of large allocations from domestic 
budgets and massive injections of foreign aid, educational planning 
had fallen short, in some instances disastrously short, of initial 
expectations. 
In an IIEP conference document published in 1968 Coombs argued that 
educational planning and the support provided by foreign aid had 
not been able to relate educational expansion to developmental needs, 
and that developing countries, without exception, were in the throes 
of a deepening educational crisis (69). 	 The Pearson report described 
a situation in which the expansion of secondary education in developing 
countries had been accompanied by continuing shortages of trained 
manpower and, at the same time, growing numbers of unemployed school 
leavers, and in which education systems were ill adapted to the 
economic and social requirements they were supposed to fulfill (70). 
The expansion of education systems had not opened up the 'royal 
road' to economic growth and national prosperity, and the high hopes 
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and widespread expectations that had characterised the early 1960s 
had been replaced by an uneasy feeling of disillusion with the conse-
quences of educational planning and the provision of aid for education. 
Towards the end of the 1960s donors initiated a critical reappraisal 
of their policies and programmes. 	 UNESCO organised conferences 
and seminars in which 'authorities' and 'experts' analysed the inade-
quacies of educational planning and the limitations of its concepts 
and methodologies (71). 	 The UN system, the World Bank, and USAID 
set up commissions to review aid programmes, identify problem areas, 
and recommend changes (72). 	 In the early 1970s the Bellagio confe- 
rences (73), under the auspices of the Ford and Rockefeller Founda-
tions, involved all the major Western donors in a critical review 
of their aid policies and programmes. 	 Arguments that suggested 
that the international aid approach to educational planning was 
based on assumptions that were over simplified and suspect and that 
it encouraged expectations that were exaggerated and over optimistic 
gained wider currency. 	 In the introduction to the Bellagio Conference  
Papers recognition of these arguments (and of limitations in the 
provision and use of aid for education) led Ward to describe the 
first stage in the international aid approach as 'the age of innocence' 
(74). 
One result of the review of donor policies was the rediscovery by 
international 'authorities' and donor agencies of the notion of 
education for rural development, and the formulation of an alternative 
development strategy for educational planning. 	 The next chapter 
examines the main features of this shift of emphasis in the interna-
tional aid approach to educational planning. 
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2 EDUCATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT 
During the 1970s, the international aid approach to educational 
planning adopted a broader view of the development process and proposed 
a more broadly based educational strategy. 	 The education for rural 
development strategy stemmed from a growing disillusion with the 
consequences of educational planning, and it over-lapped with and 
cut across the approach which had dominated the 1960s. 	 It was 
firmly based on the assumption that education, as an investment 
in human resource development, was a central element in economic 
growth and over-all national development, and in its main essentials 
it was an extension of the international aid approach of the 1960s. 
This chapter examines the main features of the international aid 
approach in the 1970s. 	 It describes the rediscovery of education 
for rural development, the importance attached to non-formal/basic 
education, the attempts to develop new approaches to educational 
planning, and the shift of emphasis in donor policies and priorities. 
It concludes with reference to the scepticism which permeated educa-
tional planning in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and which ran 
alongside the ambitious scenarios of the education for rural develop-
ment strategy during the 1970s. 
Education for rural development  
The education for rural development stragegy stemmed from arguments 
and recommendations that had a long history in the development of 
education in English speaking Africa. 	 A stream of memoranda and 
reports dating from as far back as 1847 (1) had questioned the rele-
vance of existing systems of education to the developmental needs 
of African countries and stressed the part that education could, 
and should, play in the development of rural areas. 	 The theme 
of education for rural development ran as a constant thread through 
major policy documents on education in Africa issued by the British 
Government from the 1920s to the 1970s (2). 	 There had been numerous 
attempts by colonial governments and voluntary agencies to put theory 
into practice but most of these attempts had ended in failure and 
disappointment (3). 	 As donor agencies and their academic advisers 
began to have misgivings about the consequences of educational 
planning in the 1960s, the rediscovery of this theme, tempered by 
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an awareness of a long history of previous failure, provided the 
international aid approach with an alternative development strategy 
for educational planning. 
In 1966, a conference of international 'authorities' and donor agency 
representatives held in Kericho drew attention to the related problems 
of education, employment, and rural development in Kenya. 	 The 
conference report, edited by Sheffield (4), proposed a broadly based 
educational strategy geared to the needs of rural development, and 
argued for a shift in emphasis in donor policies to provide foreign 
aid "on the basis of a comprehensive approach to rural transformation". 
A year later, Nyerere's Education for Self-Reliance (5) stressed 
the importance of primary .education in rural development, and 
challenged the notion of priority to secondary and post-secondary 
education 	 (without disturbing the rationale for manpower-led 
development in these areas). 	 As Dodd pointed out (6), shorn of 
its political rhetoric, Education for Self-Reliance was largely 
a restatement of earlier colonial policies for development related 
and community based primary education, and its proposals for gearing 
education to rural development were based on attempts made by the 
British administration in Tanganyika in the 1950s. 	 While it cannot 
be argued that Education for Self-Reliance was a product of the 
international aid community, it was taken up enthusiastically by 
donors and their academic advisers as a bold home-grown challenge 
to the 1960s trends in the international aid approach. 
Harbison and Hunter, who had presented papers at the Kericho conference, 
took part in a 1968 IIEP symposium on the manpower aspects of 
educational planning. 	 The symposium report suggested that there 
had been "a significant realigment" in the international approach 
to the development of human resources and drew attention to the 
role of education in rural development, which was "perhaps the number 
one problem for many developing countries, deserving of higher priority 
than it has been getting" (7). 	 In 1970, the report of the Common- 
wealth Conference on Education in Rural Areas, largely dominated 
by donor agency representatives and British academics, formulated 
what it described as "an alternative strategy" for "broad planning 
in education and rural development for the benefit of the majority 
of the community, the rural masses" (8). 
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In the early 1970s, donors commissioned or supported studies on 
education and rural development, notably the ICED studies on basic 
education for UNICEF (9) and non-formal education for the World 
Bank (10). 	 Reports of international conferences and studies 
commissioned or supported by donors picked up the thread that had 
run through most colonial assessments of education in African 
countries. 	 In their turn, they were critical of existing systems 
of education and questioned their relevance to the 'real' develop- 
mental needs in developing countries. 	 They pointed to the pressing 
economic and social problems of rural poverty and unemployment, 
and they stressed the need for education to be geared to the demands 
of rural change and modernisation. 
The broad logic of the education for rural development strategy 
was straightforward. 	 It started from the proposition that economic 
growth and over-all national development depended on change and 
modernisation in rural areas, and that education and training, in 
the widest sense, was an essential condition in this process. 
It proposed a 'bottom up' as opposed to a 'trickle down' theory 
of economic development. 	 The transformation of the traditional 
rural economy was "necessary to foster growth in other sectors" 
and to generate the wealth on which "can be built in due course 
the social services of health and education which are so needed 
and demanded" (11). 	 It adopted a broader view of "the social and 
economic changes which make up the development process", in which 
economic growth and social equity were linked as complementary 
goals (12). 
Although international conferences and donor studies emphasised 
that the development process was more complex, and the part that 
education could play in this process more conditional, than had 
been supposed (13), in its main essentials the education for rural 
development strategy was an extension and a broadening of the approach 
that had dominated the 1960s. 	 It was still firmly based on the 
assumption that education, as an investment in human resource 
development, was an essential condition for economic growth and 
over-all national development (14). 
	
In the keynote address at 
the 1970 Commonwealth conference (15), the Executive Secretary 
for the UN Economic Commission for Africa argued that the modernisation 
-36- 
of the traditional rural economy depended on investment in education 
and training for the development of a wide range of human resources, 
and that education and training could be "deliberately designed 
as an instrument of economic and social growth" and directed towards 
'satisfying' the most pressing economic and social needs in developing 
countries. 
The education for rural development strategy was based on the idea 
that education, formal and non-formal, could be geared to the 
production of manpower for development, and on the assumption that 
the production of large numbers of skilled people would, at the 
same time, create employment and self employment opportunities 
for them. 	 The planning of education for rural development was seen 
largely in terms of a broader, more eclectic, version of the 1960s 
manpower approach to educational planning. 	 Harbison argued that 
"the assessment of human resource requirements for rural modernisation 
offers a new frontier for manpower planners", along which various 
kinds of formal and non-formal education and training "should be 
regarded as elements of a single effort to develop and utilise the 
nation's manpower for rural transformation" (16). 	 The ICED/World 
Bank study saw the establishment of a rural learning system, 
incorporating formal and non-formal education and training, in terms 
of "a radical new approach" to human resource development directed 
towards the production of the various kinds of manpower to provide 
the wide-ranging craft, technical, and professional skills without 
which the whole process of rural transformation could not take place 
(17). 
In some instances arguments for education for rural development, 
and in particular for the part that non-formal education was 
confidently expected to play in this process, cautioned against 
the danger of assuming that it was a panacea for the problems of 
national development (18). 	 As Courtney and Kutsch (19) pointed 
out, this caution was not always reflected in submissions about 
education for rural development. 	 The tenor of these submissions, 
as well as their underlying assumptions, often bore a striking 
resemblance to the over simplified approach and over optimistic 
expectations which had characterised the international aid approach 
to educational planning in the 1960s. 
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The education for rural development strategy was, if anything, even 
more optimistic in the expectations it encouraged. 	 Education, 
in its widest sense, would bring about the transformation of the 
traditional rural economy. This transformation was seen not only 
in terms of increased productivity and economic growth but also 
in terms of an attack on poverty, ignorance, and disease, the 
eradication of economic and social inequality and injustice, the 
provision of satisfying life and rewarding work for people in rural 
areas, and the improvement of the living standards, the status, 
and the self respect of rural communities (20). 	 The international 
aid approach was still rooted in 'the age of innocence' and education 
was posited as the means to achieve economic growth and national 
prosperity, as a way of solving the most urgent economic and social 
problems in developing countries, and as a way to "restore education's 
flagging reputation as a good investment in development" (21). 
Non-formal and basic education 
Most arguments for education for rural development, as exemplified 
in papers by a senior FAO representative at the 1970 Commonwealth 
conference (22) and in the 1974 World Year Book of Education (23), 
started from the proposition that existing systems of education 
and training were counter-productive and that, if education was 
to be a 'key' element in rural and national development, it would 
need "to undergo major changes both in content and application". 
Formal education and training had a part to play, and the Commonwealth 
conference report argued that it could be used "as a positive and 
constructive force in rural development" (24). 	 But the main emphasis 
in the education for rural development strategy was on finding new 
approaches to education and training for rural people and rural 
development. 	 Two of these new approaches, non-formal and basic edu- 
cation, along with the idea of life-long education, achieved an 
almost ritual significance during the 1970s. 
(a) Non-formal education  
As Fordham (25) and Evans (26) pointed out, the idea of non-formal 
education - as distinct from its practice - was a new phenomenon. 
In practice, non-formal education, described by a wide variety of 
terms (agricultural extension, farmer training, health education, 
adult literacy, community development, and so on) had existed for 
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many years. 	 A whole range of out-of-school educative services, 
promoted by separate ministries and voluntary agencies, had grbwn 
up, often in response to specific needs - better husbandry, better 
hygiene, better family planning, for example. 	 These services 
had been manned by government officers and voluntary agency staff 
who for decades had worked to improve the farming methods, the 
health, the economic livelihood, and the education of people in 
rural areas. 	 Earlier policy documents had recognised the part 
that these out-of-school educative services could play in the 
development of rural areas (27). 	 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the rediscovery of the notion of education for rural development 
gave non-formal education, as a whole, a vastly increased importance 
in educational planning. 
The Kericho conference had outlined an educational strategy for 
rural transformation in which the formal education system would 
be a part, but not the most important part, of a broad, flexible 
approach. 	 The conference report argued that: 
"a more significant contribution to rural development 
can be made by a much strengthened, more clearly thought-out 
and effectively co-ordinated educational service to adults, 
than by alterations in or expansion of the existing system 
of primary and secondary schools. 	 In future, greater 
emphasis should be given to out-of-school education 
relative to formal education than has been true before" 
(28). 
Two years later, the phrase 'non-formal education' was coined and 
Coombs (basing his argument on the inescapable resource limits in 
developing countries and the inability of formal systems of education 
to satisfy an ever increasing popular demand) was calling for greater 
investment from developing countries and donor agencies in non-
formal education (29). 
The 1970 Commonwealth conference proposed a wider, more comprehensive 
programme of education and training for rural adults, supported 
by 'a well-designed system' of education and training for young 
people - for school leavers and drop outs, and for those who had 
never been to school. 	 Mass campaigns for the promotion of adult 
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literacy had met with only limited success during the previous two 
decades. 	 They had lost their initial impetus, political and popular 
support had dwindled, and they had often failed to maintain the 
gains achieved in the earlier stages of their operation. 	 What 
was now proposed was that adult literacy programmes, along the lines 
of the selective and intensive work-oriented approach recently adopted 
by UNESCO in its Experimental World Literacy Programme, should be 
"built into comprehensive programmes for the education and training 
of rural communities". 	 Programmes for the promotion of functional 
literacy, built into vocational training courses and work-oriented 
schemes, would be part of an over-all system of non-formal education 
and training geared to the needs of rural development (30). 
In the early 1970s, there was a remarkable surge of interest in 
the idea of non-formal education (31), fuelled to a considerable 
extent by donor interest and support (32) for the part that non-
formal education and training could be expected to play in the process 
of rural transformation and over-all national development. 	 The 
theme of the 1971 IIEP seminar for UNESCO staff in its regional 
training and research centres and UNESCO educational planning 
'experts' in member states, planning out-of-school education for 
development, reflected 
"an increased awareness of the educational and training 
functions performed outside the traditional school 
structure and a resultant need to broaden the purview 
of educational planning to encompass these activities" 
(33). 
The publication of the ICED studies in 1973 and 1974 gave wider 
currency to the phrase 'non-formal education' and to the idea of 
non-formal education and training for rural development. 
The 1974 ICED/World Bank study argued that non-formal education 
was "an indispensable and potent instrument of rural development", 
and stressed "the urgency of doing more through non-formal means 
to meet the educational needs of rural people and rural development". 
It described non-formal education as more flexible and adaptable 
than formal systems of education, and suggested that even the poorest 
countries would be able to mobilise the resources necessary for 
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"a 	 considerable expansion of non-formal education in rural areas". 
This mobilisation was seen largely in terms of a large-scale, 
nation-wide programme, embracing all the diverse kinds of non-formal 
education and training, and using a wide variety of approaches within 
a 'comprehensive and coherent' strategy for the planning of non-formal 
education for rural development (34). 
The international aid approach regarded non-formal education largely 
in terms of human resource development. 	 Most arguments for non- 
formal education started from the proposition that the human resources 
of the rural areas were a developing country's greatest potential 
asset, and that economic growth and national prosperity depended 
on the development and mobilisation of these resources (35). 
In a paper presented at the Bellagio conferences (36) Miller argued 
that the whole idea of non-formal education was still "essentially 
economic", a human resource approach to national development 
directed towards training a greater variety of workers in more 
diversified programmes and stimulating employment in sectors that 
had been neglected. 	 In a study of education and self employment 
in Kenya (37) King pointed out that most arguments for non-formal 
education were essentially work-oriented. 	 According to the 
education for rural development strategy non-formal education and 
training programmes were intended to provide rural adults and young 
people with the necessary skills (the 'intermediate' or 'appropriate' 
technology) for wage earning or productive self employment. 	 What 
was not made clear was how these employment and self employment 
opportunities were to be generated, and the whole idea of self 
employment remained extremely vague. 
(b) Basic education  
In the early 1970s, the Faure report (38), which had been 
commissioned by UNESCO, gave wide currency to the idea of universal 
basic education. 	 The provision of basic education for all children 
was seen as part of a wider process of the universalisation and 
democratisation of education at all levels. 	 Basic education was 
to be "many sided, designed not only for children and adolescents 
but also for adults, who at any age, may have need of it", part 
of an all encompassing process of life-long education which would 
be available to all on demand. 	 The report described existing 
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education systems as incapable of providing for universal basic 
education, and it echoed the de-schooling arguments of Illich, 
Reimer, and Freire in its proposals that education should be de- 
formalised and de-institutionalised. 	 It argued that the "outmoded 
barrier" between formal and non-formal education must be abolished, 
and it envisaged "a learning society" in which all methods of 
learning would be inter-changeable and recognised as equally valid. 
The 1973 ICED/UNICEF study, in its search for 'new paths to learning 
for rural children and youth', incorporated the idea of universal 
basic education into the education for rural development strategy. 	 It 
argued that the inescapable resource limits constraining further 
expansion of formal systems of education in developing countries 
and the incompatibility between what schools were teaching and what 
rural children and adolescents needed to learn made it inevitable 
that non-formal education would play an increasingly important part 
in the provision of basic education in rural areas. 
	 It proposed 
the adoption of a wide variety of approaches, formal and non-
formal, to meet "the minimum essential learning needs" of young 
people in rural areas within "the broad conceptual framework of 
a life-long learning system". 
	 It argued that every developing 
country, even the poorest, already had the beginnings of such a 
system. 	 Even so, "the building of a multipurpose rural learning 
system" would require "a massive educational effort", which would 
"succeed only if educational resources now geared to a 
narrowly conceived elitist educational establishment 
are redirected to a democratically conceived mass learning 
system designed to provide far greater equality of 
opportunity and achievement to all rural young people" 
(39). 
Arguments for rural learning systems were often characterised by 
ambiguity and contradiction in the use of the term 'basic education'. 
It was seen, often at one and the same time, as primary education 
or minimum learning needs, formal or non-formal education, first 
level or adult education, elementary education or a development 
strategy for the fullest possible utilisation of human resources 
in rural areas, or as any combination of these (40). 	 Nor was it 
always made clear whether non-formal basic education was intended 
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to complement or to provide an alternative to the existing system 
of formal education (41). 	 In spite of ambiguities and contradictions, 
there was what Sheffield described as a generally accepted view 
of 'basic education for the rural masses' (42), for adults as well 
as young people, which according to the ICED studies would "help 
accelerate social and economic development in rural areas" (43). 
Advocacy on behalf of basic education for rural development was 
as generalised and over optimistic as that for non-formal education 
(44). 	 Basic education was expected to provide the rural masses 
with functional literacy and numeracy, basic knowledge for community 
development and civic participation, and basic skills to enable 
adults and young people to find employment and self employment in rural 
areas. 	 It was expected to increase productivity and promote economic 
growth in rural areas, and to cater for the individual needs and 
aspirations of the rural masses. 	 All this was to be achieved 
through a nation-wide programme of low cost mass education. 	 A 
UNICEF conference held in Nairobi in 1974 argued that basic education 
would provide people in rural areas with 'individual fulfillment' 
and make them 'useful citizens and producers' (45). 	 The report 
of a meeting of UNESCO 'experts' in the same year outlined an 
educational strategy in which: 
"First of all, everyone, child or adult, should receive 
a minimum of education - and in many cases this minimum 
is also, for the time being, the maximum that govern-
ments can afford - which will prepare him for life, and 
enable him to be a productive citizen and to fulfill 
his individual potentialities" (46). 
Educational planning  
Coombs argued (47) that the central importance accorded rural change 
and modernisation in national economic and social development, 
and the greater emphasis given to non-formal education in the 
development process, called for a radically new kind of educational 
planning to replace ideas and practices which were no longer 
adequate. 	 This argument, and the terminology in which it was 
presented, bore a striking resemblance to that made for a new kind 
of educational planning in the 1960s and, in the same way, Coombs 
stressed the need for a more comprehensive and better integrated 
-43- 
approach to educational planning. 
Educational planning must be more comprehensive in order to see 
the wide variety of non-formal education and training activities 
as a whole, and in order to encompass and co-ordinate all a country's 
educational activities, formal and non-formal, within a single 
perspective. 	 It must be better integrated in the sense that 
various kinds of education and training must be brought together 
within a coherent national strategy of educational planning, and 
also in the sense that educational planning must be more closely 
linked with national economic and social development planning 
as part of an over-all strategy for rural change and progress. 
This new 	 kind of educational planning must provide a 'rational' 
and 'systematic' approach to ensure the 'orderly' and 'efficient' 
development of a broader more comprehensive system of education 
and training than in the past (48). 
There seemed to be general agreement about the need for "a massive 
educational effort" to develop "a comprehensive and coherent rural 
learning system", in which various kinds of education and training, 
formal and non-formal, would be linked together within national 
procedures for educational planning, 'inter-acting' with and 
'mutually 	 complementing and reinforcing' each other in a variety 
of ways (49). 	 There also appeared to be general agreement 
that, although education was an essential condition for rural 
change and modernisation, it could not by itself "precipitate a 
dynamic process of rural development" (50). 	 It would make its 
most effective contribution as "an instrument of change and 
progress" when it was dovetailed into an over-all pattern of 
integrated development" as part of a 'team' or 'package' approach 
(51) 
The 1970 Commonwealth conference argued that the need for educational 
planning to operate as an integral part of a comprehensive rural 
development strategy required that: 
"any plan for education and training in rural areas 
should be as well integrated as possible, with the 
maximum of operational co-ordination among the various 
agencies involved" (52). 
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At national level, educational planning, closely linked with 
economic planning, should be an integral part .of a comprehensive 
strategy, which would include the work of other ministries and 
other agencies directly involved in rural development. 	 At the 
community level, education, as "a key element in the whole process 
of rural change and development", should be a part of a 'team' 
approach, which would co-ordinate the work of teachers, agricultural 
extension officers, public health personnel, co-operative workers, 
and others "engaged in the education and training of rural people" 
(53). 
Coombs argued forcefully for a 'coherent and consistent' national 
strategy for rural development, in which educational planning 
would be an integral part. 	 At the same time, the planning of 
non-formal education in rural areas, "by its very nature, must be 
de-centralised and brought as close as possible to the scene of 
action". 	 The "previous piecemeal approach" to the planning 
of education and other development programmes in rural areas must 
be abandoned 
"in favour of a systematically planned and integrated 
approach, in which educational elements become closely 
interwoven with all related development factors and 
programs in each area". 
What was needed was "a far more flexible, broad gauged and 
creative kind of planning" to allow "broad participation" in 
decision making at the local level, to harness local support, 
and to ensure that education and training programmes were adapted 
to local needs and conditions (54). 
Proposals for planning education for rural development tended to 
be strong in rhetoric, but weak in suggestions for translating 
this rhetoric into practical terms. 	 Non-formal education was not 
a single, easily categorised activity. 	 Coombs (55) referred to 
the phrase as "a convenient label" for "a bewildering assortment" 
of "many different things". 	 Grandstaff (56) considered it to be 
"too broad to exempt it from ambiguity and contradiction". 	 This 
ambiguity and contradiction was reflected in arguments for linking 
formal and non-formal education and training within a comprehensive 
rural learning system, and in proposals for the planning of an 
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education for rural development. 	 The ICED/UNICEF study argued 
for a multi-purpose, lifelong rural learning system but did little 
more than suggest "a few general guides and criteria" 	 and 
list some "pitfalls to avoid" (57). 
Arguments for a rural learning system and an integrated 'team' approach 
to rural development tended to minimise the formidable organisational 
and political, as well as educational, 	 problems involved in these 
proposals. 	 Apart from references to existing mechanisms for national 
economic planning (58), the community school idea (59), and rural 
training centres along the lines of the Kenya multi-purpose training 
and development centres (60), there was little, if any, indication 
of organisational and institutional structures designed to link 
formal and non-formal education and training programmes or to 
integrate the efforts of different government ministries and other 
agencies, some of which might be outside the direct jurisdiction 
of government. 
There was little indication except in the most general terms, of 
ways and means in which inter-ministerial co-operation and maximum 
operational co-ordination among all agencies involved in the rural 
development effort might be achieved at either central or local 
level. 	 The organisational problems and political tensions which 
might be expected in attempts to develop a flexible, de-centralised 
form of planning at the local level alongside a comprehensive, 
integrated rural development strategy at the central level were 
rarely, if ever, taken into account in proposals characterised 
more by their generality and enthusiasm than by consideration 
of the practical problems of planning and implementation. 
Analysis of the problems associated with the planning of non-
formal/basic education led Evans to emphasise the need for a 
"minimal planning approach, which might be characterised as a 
philosophy of 'less is better'" (61). 
Most proposals for planning education for rural development 
tended to overlook the cogency of two closely linked arguments 
which had been made by earlier commentators. 
	
(These arguments 
are referred to again in chapters 3 and 4). 	 In spite of a long 
history of previous failure and disappointment in even the most 
determined and well organised attempts to gear education to rural 
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development (62), there was still a strong tendency to regard 
educational planning as capable of bringing about the transformation 
of the traditional rural economy. 	 The main reason for the failure 
of previous attempts, as the 1963 report of the Uganda Education 
Commission pointed out (63), was that the problem of the trans-
formation of the traditional rural economy was not primarily 
educational and there was, therefore, little to be gained in 
seeking an educational solution. 	 Without radical changes in 
existing social, economic, and political structures there was 
little 	 that either formal or non-formal education (even when 
linked with complementary measures) could do that would, of 
itself, bring about rural change and modernisation. 
The second of these arguments concerned the response that could 
be expected from the people for whom the rural education package 
was intended. 	 Foster had argued (64) that in the past rural 
populations had resisted attempts to provide rurally biased or 
vocational education. 	 They had regarded such attempts as no 
more than a second best alternative to the path of high status 
and high rewards, and they had recognised that acceptance of an 
alternative education for rural areas was likely to sustain 
existing inequalities and disadvantage them even further. 	 While 
ever rural areas remained unproductive, unreformed, and unattractive, 
rural parents and children would continue to reject rurally 
biased education programmes and to opt for and insist on the more 
vocational bias of formal academic education. 	 There was 
nothing to indicate that proposals for non-formal/basic education 
and comprehensive rural learning strategies would be any more 
acceptable to rural populations, or that such proposals would 
meet the legitimate aspirations of rural parents and children, 
or in some way tie them to the land (65). 
Aid for education 
During the 1960s, the bulk of aid to education had gone to 
secondary and post-secondary education and training for the pro-
duction of high-level manpower for the modern sector of the 
economy. 
	
Donor support for education for rural development 
and for non-formal education and training had been limited, and 
was generally offered through the agriculture, community development, 
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or health sectors, rather than the education sector. 	 British 
colonial administrations had a well established tradition of 
support for community development programmes and for rural trade 
and farm schools which had been continued through British aid 
into the 1960s. 	 FAO had provided assistance for non-formal and 
basic education for farming communities, ILO for non-formal 
training in rural skills, and WHO for non-formal health education 
programmes in rural areas. 	 UNICEF had provided assistance for 
non-formal basic education for rural communities. 	 UNESCO had 
supported 	 programmes for 'fundamental education' in the 1950s 
and initiated work oriented literacy programmes in the 1960s. 
In the 1970s, many major multilateral and bilateral donors attempted 
to link such efforts to the education systems of developing 
countries under new schemes of 'education for rural development' 
or 'basic education'. 
(a) Education for rural development  
In the early 1970s, donors declared a commitment, in one form or 
another, to the idea of non-formal/basic education for rural 
development and expressed a willingness to allocate a greater 
proportion of their budgets for this purpose. 	 UNESCO expressed 
a growing concern for universal basic education provided through 
a flexible system of formal and non-formal education (66). 	 The 
World Bank expresssed its preparedness to allocate 27 per cent 
of its education budget to basic and non-formal education and 
training (67). 	 UNICEF gave priority to non-formal education and 
the provision of a package of basic essential learning needs for 
rural communities, and USAID made strenuous efforts to redirect 
its aid for education away from post-secondary education and 
training towards the reform and expansion of formal and non-
formal education in rural areas (68). 
In 1970, the British Government issued a White Paper on Aid to Educa-
tion in Developing Countries which stressed the "importance of 
patterns of education and training which will foster rural 
development". 	 These patterns included the revision of primary 
school curricula, increased support for rural schools and for 
non-formal vocational training programmes, and "an increase in 
efforts devoted to adult education, linked with rural development 
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schemes" (69). 
	
A further White Paper in 1975 contained a formal 
commitment to focusing aid on the world's poorest, and it placed 
special emphasis on the need for integrated rural development 
programmes aimed at increased productivity in rural areas and a 
more equitable distribution of wealth (70). 
	
During the 1970s, 
most donors declared a commitment to directing aid for education 
to helping the rural masses, attacking poverty, and reducing social 
and economic inequality through integrated rural development 
programmes (71). 
Declarations of commitment to programmes of integrated rural 
development were reflected in donor attempts to broaden the 
perspective of their aid programmes and to regard aid for education 
as an integral part of a comprehensive strategy for aid for over-all 
national development (72). 	 The idea of the country programme, 
which governed the provision of aid through the UN system from 
the early 1970s, reflected an attempt to integrate aid for 
development across sectors. 	 Country programming was an attempt 
to programme aid at the country level rather than at the head-
quarters of the various UN agencies and, in this way, to ensure 
that the needs of the different sectors could be considered and 
assessed in an integrated manner so that aid for one sector would 
support, and be supported by, aid for other sectors of the economy. 
It was also an attempt to ensure that the needs of individual 
countries could be considered in relation to the needs of other 
countries, and that special consideration was given to the least 
developed countries (73). 
The ILO World Employment Programme's basic needs approach was 
an attempt to examine the entire development strategy of a country 
from the point of view of its effect on employment and income 
distribution. 	 ILO studies using this approach (74) emphasised 
the significance of the informal economic sector in over-all 
national development. 
	 They proposed greater investment in those 
sectors which would involve more people in productive employment 
and lead towards a more equitable distribution of income, and 
they stressed the need for the development of 'intermediate' or 
'appropriate' technology to improve the productivity of the rural 
and traditional sectors. 
	 They argued for an integrated approach 
to development in which education and training would be geared to 
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rural development and the needs of rural communities. 
The education for rural development strategy appeared to offer 
African countries an alternative path to economic growth and 
national prosperity, and a way of solving, or at least containing, 
their most pressing economic and social problems. 	 King argued 
(75) that proposals for education for rural development were being 
urged more by external agencies and external observers than by 
local people in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but that "within 
a very few years local decision makers,• commissions of inquiry 
and politicians had begun to stress similar themes very forcefully". 
When Nyerere published Education for Self-Reliance in 1967, he was 
virtually alone among 	 LDC leaders and governments in attempting 
to promote a coherent approach to rural education. 	 A decade later, 
there was widespread interest in the education for rural development 
strategy as evidenced in national policy documents (drawn up with 
the advice and assistance of international 'experts') and a wide 
variety of experimental approaches (largely supported by donor 
efforts) which included the vocationalisation and diversification 
of curricula, attempts to make schools self-reliant production 
units, village polytechnics, 'vocational centres', 'continuation 
schools', 'production brigades', and the use of schools as rural 
education and traning centres. 
Although there were shifts in emphasis in priorities for aid to 
education, donors still regarded education, whether formal or 
non-formal, primarily in terms of human resource development. Donors 
still saw the diversification of secondary education and, the 
development of vocational and technical schools as having a 
critical. part to play in the production of manpower for development. 
The UK 1970 White Paper gave priority "to a selective and diversified 
system of secondary education with much more emphasis on the 
vocational and technical streams" closely linked with the manpower 
needs of the urban and rural sectors, and to non-formal vocational 
training programmes to complement the work of rural trade and 
farm schools in providing the necessary manpower for the 
traditional rural sector (76). 
	
Psacharopoulos described 
educational 	 planning as still dominated by the manpower approach 
(77), and Hurst described the "conventional rationale" for the 
provision of aid for education as still resting squarely on the 
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human capital theory and the promotion of economic growth (78). 
(b) The World Bank Education Sector Working Paper 1974  
The 1974 World Bank Education Sector Working Paper is discussed 
in some detail for two reasons. 	 The first is that it summarises 
the shift in emphasis in donor policies and priorities, and the 
persistence of the main features of the international aid approach 
in the 1960s. 	 The second is that the main features of the working 
paper were incorporated into Swaziland's third education plan, 
which is discussed in detail in the Swazi case study. 
The Bank had been 	 one of the most enthusiastic and influential 
exponents of the policy of maximising education's contribution 
to economic growth through the expansion of secondary and post-
secondary education to produce the high-level manpower for the 
development of the modern sector of the economy. 	 The 1974 working 
paper described this policy as having been largely irrelevant to 
the real needs of developing countries. 	 It endorsed the alternative 
development strategy of education for rural transformation, and 
it adopted a broader view of development which took social as well 
as economic considerations into account and which was directed 
towards the alleviation of poverty and the equalisation of social 
and economic opportunity as well as the promotion of economic 
growth (79). 
At the same time, as Williams argued in a critical analysis of 
the 1974 working paper's policies and proposals, there was 
"throughout a tendency to regard education primarily as 
an instrument to provide skills needed by the economy.... 
The principle enunciated at the beginning of the working 
paper, that the social dimensions of development are 
as important as the economic, is in fact given little 
practical expression in the discussion of the content 
and style of education" (80). 
The working paper declared a commitment to basic and non-formal 
education as instruments for the transformation of the traditional 
rural economy. 
	 The Bank was prepared to support the provision 
of universal basic education, as soon as the course of development 
required, through the expansion of the formal system of primary 
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education or through a combination of primary education and a 
variety of non-formal schemes which would supplement rather than 
rival the formal system. 	 Basic education was seen as instrumental 
in "increasing the productivity as well as improving the opportunities 
of underprivileged groups", and as 
"a means by which the minimum learning needs of the masses 
will be met so as to ensure effective participation in 
the development process by all" (81). 
Education was still regarded primarily as a basic factor in economic 
growth. 	 Meeting the demand for critical skills for economic 
development was still a major objective, and the Bank would 
continue to finance secondary education and training to the extent 
that it met the needs for vocational and professional skills in 
both the urban and rural sectors of the economy. 	 Past policies 
had led to an over expansion of secondary education and the problem 
of unemployed school leavers. 	 At the same time, developing 
countries had critical shortages of educated manpower in specific 
categories. 	 Secondary education must be more closely linked with 
job requirements by giving greater emphasis to vocational and 
technical schools and through the vocationalisation of the curriculum 
in secondary schools (82). 
The Bank's lending policy would take account of the "terminal 
nature of the lower levels of education for the majority of the 
participants" and of the need for further education and training 
beyond the basic level to be "selectively and carefully planned" 
to improve the knowledge and skills necessary for the "performance 
of economic, social, and other developmental roles". 	 Secondary 
and higher education would have to be rationed through the 
establishment of controls to limit access to certain kinds and 
levels of education. 	 Access to secondary education, for example, 
could be based on assessment of ability. 	 Bank policy would take 
account of the "tendency to generate surpluses of educated manpower" 
and "point out the need for explicit government policies on rationing 
and pricing secondary education" (83). 
The working paper continued to place major emphasis on the manpower 
approach to educational planning. 	 The scope and perspective of 
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manpower analysis would be broadened to ensure a fuller use of 
available human resources by including the lower level skills 
necessary to promote and sustain economic growth in rural areas. 
The Bank was prepared to support the development of skills for rural 
areas through the ruralisation and vocationalisation of formal 
education as part of a broader strategy which would include the 
development of non-formal schemes as parallel or alternative 
programmes. 	 These non-formal programmes would have to be functional, 
part of a total delivery system, and integrated with other rural 
development activities at national and local level (84). 
The Bank declared a basic commitment to the idea of 'education and 
equity' (85). 	 Throughout the working paper there was a tendency 
to regard the goals of economic growth and social equity as 
consistent and complementary. 	 The Bank's strategy was based 
on the assumption that the "development of human resources not only 
helps to alleviate poverty but also contributes significantly to 
growth in national productivity and income", and its lending 
policy was to be directed towards the fullest possible equalisation 
of educational opportunities "in the interests of both increased 
productivity and social equity" (86). 
The Bank acknowledged that it had little idea how many developing 
countries would be willing or able to "undertake the radical changes" 
proposed in the working paper and "which many external observers 
consider necessary" (87), and it gave little indication of how 
its proposals were to be implemented. 	 Williams pointed out that 
the Bank's idea of a comprehensive educational package for rural 
development meeting all the needs of an area or group of individuals 
implied "an omniscience and an organisational sophistication" that 
would be difficult to achieve (88). 
(c) Scepticism 
The editors of the 1974 World Year Book of Education described 
an "air of scepticism" which permeated educational planning in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and which coincided with the rediscovery 
of the notion of education for rural development (89). 	 As indicated 
at various points throughout this chapter, this sceptical trend 
persisted throughout the 1970s. 
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The education for rural development strategy was accompanied by 
arguments that it presented an over simplified model of development, 
its underlying assumptions rested on shaky empirical foundations, 
its ambitious scenarios were either impracticable or would not 
produce the results expected of them, and the twin foundations 
of economic development and social equity on which it was based 
were competing rather than complementary strategies (90). 	 Linked 
with these arguments was the notion that education served to 
reproduce rather than change existing social and economic structures. 
Critiques of the education for rural development strategy argued 
that proposals for rural learning systems and basic/non-formal 
education would lead to two separate but unequal education 
systems, reflecting and sustaining rather than reducing economic 
and social inequality (91). 
Arguments that the problems of economic and social change were noL 
primarily educational and that education, far from being the most 
important element in the development process, had only a limited 
role to play (92) gained wider currency. 	 Colclough and Hallak 
suggested that educational reform depended on rather than brought 
about economic and social change (93). 	 Court and King referred 
to a "widespread recognition of the extent to which education -
both formal and non-formal - is shaped and the possibility of 
reform circumscribed by the political and economic institutions 
in a country" (94). 	 Bacchus reiterated the conclusions of the 
Uganda Education Commission in arguing that any attempt at rural 
transformation "must start with radical changes in the existing 
social and economic system" (95). 
Before the end of the 1970s, it was clear that most attempts to 
gear education, formal and non-formal, to rural development had 
ended, as in the past, in failure and disappointment. 	 Evans 
described the international aid approach as having 
"been highlighted by persistent failures to make any 
appreciable progress in either economic development or 
educational advances for the majority of the world's 
peoples trapped in rural poverty" (96). 
Todaro argued that claims that education 
-54- 
"would accelerate economic growth; 	 that it would raise 
levels of living, especially for the poor; 	 that it would 
generate widespread and equal employment opportunities 
for all ... have been shown to be greatly exaggerated 
and, in many instances, simply false" (97). 
In a later review of problems associated with vocational education 
in developing countries, Lillis and Hogan concluded that attempts 
to diversify education systems to meet the needs of rural development 
using formal and non-formal approaches had "over-all a very poor 
track record of success" (98). 	 The report of the 1982 Harare 
conference described a situation in African countries in which the 
linear expansion of existing systems of secondary education had 
been accompanied by continuing shortages of trained and qualified 
manpower, particularly middle level technicians and skilled 
workers, 	 while at the same time there were growing numbers of 
jobless school leavers (99). 
Recognitiion of "a conspicuous and alarming history of failures" 
in educational planning, and reference to critiques of its concepts 
and methodologies, led Weiler to describe educational planning at 
the end of the 1970s as moving away from an 'age of innocence' 
towards an 'an age of scepticism' (100). 	 In the preface to the 
report of a seminar on educational planning and social change held 
in 1978, the Director of the IIEP suggested that, after some twenty 
years during which educational planning had "been looked upon with 
general favour throughout the world", it had " now become the 
fashion to be sceptical of any attempt to rationalise the 
operation and development of educational systems". 	 The main 
reason 	 for this shift in thinking about educational planning 
stemmed from the over expectations which were placed on educational 
planning and the over simplified vision of the relationship 
between education and economic and social change (101). 
The next chapter examines some characteristic features of donor 
intervention through the provision of aid for education in African 
countries. 	 Consideration of the relationship between educational 
planning and economic and social change is taken up again in 
chapter 3, and more fully in chapter 4. 
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3 DONOR INTERVENTION 
There was considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance 
within the donor community. 	 Aid for education was shaped to a 
large extent by the separate traditions and corporate styles of 
the various donor agencies and their preferences for working in 
particular countries and for providing particular kinds of assistance. 
There were considerable differences in the nature and the scale 
of recipient needs arising out of differences in the pattern and 
development of their education systems and in the state of their 
financial and human resources. 	 Patterns of aid provision, conditioned 
by donor policies, recipient needs, and the amount of aid available 
for education, varied from country to country, and changed over 
the years in response to shifts in donor policies and changes in 
recipient needs and the availability of aid. 
At the same time, there was a sense in which the various donor 
agencies saw themselves, and were seen by others, as an international 
aid community, linked by strong similarities in policy and common 
concerns for the most effective use of the aid they provided. 
There was a strong donor tendency to search for generalisable 
solutions to educational and developmental problems in recipient 
countries, and to design projects which could be replicated across 
the variety of settings and the diverse conditions in African 
countries. 	 The specific array of donors and their 'experts' 
brought to bear on national education systems varied from country 
to country and over time, but at any given time similar projects 
funded by a single donor or by different agencies could be found 
in many African countries. 	 During the 1960s and 1970s, for 
example, most donors supported projects and programmes for the 
diversification and vocationalisation of secondary curricula, 
and the World Bank funded an array of secondary curriculum 
diversification projects, which were markedly similar, in many 
African countries. 
The account that follows recognises the diversity of forms and styles 
of assistance, but it deals mainly with the common concerns and 
the generalised approach which characterised donor intervention 
in African countries. 	 It describes the main features of what 
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King (1) referred to as the responsible interventionism of donor 
agencies, and notes the influence it was expected to exert. 	 It 
examines the restrictions imposed on donor intervention by 
inadequacies in the planning and management of aid on the donor 
as well as the recipient side, and by critical limitations in 
the internatonal aid approach to educational planning. 	 A final 
section refers to the issue of aid and dependency. 	 As indicated 
in the references cited in the text, the broad issues raised in 
this account have been persistent features of donor intervention 
in African countries. 
Responsible interventionism  
The first part of this section describes the common concerns that 
shaped the donor approach to aid negotiations, and some of the 
problems faced by recipient countries in responding to this 
approach. 	 The second describes the importance donors attached 
to aid for educational planning. 
(a) The aid dialogue  
The context of the aid dialogue required that it should appear to 
be between equal 'partners in development', with full recognition 
of the sovereign rights of recipient countries, and with donors 
responding to requests for assistance in the achievement of 
nationally 	 formulated goals and objectives (2). 	 But the various 
donors had their own policies and procedures which determined the 
kind of assistance they were prepared to offer, and the ways in 
which they were prepared to provide it. 	 They entered aid 
negotiations with their own views on educational needs and priorities, 
and they specified, in various degrees of detail, projects and 
activities they were prepared to support (3). 
	
As Phillips (4) 
has pointed out, developing countries, by the very fact that they 
were recipient countries, were not in a position to control 
completely the nature and the conditions attached to aid for education, 
and the provision and administration of aid was largely controlled 
by donor priorities and donor procedures. 
The nature and the persistence of the fundamental tension which 
characterised the international aid approach is neatly illustrated 
in donor agency documentation. 	 A 1972 SIDA policy document on 
-64- 
Aid and Education (5) contained a basic commitment to the idea of 
responding to national goals and priorities and, at the same time, 
made it clear what educational policies and priorities SIDA was 
prepared to support. 	 The World Bank 1971 and 1974 education sector 
working papers (6) stressed the need for more continuous dialogue 
and closer co-operation to ensure that projects were agreed 
between the Bank and its member countries, but the account of Bank 
lending policy left member countries in no doubt as to what policies 
and priorities the Bank would support. 	 The 1984 ODA document on 
British aid (7) emphasised that "Aid is based on discussions 
and negotiations with partner governments so that the assistance 
offered represents an agreed view of needs and priorities". 	 At 
the same time, it listed the needs and priorities ODA was prepared 
to support and made it clear what kind of assistance ODA was 
prepared to provide. 
Donor commitment to the theory of responsiveness was tempered by 
their own views on 'what was best' for education in developing 
countries, an understandable interest in ensuring that the aid they 
provided was used as effectively as possible, and a concern for 
what were seen as persistent weaknesses in educational planning 
and management in developing countries. 	 The kind of aid donors 
were prepared to offer was conditioned by their own policies and 
procedures and their own analysis of a recipient country's 
educational needs and priorities. 	 They required assurances that 
the aid they provided would be used to support policies of which 
they approved and that, when provided, it would be properly 
administered and accounted for (8). 	 Hurst referred to 
"a conflict between seeing that aid is spent efficiently 
on approved purposes, on the one hand, and encroaching 
on the sovereign rights of a nation to self determination 
on the other" (9). 
King pointed out that "In crude terms, in the trade-off between 
sovereignty and accountability, it frequently transpires that the 
donor knows best" and, as aid negotiations were ultimately loaded 
in favour of the aid giver, the aid dialogue was largely controlled 
by the various donor agencies (10). 
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Donor concern for accountability was linked with an equally strong 
concern that the aid they provided should have the maximum possible 
impact, and be seen to have the maximum possible impact (11). 
Donors 	 searched for situations in which their aid would have 
what was referred to as a 'multiplier effect'. 	 They looked for 
institution building projects, for pilot schemes and experimental 
models which could be replicated across the system, for the placement 
of 'experts' and 'advisers' in what ODA described as key parts 
of the education system, concentrating on "finding important 
pressure points" within the education system (12). 	 They 
designed comprehensive package projects in which as many critical 
factors as possible were covered, and which relied increasingly 
on the availability of 'experts' and the appointment of a senior 
'experts' with over-all responsibility for project implementation. 
They insisted on project identification and appraisal missions; 
detailed definition of project objectives, activities, inputs and 
outputs spelled out in joint agreements; regular reporting 
procedures; 	 the drawing up of work plans and the setting of 
deadlines; careful attention to accounting procedures and the 
disbursement of project funds; 	 and regular monitoring and evaluation 
missions (13). 
Donors sought to improve the effectiveness of their aid programmes 
through collaboration between the various agencies and the co- 
ordination of their efforts. 	 The 1970 White Paper on British aid 
(14) outlined a strategy for closer collaboration among donors and 
more co-ordination between their aid programmes. 	 OECD reports 
on development and co-operation (15) called for a more flexible 
approach to the provision of aid and for closer co-ordination among 
donors to avoid competition and duplication of effort. 	 These 
themes, examined in detail in a paper by Phillips (16), ran as 
a constant thread through the report of the 1972-74 Bellagio 
conferences. 	 There was a tendency for donors to see themselves, 
and to be seen by others, as a 'development community' (17), a 
'donor fraternity' (18). 	 Meetings of the Bellagio (later IWGE) 
group and the DAC committee of the OECD were designed to provide 
regular channels for international co-operation and to develop 
an integrated approach to the problems of development in recipient 
countries. 	 There were also occasional inter-agency review seminars 
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held by the IIEP, specialist sector reviews, and one-off events 
ranging from the Ditchley conference in 1964 to the 1984 Windsor 
conference. 
UNDP country programming was an attempt to co-ordinate the efforts 
of the various UN agencies across sectors, and to involve recipient 
countries more closely in project identification and appraisal. 
The ILO studies of a country's entire development strategy (19) 
provided donors with a basis for collaboration and co-ordination 
of their efforts. 	 Other moves towards co-operation included 
joint programmes and co-operative agreements such as those 
between UNESCO and UNICEF and UNESCO and the World Bank, and the 
generation of joint projects such as those financed by SIDA and 
executed by various UN agencies. 	 Whatever the intention, the 
danger with such an approach was that it could be regarded as further 
strengthening donor control of the aid dialogue, encouraging 
donors in attempts to influence domestic policies, and, as the 
World Bank pointed out (20), usurping a recipient country's 
responsibility for the planning and co-ordination of aid. 
Donor attitudes and procedures were shaped by what they regarded 
as serious inadequacies in educational planning and management 
in recipient countries. 	 The World Bank's conclusion that the most 
pervasive weakness in education in developing countries was in its 
planning and management, and its preoccupation with the need to 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their education and 
training systems (21), reflected widely held views which were 
expressed, with various degrees of emphasis, in donor agency 
documents and commentaries on aid for education (22). 	 There was 
a general acceptance among donors of the need to strengthen 
educational planning and management in developing countries to enable 
them to "sharpen their participation" in the aid dialogue, 
develop their capacity for project identification and implementation, 
and improve the planning and co-ordination of aid on the recipient 
side (23). 
In a lead paper at the 1984 Windsor conference, organised jointly 
by ODA and the University of London Institute of Education, King 
argued that the interest in accountability was "further evidence 
of donors feeling that education somehow has got out of control", 
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and referred to "a widespread feeling that education is being 
mismanaged" and "very strong agency concerns" for what was seen 
as a "decay in professionalism" and a lack of commitment in ministries 
of education and in education systems in developing countries. 
One result was an intensified donor search for projects which 
would be administration proof and system proof and for more rigorous 
procedures which would ensure the successful operation and 
implementation of the projects they funded (24). 
Donors required copious and detailed information to support 
requests for aid. 	 Each agency had its own style, its own 
procedures, and its own format, and requirements varied from donor 
to donor and from project to project. 	 The need to comply with 
donor procedures, often characterised by 'cumbersome complexity 
and unwieldiness', and with the different criteria and agenda 
insisted upon by the various agencies placed an immense strain on 
what were already inadequate systems of planning and management. 
Developing countries were not equipped to provide the various 
donors with the information and the documentation they required, 
and the preparation of project documentation was taken over, more 
often than not, by short-term technical missions sent out by the 
various agencies to advise and assist in the identification and 
appraisal of priority projects and, in some instances, by longer-
term 'experts' provided to advise and assist in educational 
planning. 	 A great deal of agency time was taken up in identifying 
suitable projects, in some cases ready made projects, and in 
'ventriloquising' requests for them (25). 
The diversity of forms and styles of assistance appeared to offer 
recipient countries opportunities for selecting from the different 
kinds of assistance those projects and approaches which best served 
their needs and interests. 	 It also appeared to suggest that it 
might be possible for a recipient country to play one donor off 
against another, and so assume some measure of control over the 
aid dialogue. 	 But the different kinds of assistance offered by 
the various donors created problems for recipient countries. 
As Clifton-Everest pointed out in a background paper at the 1984 
Windsor conference (26), the different procedures required by a 
variety of donors could all too readily appear as "an impenetrable 
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bureaucracy", and the names used by the various agencies to describe 
the kinds of assistance they were prepared to offer were "notoriously 
confusing". 	 The variety of approaches and procedures often made 
it difficult for recipient countries to understand exactly what 
kinds of assistance were available, how they could be most profitably 
used, and what conditions were attached to their provision. 
Sectoral agreements intended to ensure a more effective use of 
aid and to involve recipient countries more closely in project 
identification and appraisal (27) appeared to offer a solution, 
but the position of the recipient country might be much more 
compromised with sectoral agreements than with aid negotiated on 
a project by project basis. 	 With sectoral agreements 
"the recipient is sometimes in danger of becoming so 
constrained that he no longer has any freedom of choice 
about the course of development at all. 	 The effect 
of most sectoral aid agreements is to package the donor's 
offer of aid and thereby strengthen his negotiating 
position. 	 Aid is offered on an all or none basis. 
The recipient either accepts all the donor's terms or 
he receives nothing" (28). 
Clifton-Everest suggested that there were two kinds of conditions 
attached to the provision of aid. 	 On the one hand, there were 
"the conditions of use defined by the activities or policies that 
a donor considers worthy of support", and which have been referred 
to in earlier paragraphs. 	 On the other, there were the broader 
conditions "which might entail an undertaking to follow certain 
policies or to implement certain administrative changes". 	 It 
was clear that donors 
"have wanted to vet recipients' development programmes, 
and to limit their support to those projects and activities 
which, in their view, could be justified as part of a 
sound strategy for the sector. 	 Some donors have 
wanted to go even further than this, and to negotiate 
changes in the recipient's development plan beyond 
those areas in which they were willing to give support" 
(29). 
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The Zambian Ministry of Education report of a World Bank project 
carried out in the mid-1960s and early 1970s described the problems 
arising out of the conditions attached to the provision of aid, 
and the need to comply with Bank requirements and procedures which 
proved to be beyond the capacities and experience of local people 
to handle. 	 It referred to the "policy changes demanded by 
representatives of the Bank as a condition of loan assistance", 
described how "at a political level there was considerable 
resentment at what was interpreted as the Bank's unwarranted 
attempts to influence domestic policies", and concluded that "the 
influence of outside agencies in policy making has been rather 
substantial" (30). 	 In a case study of a similar project in Sierra 
Leone, Wright noted that local officials felt that the Bank had 
imposed unacceptable constraints and attempted to influence 
government policy, and concluded that diversification of the 
secondary school curriculum "was not so much a 	 policy formulated 
by the government as one thrust upon it" in connection with an 
external project (31). 
(b) Aid for educational planning  
As already indicated, donors had their own criteria which governed 
their provision of aid for education. 	 In the mid-1960s a senior 
World Bank official made it clear that consideration of requests 
for aid depended upon the preparation of "a comprehensive, well 
balanced, practical education plan". 	 The Bank needed 	 to be 
satisfied that steps had been taken to make the education and 
training system "effective and efficient", and it would "expect 
to find arrangements made for exercising a continuous planning 
function" and for the "efficient co-ordination of aid received 
from various sources". 	 Project identification and appraisal 
would be characterised by a "hard-boiled insistence on sound 
project priorities and adequate project planning and implementation" 
(32). 	 Approaches by other agencies might have been less hard- 
boiled, but donors shared (33), and still share (34), a strong 
concern for evidence of a sound framework of educational planning 
to support requests for aid and to ensure the most effective use 
of the aid that was provided. 
There was a general tendency on the part of donors to assume that 
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an understanding of the basic concepts of educational planning 
and a mastery of its often sophisticated methods and techniques 
demanded a particular kind of expertise and a high degree of 
technical competence (35). 	 Developing countries were not equipped 
to undertake the kind of educational planning and manpower analysis 
donors required to support proposals for aid. 	 Nor had they 
developed the 	 capacity for effective planning and management of 
the education system, or for efficient administration and co- 
ordination of aid. 	 The introduction and operation of educational 
planning in developing countries has depended on external assistance 
in the form of short-term missions and longer-term 'experts' 
provided by UNESCO and other agencies (36). 	 There was an acute 
shortage of 'expert' personnel in the initial stages of aid for 
educational planning and, as Curle (37) pointed out, many of the 
'experts' sent out to advise and assist developing countries 
in the early 1960s lacked the necessary experience and expertise. 
Coombs has described the determined attempt, made during the 
1960s, to remedy this situation. 	 International agencies gave 
educational planning a top priority, training programmes were 
established, research was undertaken, and a growing body of 
professional literature emerged. 	 UNESCO was the main catalyst 
in this movement, particularly as it related to educational 
planning in developing countries. 	 Between 1960 and 1963, it 
established a network of regional training and research centres 
in Latin America, Asia, the Arab States, and Africa. 	 In 1963 
(with the co-operation of the World Bank, the Ford Foundation, and 
the French Government) it founded the International Institute for 
Educational Planning (IIEP) in Paris (38). 
Since its foundation the IIEP has had a significant impact on the 
theory and practice of educational planning in developing countries. 
It promoted basic research, developed and disseminated the concepts 
and methodologies of educational planning, trained educational 
planning 'experts' for international service, and provided training 
programmes to help recipient countries develop their own capacity 
for educational planning. 
	 It became a meeting ground and exchange 
centre for officials and academics from universities and other 
organisations that were developing their own research and training 
programmes. 
	 It provided a centre for international conferences 
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and seminars, and it produced a stream of reports, case studies, 
occasional papers, and major publications on various aspects of 
educational planning. 	 It was largely instrumental in establishing 
what was described as "an international community of educational 
planners" (39), and in encouraging the notion of an international 
aid approach to educational planning. 
During the 1960s UNESCO, on its own and in co-operation with the 
World Bank, sent out short-term missions to advise developing 
countries on administrative requirements for educational development, 
including the establishment of educational planning units in 
ministries of education; 	 to "assist in the selection of priority 
areas" in their education plans; 	 and to advise and assist in the 
identification and appraisal of priority projects for donor financing. 
During the same period UNESCO provided longer-term resident 'experts' 
to advise and assist developing countries in target setting, the 
planning and financing of education, and the preparation of 
education plans (40). 
	
Other organisations, notably the Ford 
Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation, sent out 'experts' to 
assist in the preparation of manpower plans and in the establishment 
of educational priorities (41). 	 During the 1970s and into the 
1980s the operation of educational planning in developing countries 
continued to depend, to a considerable extent, on the availability 
of 'experts' provided by UNESCO and other agencies to advise and 
assist in the planning and management of the education system, 
the drawing up of national education plans, and the planning and 
co-ordination of aid, supported by 'experts' in manpower analysis 
and short-term missions and consultants sent out to undertake 
specific planning tasks (42). 
The importance donors attached to aid for educational planning was 
shaped, and still is shaped, by their concern for the most effective 
use of the aid they provided, and by an equally strong and 
persistent concern for the weaknesses in educational planning 
and management in developing countries. 	 What was described as 
a decline in already inadequate systems of planning and management 
(43) sharpened the issue of aid for educational planning. 	 The 
report of the 1984 Windsor conference noted that the importance 
of aid for educational planning was a common feature of all donor 
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agency reports, and so obvious as to need little elaboration. 
It stressed the need for substantial, and better directed, donor 
assistance to develop the capacity in African countries for the 
planning and management of the education system, and for the 
planning and management of aid (44). 
The impact of donor intervention  
Aid for education was, by its very nature, designed to have an 
influence in the planning and development of education in African 
countries, whether or not this intention was made explicit (45), 
and however hard-boiled or diplomatic the donor approach might 
be. 	 African and expatriate observers, cited below, have described 
donor intervention as exerting a considerable influence, in some 
instances a decisive influence, in educational planning and 
development in African countries. 	 The Zambian Ministry of Education 
report and the Sierra Leone case study, already referred to, 
described how the World Bank insisted on its own procedures for 
project identification, appraisal, and implementation, demanded 
changes in existing administrative arrangements, and exerted 
substantial influence in the formulation of educational policy 
(46). 
The Director of Educational Planning in Upper Volta described how 
external aid was channelled almost entirely through projects 
identified and drawn up by visiting missions, implemented through 
technical assistance, and controlled and monitored by agency procedures 
over which the Ministry of Education had little or no control. 
The preparation of the education plan was conditioned, to a 
large extent, by the availability of external aid and the inclusion 
of projects that donors were prepared to support, and the role of 
national educational planners was restricted to providing data 
and servicing the needs of visiting missions and consultants, and 
assisting in the preparation of project dossiers. 	 Attempts at 
planning on the recipient side became "meaningless", and the funds 
obtained through aid for education bore "no relationship to what 
is lost in terms of independence and coherent national policy" (47). 
In an assessment of the impact of international assistance 
organisations on the development of education Spaulding maintained 
that "no one can dispute the fact that assistance organisations 
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have been and are influencing" the planning and development of 
education in developing countries 
"both in terms of the kind of educational programmes 
receiving priority and in terms of how these programmes 
are implemented and adopted. 	 This is done through 
the various policies adopted by the various assistance 
organisations ... and through the way such agencies manage 
technical assistance activities, capital loans and other 
grants, once they agree to assist a government". 
In some instances, donor agencies appeared to exercise a decisive 
influence in over-all educational policy formulation, planning, 
programming, and implementation; 	 in others influence was brought 
to bear through a "more project centred impact". 	 Whatever 	 kind 
of influence was brought to bear, donor policies had an impact on 
the planning and development of education in developing countries 
far out of proportion to the amount of actual aid provided (48). 
In the report of a 1977 IIEP seminar on educational planning and 
social change and in articles on education and development Weiler 
argued that the planning of education in developing countries 
was largely determined by their dependence on external aid, and 
the imposition by donor agencies of international models of 
educational planning. 	 Dependence on external funding imposed 
severe limitations on a recipient country's ability to act 
independently in shaping the future of its education system. 
The availability of resources for education, and the establishment 
of priorities for the allocation of these resources, was largely 
determined by donor policies and procedures and their preference 
for projects in particular sectors of the education system. 
The formulation of a coherent national education policy was 
impossible where external donors brought their own perspectives 
to bear on the policy making process in developing countries (49). 
Donor policies were not always translated into practice, donor 
projects and programmes were not always fully implemented, and aid 
for education did not always have the determining influence 
ascribed to it in the commentaries referred to above. 	 The impact 
of donor funded projects and programmes was restricted by 
inadequacies in the planning and administration of aid on the 
-74-- 
donor as well as the recipient side. 	 The responsible interventionism 
and operational persistence of donor agencies rested on the 
assumption that donors knew 'what was best' for recipient countries, 
and that they could provide the expertise, as well as the financing, 
to ensure that 'what was best' would be effectively and efficiently 
implemented. 	 As Hurst (50) has pointed out, the idea of technical 
assistance presupposed that 'donors knew how to do it and recipient 
countries didn't'. 	 The limited documentation that is available 
suggests that this was not always the case. 
Reviews of aid for education in the 1960s noted that developing 
countries were not equipped to control the aid dialogue or to make 
selective and systematic use of available external aid. 	 At the 
same time, donor capacity to provide constructive assistance was 
underdeveloped. 	 Donor agencies had limited and not always 
relevant experience and expertise on which to draw and their 
administration and management of external aid was often less than 
adequate (51). 	 There was no positive attempt, on either the 
donor or recipient side, to plan the co-ordination of external aid. 
Donor agencies competed with each other for projects, they funded 
projects which transferred foreign models which were inappropriate 
and expensive, and they established projects that advocated rival 
educational philosophies and different educational standards. 
They provided, and developing countries accepted, aid that generated 
additional recurrent costs and which involved interest and 
repayment on loans which recipient countries could ill afford. 
Projects were often poorly designed and badly implemented. 
There were long delays between the initial design and the eventual 
implementation of donor projects, reservations about recruiting 
procedures which produced 'experts' of variable calibre, problems 
in the supply of 'experts' and other forms of assistance, and 
problems in the training of 'counterparts' and the provision of 
scholarships (52). 
Inadequacies in the planning and administration of aid for education 
on the donor and the recipient side persisted through the 1970s 
and into the 1980s (53). 	 The move towards donor collaboration 
and co-ordination was often more apparent in declarations of 
intent at international conferences and in donor publications than 
in the generation and operation of projects at country level. 
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Phillips referred to competition between donors, the lack of exchange 
of information on policies and procedures, and differences between 
official agency policy and the generation of projects at country 
level (54). 
	 Spaulding noted a general lack of collaboration, 
and described the operation of aid for education at country level 
as "a patchwork of programmes and projects, a bevy of expert teams 
under a variety of auspices" concerned with their own interests 
rather than the possibilities for co-operation and co-ordination 
(55). 
The considerable diversity of forms and styles of assistance within 
the donor community appeared to offer the various agencies a remarkable 
wealth of possibilities to respond to the many different needs of 
African countries, and to arrange their aid programmes so that they 
complemented one another. 	 But, as King (56) and Clifton-Everest 
(57) pointed out, there was "negligible understanding of the culture 
and organisation of other agencies", in spite of recognised channels 
for donor collaboration. 	 There were tensions between the aid 
priorities of individual donors and the demands of international 
co-operation, and the persistence of the separate traditions of 
donors, their preference for working in particular kinds of countries, 
and their sense of what they did best tended "to make it difficult 
to arrange much in the way of very coherent co-ordination at the 
level of the individual country". 	 The variety of approaches and 
procedures tended to result in unco-ordinated inputs, conflicting 
pressures from different donors, and what were often irreconcilable 
conditions insisted upon by the various agencies. 
THe various donor agencies designed self contained 'package' 
projects, relied increasingly upon the provision of 'experts', 
and insisted upon agency procedures for close supervision of 
project implementation. 	 But there was no guarantee that an aid 
project which was successfully implemented from a donor perspective 
would have any appreciable impact on the planning and development 
of education in the recipient country. 	 In discussion of the 
influence that aid for education was expected to exert King 
referred to aid projects "insulated from the ordinary rough and 
tumble of life" in the recipient country's education system, and 
concluded that the very factors which ensured their success as aid 
projects ensured their failure when agency funds were removed. 
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On paper the generalisation or replication of projects across the 
education system was assured. 	 In reality, the education system 
"gradually returned to normality" (58). 	 In some instances, when 
an aid project came to an end, it meant the end, for all practical 
purposes, of the programme or activity for which it had assumed 
responsibility. 
As already indicated, donors attached great importance to aid for 
educational planning. 	 In the late 1960s and through the 1970s 
what were referred to as the administrative aspects of educational 
planning became a major preoccupation within the IIEP. 	 A stream 
of discussion papers and seminar reports contained recommendations 
for the renovation of inadequate management structures and 
procedures, and proposals for the training of new cadres of educational 
planners and administrators (59). 
	
Reference in earlier paragraphs 
to continuing, and increasing, donor concern for weaknesses in 
recipient countries in the planning and management of the education 
system and the planning and administration of aid suggests that 
donor assistance in these areas had not exerted the kind of 
influence expected of it. 	 The Windsor conference report referred 
to a "decline in administrative performance" and "the pervasive 
lack of management capacity throughout the education system" 
in African countries (60). 
Donor assistance exerted considerably more influence in the 
preparation of education plans, but national education plans, 
drawn up with advice and assistance from 'experts' provided for 
the purpose, were rarely, if ever, implemented. 	 As early as 1967 
Coombs (61) referred to the lack of implementation of education 
plans as "the number one problem of educational planning". 	 In 
1968 a UNESCO conference (62) described the divorce between planning 
and the implementation of plans as a "major and frequently recurring 
problem". 	 The report of an IIEP seminar published in 1980 (63) 
referred to the "alarming frequency" with which plans in education 
encountered implementation problems, and considered "the question 
of implementation as one of the most problematic and preoccupying 
aspects of the entire issue of educational planning". 
Critiques of the international aid approach suggested that lack 
of implementation could be traced to the application of a kind of 
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educational planning which was restricted in scope, overly concerned 
with technical factors, and dominated by economic criteria. 
Beeby argued (64) that educational planners were primarily 
concerned with the design of education plans and had little or nothing 
to do with the problems of implementation, and that "the artificial 
separation between planning and administration" was the "most serious 
weakness of the modern movement in educational planning". 
Educational planners had little experience of how the education 
system worked, or of the adjustment and compromise involved in the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of an education plan. 
More often than not the plan drawn up by the 'expert' planner 
turned out to be impractical, and the educational administrator 
was left to carry it out as best he could by making adjustments, 
dealing with unexpected problems and unforeseen contingencies, and 
seeking new policy decisions. 
Educational planners paid little attention 	 to educational criteria, 
to the needs of the children in the system, or to the variety of 
factors which had a bearing on the teaching/learning process in 
the classroom. 	 The administrator needed to become "an educational 
watchdog", prepared to defend "the values that seem to him proper 
to education". Nor did educational planners give special consideration 
to the education system's capacity for growth, and the educational 
and administrative limits imposed on this capacity. 	 These included 
existing patterns of provision, established organisational structures, 
the level of education and training of the teaching force and the 
wide range of ability and adaptability among teachers, the time 
lag that was part of any attempt at educational reform, and the 
innate conservatism throughout the system. 	 One result was that 
educational planning, dominated by the ideas and techniques of 
economists, did what it knew best, concentrated on the quantitative 
aspects of educational development, at the expense of quality (65). 
Following Beeby, and with a case study of his experience in Papua 
New Guinea for support, McKinnon argued (66) for a more realistic 
approach to educational planning. 	 Lack of practical experience 
and concentration on technical factors resulted in "narrowness 
and neglect of other important issues", in particular the practical 
issues and organisational features which were "the facts of life 
for an administrator", and which played a crucial part in the 
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design and implementation of an education plan. 	 Far too often 
education plans were not implemented because the planners who 
designed them failed to take into account the limitations imposed 
by the legal and regulatory features of the education system, the 
existing organisational framework of the education system and its 
relationship with the more general pattern of government, and 
established patterns of financing and administration. 
The international aid approach paid little attention to the broader 
political and social settings in which education plans were prepared, 
and in which they were expected to work. 	 Beeby (67) and McKinnon 
(68) drew attention to the influence exerted by political realities 
and social values in the planning and development of education. 
Educational planners failed to recognise the need to balance "the 
complex of competing forces", the pressure groups and vested 
interests, from which an education plan finally emerged, and which 
continued to shape its implementation. 	 Nor did they take into 
account the interests and expectations of the various groups who 
managed, worked in, or made use of the education system. 	 Anderson 
(69) and Foster (70) questioned the effectiveness of a kind of 
educational planning which ignored social and political constraints, 
and which seemed unaware that the planning and development of 
education was often shaped by political, rather than economic, 
criteria. 
The 1963 Uganda Education Commission report (71), and later 
commentaries (72), pointed to the limits imposed on educational 
planning by social, economic, and political forces, and suggested 
that the development of education depended upon, rather than brought 
about, economic and social change. 	 Foster argued (73) that the 
development of education was shaped by a variety of historical, 
sociological, economic, and political factors over which a ministry 
of education had little or no control, and which were "almost totally 
ignored" in international models of educational planning. 	 In 
addition, educational planning adopted a global approach in which 
it was assumed that international models could be generalised across 
the variety of settings and diverse conditions in African countries. 
As a result it underestimated the differences between African 
countries, and failed to come to terms with the historical, social, 
economic, and political realities in particular African countries. 
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In a paper presented at the 1972-1974 Bellagio conferences Jolly 
questioned the assumption that the development of education was 
directed by the policies adopted by a ministry of education, and 
argued that it was in fact largely directed by a ministry of 
education's often partial and inadequate reaction to a combination 
of local pressures (74), pressures which, as Colclough and Hallak 
pointed out (75), often ran counter to the declared aims and 
objectives of educational planners and administrators. 	 Levin argued 
that the 'academic' models of educational planning were not a crucial 
determinant in the direction of educational development, and that 
the development of education systems was shaped and directed by a 
combination of economic, political, and social forces rather than 
by the concepts and methodologies of educational planning or the 
stated intentions and objectives in national education plans (76). 
Foster drew attention to the fact that the attitudes of local 
populations and their demand for education played a far greater 
part in the development of education systems than was often supposed, 
and the success or failure of new education and training programmes 
depended to a large extent on the response from local communities, 
whether they were urban elites or part of the rural masses (77). 
McKinnon pointed out that community expectations frequently cut 
across well meaning plans to improve education or to introduce 
new programmes (78). 	 Windham suggested that the development of 
education was shaped to a large extent first by the short-term 
political interests of those in power, and second by what people 
wanted from education and their perception of the rewards that 
education offered. 	 Educational planning that was not grounded 
in an understanding of this demand and of the social and economic 
forces that conditioned it was "doomed to either futility or 
counter productivity" (79). 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s commentaries such as those by 
Castle, 	 Beeby, and Foster stressed the need for a more practical, 
commonsense approach to educational planning. 	 Their arguments 
represented an 'age of practicality' which ran alongside the 'age 
of innocence' as a critical commentary on its over simplified 
assumptions and over optimistic expectations, and which provided 
a background for the idea of an 'age of scepticism'. 	 The issues 
raised by the 'age of practicality' are referred to in the critiques 
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of educational planning cited above, and at various points in chapters 
1 and 2. 	 They are referred to again in chapter 4 in an analysis 
of the ways in which African countries responded to donor 
intervention. 
Aid for education and dependency  
In the 1960s Bauer had argued forcefully that external aid, even 
though well intentioned, retarded rather than accelerated progress 
in developing countries. 	 The obstacles to development in these 
countries were domestic rather than external and the determinants 
of progress were the capacities, attitudes, and social institutions 
of the society concerned. 	 Aid tended to retard development because 
it encouraged passivity and dependence on others, undermined self 
reliance, and bred resentment (80). 
In the second half of 1970s the idea of aid and dependency was 
given a different emphasis in arguments which derived from the 
dependency theory of international economic relations, as exemplified 
in the work of Leys (81), and linked with the development of 
education in developing countries by Carnoy (82). 	 According 
to the dependency theory, developing countries were still under-
developed because they were tied to and dependent upon an interna-
tional network of economic wealth and political power, over which 
they had no control, and which worked to perpetuate their under 
development and their dependence on advanced Western countries. 
International governmental and corporate agencies, aided and 
abetted by local elites in furtherance of their own capitalist 
interests, retarded or distorted development in developing 
countries, using the modern sector for their own purposes and 
leaving the traditional rural economy to stagnate. 
Although aid was directed ostensibly towards change and modernisation, 
it was part of an international conspiracy to perpetuate under 
development and increase dependency. 	 It served as a smokescreen 
to conceal the real exploitation taking place, and as a sop or 
palliative to divert attention away from the fundamental economic 
and political inequalities between developed and developing 
countries. 	 Aid for education ensured the supply of the small 
amount of educated manpower required for the capitalist owned 
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modern sector, and provided the trained agents and intermediaries 
for the process of capital exploitation. 
	 At the same time, it 
inculcated the political and social values of metropolitan 
countries as a way of moulding the consciousness of the exploited 
into acceptance of their own exploitation (83). 
The idea of aid as part of an international conspiracy derived 
from a prior interpretation of social reality, which mistook 
consequence for intention, and which was beyond proof or disproof 
through argument or research. 
	 It provided a framework within 
which all other explanations could be accommodated and interpreted 
in terms of a single perspective. 	 There was a strong suggestion 
that things were not as they seemed, and it needed the dialectic 
of the dependency theory to explain them as they really were. 
So, for example, the over supply of educated manpower resulting 
from a government's response to social and political pressures for 
the expansion of secondary education was seen in terms of a capitalist 
strategy to depress wages and increase profits (84). 
	 In the same 
way, donor proposals for basic/non-formal education concealed 
a strategy for limiting aspirations, perpetuating economic and 
social inequality, and legitimising a status quo of under development 
and exploitation (85). 
Developing countries were dependent in varying degrees upon aid 
for education. 	 As the Permanent Secretary for education in 
Ethiopia pointed out, it was "a fact of life that most forms of 
development action in developing countries could not take place 
without some element of aid" (86). 
	
The funding power of donor 
agencies placed them in a strong position in aid negotiations, 
particularly in the poorest countries with the greatest needs, and 
frequently with the greatest array of aid donors and consequently 
the 	 greatest 	 problems 	 in 	 aid absorption and aid accountability. 
As indicated in earlier paragraphs, 	 donor assistance was designed 
to have an influence in the planning and development of education 
in recipient countries. 
	 Donors attached conditions to the provision 
and use of aid, they brought their own perspectives to bear on the 
policy making process, and in some instances they insisted upon 
changes in domestic policies. 
	 But there was nothing to indicate 
that the various donor agencies were, knowingly or unknowingly, 
part of an international conspiracy. 	 Hurst (87) pointed out, there 
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was no hard evidence to support the idea of such a conspiracy, and 
Eckstein and Noah saw the dependency theory applied to education 
as beset by "formidable logical and empirical weaknesses" (88). 
The issue of aid and dependency was sharpened in the second half 
of the 1970s by changes in the world economic situation. 	 A world 
economic recession, rises in oil prices, high rates of inflation, 
and rising levels of unemployment affected developed and developing 
countries, but the massive negative changes in terms of trade for 
primary exporters and oil importers struck hard at the economies 
of most developing countries in the second half of the 1970s and 
into the 1980s. 	 Rates of economic growth stalled or reversed, 
food and agricultural production continued to decline. 	 External 
borrowing negotiated in previous years caused acute debt servicing 
problems, and most African countries were "on a treadmill of 
arrears, re-scheduled debts and additional borrowing to finance 
debt servicing" (89). 
At the same time, the effects of the recession in richer indus-
trialised countries limited their ability to provide aid on the 
same scale as in the past, at a time when developing countries 
were most in need of external assistance. 	 As donor agency funds 
shrank and aid budgets were cut back, there were two main consequences 
for aid for education. 	 The first was an increasing need to 
support arguments for aid for education against the competing 
demands from agriculture, energy, water, and health, sectors which 
might hold out more promise of a substantial early pay off. 
	 The 
second was an intensified donor search for situations in which the 
aid they were prepared to offer would have the maximum possible 
impact (90). 
The next chapter describes, in broad outline, the main features 
of an approach to educational planning in African countries which 
was at variance with the international aid approach. 
	 It suggests 
that this approach shaped the planning and development of 
education in African countries, and limited the influence donor 
assistance was expected to exert. 
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4 AN AFRICAN APPROACH TO EDUCATIONAL PLANNING 
African countries vary considerably in size and population, in 
natural and human resources, in economic wealth and political 
systems and ideologies, in their cultural, religious, and linguistic 
diversity. 	 They have different historical legacies, and they vary 
in the nature of their response to colonial and post-colonial 
experiences. 	 With such diversity in setting and conditions 
approaches to the planning of education were almost certain to 
vary from country to country. 	 At the same time, as noted in the 
Lagos conference report (1), there were broad similarities in 
approach across African countries. 	 This chapter recognises 
variations across African countries, but it suggests that there 
was a sense in which there was an African approach to educational 
planning, as distinct from and at variance with the international 
aid approach. 
The first section in this chapter describes in broad outline an 
African approach to educational planning, and the ways in which 
it restricted the influence donor intervention was intended to 
exert. 	 The second suggests that educational development depended 
upon rather than brought about economic and social change. 
Together, the first two sections suggest that the planning and 
development of education in African countries was shaped by an 
African approach to educational planning and the variety of societal 
institutions across African countries, rather than by the 
acceptance 	 or 	 imposition 	 of 	 international 	 models 	 and 	 the 
responsible interventionism of donor agencies. 	 A final section 
refers to the persistence into the 1980s of the main assumptions 
that underpinned the international aid approach to educational 
planning. 
An African approach  
This section describes broad similarities in approach to educational 
planning across African countries, under the headings of policies, 
politics, popular pressures, planning, and pragmatism. 	 Reference 
to the influence of political considerations in educational 
planning runs throughout the section. 
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(a) 	 Policies  
The report of the 1976 Lagos conference of ministers of education 
of African countries (2) noted "a remarkable consensus" in 
educational policies in African countries, and commented 
"It is clear that educational strategies are being designed 
which, through different ways and means, reflect a 
variety of situations, political choices, and availability 
of resources. 	 These are all aimed at achieving the 
same purposes; 	 giving access to education to all; 
eliminating or reducing disparities between the various 
parts of the country, between social groups, between 
men and women; 	 relating education to the world of work, 
to manpower requirements, to the environment, to the 
culture and values of the community". 
These strategies were based on two principles. 	 The first was that 
"education is an inalienable right which all should be able to 
exercise". 	 The second was that "education is a determining factor 
in economic, social and cultural development". 	 For this reason 
and, as it "has a role to play on the political scene", the " systems 
and structures whereby it is provided should express the national 
political will". 
The Lagos conference and the 1982 Harare conference were organised 
by UNESCO in co-operation with OAU and ECA. 	 Conference reports 
were dominated by views from African countries, rather than those 
of donor agencies and their academic advisers. 	 There was a 
sense in which African countries saw the rhetoric of conference 
reports and declarations as representing an African, as distinct 
from an expatriate, approach to education and the part it could 
be expected to play in national development. 	 As indicated in the 
above quotation, the idea of manpower for economic development which 
dominated the international aid approach was one aspect, but not 
the most important aspect, of a wide ranging and ambitious set 
of educational aspirations in African countries (3). 	 The Harare 
conference (4) noted that "the principle of the right to education 
for all had been adopted by all the African states", and that they 
had made, and continued to make, strenuous efforts to ensure "the 
effective exercise" of this right. 	 The expansion of education 
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at all levels, seen in terms of 'democratisation' and 'generalised 
access' (5), was a major policy concern, and many African countries 
were already grappling in various ways with problems stemming from 
the adoption of an 'open access' approach to lower secondary 
education (6). 
Differences between the approach to education in African countries 
and the international aid approach led to conflicts in policy 
priorities, and donors and recipients often seemed to operate at 
cross purposes in the design and implementation of externally 
funded projects. 	 This was particularly the case in projects for 
the diversification of 	 secondary curricula, where donor concern 
for selective development geared to manpower needs was at variance 
with the tendency towards an 'open access' approach in many 
African countries. 	 The tension between donor and recipient 
approaches is illustrated in the case study of a World Bank 
diversification project in Sierra Leone. 
The Bank project was designed and implemented against a background 
of a national education policy entangled in a complex web of ambitious 
educational aspirations such as expansion of the system at all 
levels, democratisation of educational opportunity, universal 
primary education in the shortest possible time, qualitative 
improvements in the education system, improved linkages between 
education and national development through the production of 
manpower for development. 	 Diversification had always been an 
important educational concern, but along with other changes 
always regarded as necessary adjuncts to a major programme of 
educational expansion. 	 Although Sierra Leone was prepared to go 
along with the Bank in regarding diversification as an important 
aspect of its educational development strategy, it was not prepared 
to sacrifice or even curtail the pursuit of other educational 
goals in the interest of diversification. 	 Indeed some of these 
other educational goals were regarded as more important than 
diversification, and there was resentment over what were seen as 
attempts by the Bank "to influence Government policy in a highly 
sensitive area where social pressures cannot be ignored" (7). 
(b) Politics  
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Educational development policies in African countries were shaped 
as much by political considerations as by the notion of manpower 
for economic growth. 	 In the 1960s the manpower approach fitted 
with and supported the aspirations in newly independent African 
countries for economic growth and modernisation, but the expansion 
of secondary and post-secondary education and training was not 
geared exclusively to assumed requirements for economic growth. 
It was shaped to a large extent by the "political imperative" of 
localisation (8), and by a political awareness of the strong and 
insistent pressures exerted by an increased and increasing popular 
demand for education (referred to in the following section). 
Strategies for educational development were conditioned by the need 
to respond to the demands of localisation, "an over-riding concern 
for the replacement of expatriates in both the public and the private 
sectors" (9), which would be an assertion and a justification of 
a recently acquired independence. 	 The development plans of the 
three East African countries were based on estimates of high-level 
manpower carried out by donor 'experts'. 	 But, as Rado pointed 
out (10), each East African development plan set as its first 
long-term aim the localisation of the public service and the modern 
sector of the economy. 	 The demands for localisation and economic 
growth were, more often than not, competing rather than complementary. 
Thomas (11) indicated that the reason manpower targets seemed 
impossibly high in Uganda was 
"not related to any prospects for large-scale economic 
development. 	 It arises from the fact the government 
and the economy of the country have hitherto been operated 
and managed by foreigners". 
Rado and Jolly (12) argued that the implementation of a policy geared 
primarily to the replacement of expatriates would slow down economic 
development, and the problem in Uganda "resolves itself to one of 
political choice of priorities" between economic growth and 
localisation. 
The widespread application of the manpower approach in African 
countries could be explained in terms of donor advocacy, and national 
aspirations for rapid economic growth and modernisation (13). 
From a political point of view, much of its appeal stemmed from 
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what Thias and Carnoy (14) referred to as its "innate expansionist 
quality". 	 It seemed a relatively simple matter to justify a bold 
educational growth policy, and requests for aid to support it, 
on the grounds that the production of high-level manpower would 
lead to economic growth and the "blessings of modernity" (15) from 
which all would eventually benefit. 	 At the same time, proposals 
for the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education and 
training could be rationalised in terms of a vigorous localisation 
policy, and as a response to social and political pressures for 
the increased provision and more equitable distribution of 
educational opportunity. 
The broader version of the manpower approach proposed in the 
education for rural development strategy appeared to offer a 
solution to the deep rooted problems of rural poverty and unemployment, 
and to point towards an alternative path to economic growth and 
modernisation. 
	
In addition, the idea of vocationalising education 
had been an enduring feature of educational policy in many African 
countries, before and after independence (16). 	 The persistence 
of critical manpower shortages, particularly at craft and technician 
levels, when there were increasing numbers of young people who 
could not find employment on completion of their schooling, lent 
additional weight to long standing arguments that education was 
too academic and not geared to the real development needs in 
African countries. 	 Non-formal education and training programmes 
had the added advantage, in theory if not always in practice, that 
they offered a way of responding to pressures for educational 
expansion without a massive investment of national resources, and 
they were expected to generate employment and self employment 
opportunities. 
The report of the 1982 Harare conference for ministers of education 
and those responsible for economic planning in African countries 
noted that 
"delegates voiced their concern to bring education into 
better alignment with the need for trained manpower, 
not only in the modern sector but also in the traditional 
rural sector and the informal urban sector", 
and stressed the need for a manpower approach to educational planning 
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(17). 	 But educational policy continued to be shaped as much by 
short-term political interests as by projections of manpower needs 
in the surveys carried out by donor 'experts'. 	 Bacchus (18) 
suggested that in many African countries the decision to 
establish vocational programmes was a political response to the 
problems of increasing numbers of unemployed school leavers 
and the continuing demand for educational expansion, rather than 
an attempt to develop a comprehensive and coherent national 
strategy to meet the wide ranging manpower needs in African 
countries. 	 Lauglo (19) indicated that in Kenya the attempt at 
diversification of the secondary curriculum had not been so much 
an attempt to meet certain projected manpower needs as an essentially 
political response to a situation in which the products from the 
regular academic programmes were experiencing increasing difficulties 
in finding employment. 
Local elites, faced with the social and political problems of 
disappointed and disaffected school leavers, rural-urban drift, 
and the widening gap between rural and urban sectors, argued that 
something had to be done to diversify the education and employment 
opportunities of the rural masses. 	 As King pointed out, "even 
from motives of enlightened self interest" it was possible to see 
that the very few jobs available in the modern sector "could not 
possibly accommodate the massive aspirations of thousands to similar 
positions". 	 Formal and non-formal education and training 
programmes were designed to lower these aspirations and bring them 
more into line with employment and self employment opportunities 
in the rural and urban sectors (20). 
	 Bacchus (21) argued that 
there was no doubt that these attempts "had at their roots a 
strong political motivation", before and after independence. 
They represented an important part of the effort 
"to use the instructional programmes of the schools 
as a mechanism of social control - a means of trying 
to 'cool off' or lower the occupational aspirations 
of the youngsters in these societies to a more 'realistic' 
level". 
(c) Popular pressures  
The planning and development of education in African countries 
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was shaped to a large extent by a political awareness of the 
strength and persistence of popular pressures for the expansion 
of education. 	 Coombs noted (22) that there could have been 
little doubt in the minds of the leaders of African countries 
in the 1960s that a popular demand for education existed, and that 
it exerted considerable pressure for the rapid expansion of 
education at all levels. 	 The demand for education seems to have 
been released in the 1950s, and then enlarged by a continuing 
population explosion. 	 The growth of primary education in developing 
countries in the 1950s had generated a demand for secondary 
education and the increasing popular pressure for, and the 
consequent expansion of, secondary education in African countries 
were a natural extension of past trends. 	 This pressure had been 
added to by national and international declarations that education 
was a fundamental human right to which all were entitled, by the 
setting of ambitious enrolment targets and the making of large 
promises at international conferences, by the influence of populist 
political ideologies in ex colonial countries. 	 It was a 
pressure that was impossible to ignore and difficult to resist, 
and it made increasing demands on available resources. 
What Phillips described as a "revolution of rising expectations" 
(23) continued into the 1970s and the 1980s. 	 The Windsor conference 
report (24) described the dilemma in African countries of 
maintaining participation rates in the face of rising populations, 
and of seeking to provide further educational opportunities 
demanded by an increasing number of jobless school leavers. 	 Added 
to the difficulty of maintaining quantitative growth was the more 
intractable problem of ensuring or restoring acceptable levels 
of educational quality. 	 As Williams (25) pointed out, it had 
"often seemed in the past as if maintaining the quality 
of education had been regarded as bringing less 
political reward than numbers of schools and teachers 
and particularly enrolments". 
The strength and persistence of popular pressures for the expansion 
of education, and in particular for the expansion of secondary 
and post-secondary education, and the preparedness in African 
countries to respond to these pressures, was reflected in the 
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report of the 1982 Harare conference (26). 
	
The report took note 
"of the outstanding progress made in the past twenty 
years with regard to the quantitative expansion and 
renovation of education in Africa: 	 in no other region 
of the world has there been such a rate of growth in 
overall enrolments". 
Between 1960 and 1980, enrolments at the first level of schooling 
in sub-Saharan African countries had almost doubled, they had 
increased more than fourfold in secondary education, and enrolments 
in higher education had increased eightfold over the same period. 
The international aid approach acknowledged the existence of 
popular pressures for the expansion of education in references to 
the social demand approach to educational planning. 	 The problem, 
using this approach, was to estimate the demand for different 
levels of education and to provide the necessary schools and teachers 
to cater for it within the resources limits of the economy. 
The social demand approach, described by Phillips as "no approach 
at all" (27), was seen as contradicting and competing with the 
need for the controlled development of secondary and post-secondary 
education geared to economic needs as determined by the manpower 
approach (28). 	 Coombs (29) listed the three main criticisms 
made of the social demand approach. 	 It ignored the larger 
problem of national resource allocation. 	 It ran counter to 
"the character and pattern of manpower needed by the economy". 
It tended to over stimulate popular demand, to under estimate costs, 
and to spread available resources so thinly that the quality and 
effectiveness of education would be reduced to the point where 
education became a dubious investment. 
Social and political pressures for the expansion of existing 
systems of formal secondary education were conditioned by a shrewd 
awareness of the rewards of education as a private investment. 
As Lewis pointed out, 
"the idea of education as an investment was recognised 
and pursued by Africans long before the economists made 
it a feature in the theory of education for development" 
(30). 
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For many education was an escape route from the drudgery and 
backwardness of the traditional rural economy, and secondary and 
higher education provided access to employment in the modern 
sector and the exorbitant advantages of the elite (31). 	 As already 
indicated in chapter 2, Foster argued that rural populations had 
resisted, and would continue to resist, attempts to provide rurally 
biased or vocational education as no more than a second best 
alternative, and they would continue to insist on the more 
vocational bias of formal academic education. 
Later commentaries (32) described problems in developing formal 
and non-formal vocational education and training programmes in 
similar terms. 	 Wright (33) noted 
"a fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of 
pupils (and their parents) who regard education as a 
means of upward mobility to 'high status' occupations, 
and the popular perception 	 of vocationalisation as a 
preparation for 'low status' occupations". 
In a 1986 review of vocationalisation in developing countries 
Bacchus (34) commented on its lack of appeal to pupils and parents, 
and the higher rewards and "increased attractiveness of the modern 
sector with its greater demand for individuals with an academic 
education". 
Attempts to lower pupil and parental aspirations and make them more 
'realistic' were hardly likely to have the required effect. 	 Attempts 
to generate employment opportunities in rural areas through the 
Swaneng Hill brigades in Botswana foundered because trainees did 
not accept this as their future. 	 They wanted a certificate that 
would lead to a salaried job in the modern sector. 	 As van Rensburg 
pointed out, 
"As far as students and parents are concerned, secondary 
education serves its purpose well. 	 People do not want 
to change it, they want more of the same" (35). 
Bock (36) and King (37) argued that non-formal vocational programmes 
were not designed to lead to modern sector employment, and were 
unpopular for this reason. 	 Formal technical and vocational programmes 
were accorded low status except in the few instances when they could 
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, be seen to lead directly to employment in the public service or 
a foreign owned enterprise. 
	 Both were seen, more often than not, 
as a pathway to further education and a return to the formal 
academic education system. 
The increase in the number of unemployed school leavers far from 
leading to a decline in the demand for formal education led to 
even further expansion in this demand. 	 Edwards and Todaro (38) 
argued that educational development was shaped by the private 
demand for education in the face of rising unemployment. 	 Carnoy 
(39) suggested an inflationary model of educational development 
in which growing numbers of jobless school leavers increased the 
demand for more education at higher levels. 	 The Windsor conference 
report (40) noted "a built in momentum in African populations which 
guarantees massive over-all numerical growth into the next century", 
the broadening of the age pyramid and the increase in an already 
high dependency ratio, and concluded that "the sheer pressure 
of demand for schooling is likely to continue as long as anyone 
can foresee". 	 Williams (41) argued that although logic, supported 
by research findings, might suggest a shift of emphasis towards 
primary education strong parental demand was directed towards the 
expansion of secondary and post-secondary education: 
"the message that reaches parents is riot that schooling 
has lost its point as a result of the 'diploma disease'; 
rather the lesson many of them learn is that their 
children need more education if they are to get a job". 
(d) Planning  
The African and international aid approaches to educational 
planning operated according to different sets of assumptions and 
were directed towards the achievement of different objectives. 
As indicated in chapter 1, this was not always readily apparent in 
the early 1960s when African and donor interests appeared to coincide 
in a groundswell of enthusiasm for ambitious programmes of educational 
expansion which it was assumed would constitute the royal road to 
economic growth and over-all national development. 	 By the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it was becoming increasingly evident from 
critiques of the international aid approach (already referred to) 
that there was a fundamental difference between the two approaches 
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in the planning and management of the education system as well as 
in broader policy issues. 
The difference between the approach to planning and management of 
education in African countries and the international aid approach, 
with particular reference to the years after 1974, was summarised 
in a lead paper presented by Williams (42) at the Windsor 
conference. 	 It suggested three educational strategies as ways 
of overcoming what were described as the constraints and challenges 
that were besieging education in African countries. 	 These were 
described in terms of "passive reaction, radical re-structuring 
and planned improvement", and categorised as the 'sit-out', 
'break-out', and 'work-out' options. 	 Williams suggested that the 
'sit-out' option, which was described as "reacting by responsive 
adjustment rather than premeditated intervention to successive 
pressures afflicting the system", was "in fadt the main strategy 
that African governments have pursued". 
The main symptoms of the 'sit-out' option were a depressed teaching 
force, inadequate management structures, a lack of professionalism 
and commitment throughout the system, and a qualitative erosion 
of educational standards. 	 The rapid expansion of education 
systems had outstripped the capacity in ministries of education 
for effective management and control. 	 A major problem was over- 
staffing in schools, resulting from poor organisation and 
supervision. 	 Education systems were characterised by heavy 
teacher turn over and wastage, high rates of teacher absenteeism 
and 'moonlighting', and a high number and proportion of unqualified 
teachers, a problem added to by an unwillingness to enter teaching 
on the part of better qualified graduates and, in some instances, 
by a deliberate decision on the part of governments to recruit less 
highly qualified and lower paid teachers than had been the case 
in previous years. 
The main features of the 'sit-out' option reflected long standing 
donor concern for weaknesses in planning and management in African 
countries. 	 From a donor perspective inadequate organisational 
structures, ineffective operational procedures, and a lack of 
professionalism and commitment were linked with a lack of control 
over what happened in the education system, failure in plan 
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implementation, and ad hoc expansion of the education system. 
King (43) described planning and management in African countries 
in terms of a break down in the briefly inherited traditions of 
Western style administration and its replacement by a less formal, 
more ad hoc away of doing things, which relied increasingly on 
oral tradition for the taking and communication of decisions. 
Ministries of education were overstaffed while, at the same time, 
there was a shortage of relevant skills and experience, and the 
politicisation of appointments had led to a lack of commitment and 
a paralysis of initiative among professional career officers (44). 
King (45) noted "a predictable collapse of civil service morale" 
in the technical wings of the service as it had become clear 
progressively that technical knowledge was not particularly important 
to policy formulation and implementation. 	 The nature of many 
educational decisions was highly political, shaped by the short-
term interests of those in power, and conditioned by reference 
to a deeply rooted set of obligations based on tribe, clan, and 
kinship (46). 
	
The political instinct to respond to popular 
pressures for educational expansion often ran counter to the 
professional instinct to consolidate quantitative gains by 
qualitative reinforcement (47), as well as donor proposals for 
a more selective development of the education system geared to 
the production of the 'requisite skills for economic growth 
and national development'. 
The 'work-out' option and its emphasis on the need for planned 
and purposeful educational renewal reiterated the recommendations 
for improved professional leadership and management, proper 
advisory and supervision services, more control over what was 
happening in the education system, and more efficient use of 
available resources which had been recurring features of donor 
agency documentation, and which had been the main preoccupation 
within the IIEP in the late 1960s and through the 1970s. 
	 Williams 
concluded that while the education professional had an important 
role to play in attempts to counter balance the tendencies of the 
'sit-out' option, the task was "primarily one for the national 
political leadership" (48). 
The approach to educational planning and management in African 
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countries was characterised by a process of responsive adjustment 
and adaptation to political and social pressures rather than by 
donor notions of planned intervention and control. 	 While donor 
agencies might see this approach as evidence of persistent 
weaknesses in planning and management in recipient countries, there 
was a sense in which it was a way of protecting a view of education 
and development which was at variance with donor policies and 
priorities. 
	
The largely non-interventionist approach adopted by 
African countries meant that there was little likelihood that 
donor policies and donor projects would be fully implemented in 
the way envisaged in the international aid approach. 	 This may 
not have been the intention but, more often than not, the 
consequence was that, in varying degrees across African countries, 
the influence donor assistance was expected to exert was restricted, 
and national aspirations for education were protected against the 
responsible interventionism and operational persistence of donor 
agencies. 
(e) Pragmatism  
Linked with the assumption that donors knew 'what was best' was 
a strong tendency for them to regard African countries as willing, 
and more or less passive, recipients of donor assistance and donor 
expertise. 	 Generalisation about donor intervention and the 
response in African countries to this intervention is limited by 
the various conditions referred to at the beginning of this chapter, 
and by the variety of patterns of aid provision referred to in 
chapter 3. 	 The response in any particular country was conditioned 
by the specific array of donors and their 'experts' brought to 
bear upon the national education system, and the pattern of 
interaction between government and the various donor agencies 
developed over the years. 	 Response to donor intervention could 
vary not only from country to country but also from donor to 
donor and from project to project within a particular country. 
In addition, the aid process had evolved over the years. 	 There 
had been shifts of emphasis in donor policies, and some donor 
agencies had made changes in their operational procedures and in 
the tenor of their approach to aid negotiations (49). 	 The 
following account recognises the existence of a broad spectrum of 
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responses across African countries, but it suggests that in 
general terms the response to donor intervention in African 
countries tended towards the pragmatic rather than the passive. 
African countries could hardly fail to appreciate the significance 
of the connection between the availability of external aid and 
donor concern for the establishment of a sound framework of 
educational planning. 	 While they accepted, in principle, that 
assistance in educational planning was a form of aid that had the 
highest priority and ostensibly welcomed donor provision of 
specialist services (50), their acceptance was not completely 
disinterested. 	 Acceptance of the need for educational planning 
was conditioned, to a large extent, by donor insistence on an 
education plan and on arrangements for sustained and systematic 
planning as conditions for aid. 
Coombs (51) noted that, in some countries, acceptance of the need 
for educational planning was in direct response to donor agency 
requirements and the prodding of donor agencies. 	 Weiler argued 
(52) that, in some instances, the adoption of some form of 
systematic educational planning in developing countries had been 
prompted by "the genuine intention to enhance the level of 
rationality of the educational decision-making process" while, 
in others, it had been "the more or less mechanical reaction to 
an external demand that some form of planning would be a prerequisite 
for receiving foreign assistance for educational development". 
Over the last twenty years, most developing countries had adopted 
one form or another of institutionalised educational planning. 
Most had done so under pressure from donor agencies and these 
agencies had been largely responsible for introducing 
"both the notion and the specific models of educational 
planning into developing countries - often by insisting, 
in no uncertain terms, on the demonstration of sustained 
planning efforts as a prerequisite for financial 
assistance in key educational areas". 
African countries might be prepared to accept assistance in 
educational planning as a condition for the provision of external 
aid, but their commitment to donor models of educational planning 
was often less than wholehearted. 	 The donor approach ran counter 
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to that adopted in African countries, and the operation of educational 
planning was marginalised in a variety of ways. 	 There was a 
tendency to regard educational planning, whether carried out by 
'experts' or national staff, as an imported, expatriate activity, 
separate from the process of policy formation. There was a reluctance 
to consider the implementation of educational strategies proposed 
by educational planners, and educational decisions were rarely 
based on technical information and critical analysis. 	 Educational 
planning was often reduced to the apparent neutrality of its 
minimum function of gathering data on the education system and 
making it available for potential users (53). 
The endorsement of donor policies and priorities in African 
countries was conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the 
availability, and expectation, of external aid and the need to 
comply with donor requirements. 	 The incorporation of donor 
priorities into national education plans did not necessarily imply 
any serious commitment on the part of recipient countries, and a 
fundamental reason for the lack of implementation of education 
plans stemmed from the conflict between national aspirations for 
education and the declared intentions and objectives in plans drawn 
up with the advice and assistance of donor 'experts' provided for 
the purpose. 
In some instances, as noted by Coombs (54), education plans were 
drawn up "merely to please the donor" and "national priorities 
simply reflected what were thought to be agency priorities". 
In others, acceptance of donor priorities was tempered by a 
reluctance to curtail other national priorities, which were regarded 
as more important (55). 	 Foster (56) argued that manpower 
forecasts and the general idea of manpower for economic growth were 
used to buttress policy decisions that would have been made in 
any case for reasons other than those of manpower for economic 
growth. 	 Smyth (57) suggested that the adoption of donor policies 
in developing countries was conditioned, almost entirely, by the 
availability of substantial external aid for education and what 
developing countries saw as the need to formulate appropriate 
assurances to make sure they obtained their share of this aid. 
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There was a tendency in African countries to be critical of the 
donor approach to aid for education, and to resent what was seen 
as disregard for national preferences and national aspirations. 
From a recipient perspective, it often appeared that aid for education 
was provided "as part of a preconceived package by the external 
donor", and aid projects were imposed, or at the very least unduly 
influenced, by donor agency priorities and procedures (58). 
Such 	 conflict • and 	 its 	 resulting 	 ambivalence 	 had 	 significant 
implications for project, and policy, implementation. 
	 Wright 
described (59) how implementation of an aid project was distorted 
by government insistence on injecting national priorities into the 
project, and by channelling project investments into schools 
selected on elitist and political grounds. 	 In other instances, 
project implementation was distorted or neutralised by lack of 
administrative support, delays in providing national staff, the 
non-utilisation of project related training, and the use of aid, 
and donor 'experts', for purposes other than those for which they 
were intended (60). 
Lack of support for donor projects could be explained in terms of 
shortages of suitably qualified and experienced manpower and weaknesses 
in planning and management in recipient countries but, as noted by 
a senior World Bank official (61), projects often failed because 
from the very beginning they lacked serious commitment on the part 
of 	 recipient countries. 	 For whatever reason, and whatever the 
intention, lack of support for donor projects was another way in 
which the influence donor assistance was intended to exert was 
restricted, and national aspirations for education were protected 
against donor intervention. 
Economic and social change  
The persistence of an African approach to educational planning 
precluded any real possibility that donor policies would be fully 
implemented in the way intended by the various agencies. 	 But, 
had it been possible to implement these policies, it is unlikely 
that implementation would have brought about the kind of economic 
and social change envisaged in the international aid approach. 
As indicated in chapters 2 and 3, critiques derived from experience 
and observation of attempts to gear education to rural development 
in African countries (62) had argued that the problems of economic 
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and social change were not primarily edcuational and there was, 
therefore, little to be gained in seeking an educational solution. 
They suggested that education, far from being the most important 
element in the, development process, had only a limited role 	 to 
play, and that educational development depended upon rather than 
brought about economic and social change. 
The report of the Uganda Education Commission pointed out that the 
problems of rural change and modernisation were intimately bound 
up with economic, technical, and social problems, which included 
systems of land tenure, methods of land use, finance and marketing, 
and tradition and tribal custom. 	 Any attempt at rural change and 
modernisation would, therefore, need to start with radical 
changes in existing economic and social structures, which would 
involve "embarrassing political and legislative complications" 
(63), and which were unlikely to be sanctioned by local elites 
whose power and position might be threatened by such changes. 
Later critiques (64) indicated that concerted efforts to use the 
education system to promote economic development, alleviate 
poverty, or reduce social inequalities had shown little evidence 
of success. 	 The development of education had not led to 
economic development, and not only had education failed to achieve 
greater equity in the distribution of income and social status, 
it seemed in many ways to have contributed to reproducing and 
further consolidating economic and social inequalities. 
	 Carnoy 
and Levin (65) argued that the reason for education's inability 
to exercise the sort of leverage expected of it was that, although 
it was generally regarded as a powerful device for achieving 
economic and social change, the social dilemmas which arose out 
of the basic functioning of the economic, political, and social 
structures in a society were not amenable to solution through 
educational planning and reform. 	 Levin (66) described 
educational planning as "necessarily an exercise in optimism". 
The implicit assumptions underlying the educational planning 
exercise were "in conflict with the actual social reality that 
we face", and educational planning directed towards alterations 
in existing societal structures would fail to achieve its stated 
objectives. 
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Carnoy and Levin (67) gave the argument an additional emphasis. 
The reason education reproduced and consolidated existing inequalities 
was that the development of education was controlled and manipulated 
by the dominant group or groups in society to maintain and further 
their own interests. 	 Their dominance depended upon the reproduction 
of prevailing patterns of economic wealth, political power, and 
social status, and education was used as a means of reproducing 
and consolidating these patterns through the exploitation and 
socialisation of the masses. 	 On the one hand, education was seen 
as a weak and powerless instrument for economic and social change, 
while on the other it was regarded as a powerful device for the 
reproduction of economic and social structures. 	 But, as Foster 
had pointed out in earlier commentaries (68), viewed in 
historical perspective education was a remarkably clumsy instrument 
for large-scale economic and social change, and it had also "been 
a failure as an agency of conformity and repression". 
The critiques referred to in discussion of the 'age of practicality' 
argued that what evidence there was suggested that educational 
development was shaped by the economic, political, and social 
institutions of a country, and educational reform depended upon 
prior economic and social change, rather than the other way around. 
As indicated in chapter 2, this view gained wider currency in the 
late 1970s and into the 1980s. 	 The conclusion reached by Bacchus 
(69) in a recent review of vocationalisation brings discussion in 
this chapter full circle to consideration of the political 
context of educational planning: 
"our continuing concerns with issues like the vocatio-
nalisation of the curriculum only draws away our attention 
from the more important and burning issue of producing 
effective 	 development 	 and 	 supporting 	 educational 
strategies aimed seriously at grappling with these 
crucial social and economic problems in the LDCs 
But this needs the kind of development strategy and 
political will and determination to implement which most 
political leaders in the LDCs have not been prepared 
to demonstrate, at least up to this point of time". 
The international aid approach  
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The general air of scepticism that characterised most commentaries 
on educational planning and aid for education in the late 1970s 
(70) was a far cry from the confident assertions of the manpower 
approach and the ambitious scenarios of the education for rural 
development strategy. 	 By the 1980s, most commentators on 
international aid for education (71) tended to give the impression 
of a vast process at work, a process that often appeared to be 
misguided in its intention and misdirected in its application. 
In spite of continued disillusion with the consequence of 
educational planning (referred to in chapters 1 and 2) and repeated 
criticisms of the international aid approach, donor rationale for 
aid for education remained virtually unchanged. 	 Donor 
reappraisals recognised that the principles and methods of 
educational planning were "neither as certain nor as effective as 
had been thought" (72), but they rarely, if ever, seriously 
questioned the basic assumptions of the international aid approach 
(73). 
The World Bank 1980 Education Sector Policy Paper (74) reaffirmed 
a positive view of education linked to economic growth, as "a 
central element in development". 	 Education was not just a 
sector of development, it was a basic factor in development efforts 
in other sectors, sustaining and accelerating over-all development. 
The 1982 edition of ODA's British Aid to Education in Developing  
Countries (75) emphasised "the developmental role of education in 
relation to manpower needs and both social and economic growth". 
The 1984 edition (76) stressed the developmental role of education 
in the production of trained manpower, and as "a strand that runs 
through all economic and social development". 	 As Hurst (77) and 
Clifton-Everest (78) noted, donor rationale for aid for education 
still rested squarely on the theory of human capital and the 
promotion of economic growth. 
Williams (79) argued that the Bank's 1980 sector paper adopted a 
"mechanistic approach" in which education was regarded primarily 
as an instrument for promoting development and for solving 
economic and social problems in developing countries. 	 In a more 
general discussion of aid for education, Hurst (80) maintained 
that donors tended to take "an instrumentalist view of education, 
dominated by economic criteria". 	 They did not especially value 
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it as an end in itself or, apart from token utterances, as a human 
right. 	 Nor did they profess much interest in education as "an 
ideological or moral instrument". 	 Donor agency representatives 
(81) might make token references to education's "broader socio-
cultural dimension", but they left little doubt that the provision 
of aid was based on "the need for education as a central element 
in growth". 
The international aid approach still leaned heavily on the 
assumption that educational planning was capable of directing and 
controlling the development of education, and gearing it to the 
demands of economic and social progress. 	 Proposals for a new 
kind of educational planning in the late 1970s, and the terminology 
in which they were made, bore a striking resemblance to earlier 
proposals in the 1960s and early 1970s (82). 	 They presented 
similar arguments for a more comprehensive and better integrated 
approach to educational planning, more closely linked to the needs 
of economic and social change. 	 As in the past, there was a 
strong tendency to see the limits to educational planning, and 
their solution, in terms of the need for further research, the 
formulation of new concepts and methodologies, the renovation of 
organisational structures and administrative techniques, and the 
training of new cadres of educational planners (83). 
Aid for education was still shaped by the responsible interventionism 
and operational persistence of the various donor agencies. 
Clifton-Everest (84) noted that 
"If the last two decades have been sombered by repeated 
criticisms of methods used to promote development within 
the education sector, and by a sense of disappointment 
that so little headway has been made, this does not 
seem to have dampened the ardour of donors in their 
quest for more effective methods of assisting education". 
Commentaries on aid for education referred to in this chapter and 
in chapter 3 indicate that donor intervention was still shaped by 
comon donor concerns for the most effective use of the aid they 
provided, and characterised by continuing tension between donor 
and recipient approaches and priorities. 
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The thesis now turns from general analysis of the international 
aid approach to a case study of secondary education in Swaziland. 
Examination of what happened in the planning and development of 
secondary education, and the part played by donor intervention 
in this process, focuses on the period covered by Swaziland's 
Third National Development Plan 1978/79 - 1982/83.  
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5 	 SWAZILAND 
Description of the Swazi background refers to several characteristics 
noted in the Windsor conference report (1) that Swaziland shares 
with other African countries. 	 In common with all but two of the 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa Swaziland has a colonial past. 
It has political and economic links with other African countries 
through its membership of organisations such as the OAU and SADCC. 
It is styled a 'less developed country'. 	 It is largely agrarian, 
there are inequalities in the development of the traditional and 
modern sectors of the economy. 	 It has a rapid population growth 
rate with a broadening base of the age pyramid. 	 It has problems 
of jobless school leavers and rural-urban migration. 	 It is 
particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in international commodity 
markets and natural setbacks through drought or plant disease. 
These are broad generalisations which conceal the variety of 
settings and diverse conditions across African countries. 	 The 
following account of Swaziland's political, social, and economic 
structures draws attention to a distinctive combination of Swazi 
characteristics: 	 the remarkable homogeneity of the Swazi people, 
the virtually unchallenged authority of the traditional monarchy, 
the strength and persistence of traditional institutions and customs, 
the monarchy's increasing participation in the modern economy, and 
Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa. 
Size and population  
African countries vary considerably in size and population. 	 The 
kingdom of Swaziland is one of the smallest countries in Africa 
in terms of both its size and its population. 	 It is a landlocked 
country with an area of 17,364 square kilometres, slightly 
smaller than the size of Wales. 	 It is situated in southeastern 
Africa, roughly between the 25th and 27th parallels, between the 
Republic of South Africa and Mozambique, and almost completely 
surrounded by South African territory. 	 It is largely dependent 
on its neighbours for communication with the rest of the world. 
The nearest seaport is Maputo in Mozambique, 225 kilometres from 
Swaziland's capital Mbabane. 	 Johannesburg, the industrial and 
commercial centre of South Africa, is 390 kilometres away. 
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The boundaries of African countries were fixed by the colonial 
powers and were often arbitrarily drawn. 	 One result is that almost 
all African countries contain disparate varieties of people, and 
political leaders face the critical task of welding them together 
as a nation. 	 In contrast to nearly all other African countries 
Swaziland's boundaries enclose a single group of people who share 
a common language and a common tradition. 	 This group constitutes 
the Swazi Nation, ruled over by a traditional monarchy, and largely 
regulated by traditional Swazi law and custom. 	 The 1976 population 
census showed that only about 2.4 per cent of the population was 
of non Swazi origin. 	 The census showed a population of 519,959 
of which 494,534 were permanently resident and 25,425 were temporarily 
absent, many of them employed as migrant workers in South Africa. 
The census indicated a resident African population of about 482,000. 
Over the decade since 1966, the resident population had been 
increasing at a recorded rate of 2.8 per cent a year. 	 As a 
result, a large number of Swazis were young; 	 approximately half 
were less than 15 years old. 	 Consequently, the proportion of 
the population of notional school going age was high, while the 
proportion of adults of working age was low (2). 	 In 1982, it was 
estimated that the rate of population growth was running at an 
average not of 2.8 but of 3.5 per cent a year, an increase which 
would make this dependency ratio higher. 
The political system  
The coming of independence did not enfeeble or herald the demise 
of the traditional monarchy as it did in many other African countries. 
Swaziland has a dual system of government in which a system of 
modern government and a traditional political system exist side 
by side and overlap. 	 The modern system of government has all the 
trappings of a central government - Prime Minister, permanent 
secretaries, civil servants and bureaucratic procedures - but the 
real power in the conduct of affairs in Swaziland was exercised 
by the king, and the modern system of government was an extension 
of and subordinate to his traditional powers as king of the Swazi 
Nation. 
The modern system of government was a legacy of the British 
administration in Swaziland. 	 Before the granting of independence 
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in September 1968, the British administration had established a 
Westminster style constitution with national elections, a House 
of Assembly, and a Senate. 	 This constitution did riot provide 
a platform or open up the way to power for the leaders of the 
political parties that sprang up in the 1960s. 	 The traditional 
political system had been left virtually intact during the British 
administration and it was Sobhuza's use of traditional structures 
and techniques that enabled him to gain control of the modern 
system of government and, by so doing, to maintain and expand his 
political power (3). 
(a) The traditional political system  
The traditional Swazi political system is that of a powerful, 
centralised dual monarchy consisting of the ngwenyama (king) and 
the ndlovukazi (queen mother). 	 Political power resides in and 
radiates from the king and membership of the nation and the 
political system is contingent on direct allegiance to the king. 
The king consults senior princes on important issues and is 
advised by an inner council (liqoqo), a small, aristocratic, and 
highly prestigious group; 	 and by the Swazi National Council 
(libandla laka Ngawane), a general meeting of chiefs, headmen, 
and councillors. 	 The liqoqo meets irregularly, called to advise 
the king on any matter of state importance; the Swazi National 
Council meets when summoned to the royal cattle byre at the 
traditional capital of Lobamba. 
The king is head of an extensive bureaucracy staffed by princes 
of the realm and tindyuna (councillors) appointed by the king who 
can be of either noble or common birth. 	 Councillors are 
strategically placed throughout the kingdom and, apart from their 
political and administrative duties, they act as the eyes and ears 
of the king. 	 The king controls all Swazi Nation Land 'in trust 
for the nation'. 	 Swazi Nation Land is divided into districts, 
each headed by a chief (sikhulu) who has control over local 
membership of the community and the power of land allocation. 
Chiefs are most often princes or headmen of important clans. 
Districts, which can be as big as 52 square kilometres and 
include several thousand people, are commonly divided into wards, 
each with an induna (official) with authority delegated by 
the chief (4). 
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(b) The modern political system  
The 1960s in Swaziland saw the formation, break up, and regrouping 
of a number of political parties and political alliances (5). 
In 1964, the king formally entered the modern political arena by 
forming his own political party, the Imbokodvo National Movement, 
and announcing that the Swazis would contest the common roll 
elections as a nation. 	 The Imbokodvo National Movement had all 
the trappings of a modern political party but it was, in effect, 
an updated version of the Swazi traditional political system. 
All decisions were made by the king and his closest advisers. 
Mass participation in the electoral system and support for Imbokodvo 
were mobilised through traditional loyalty to the king, an existing 
bureaucracy, and an in-place administrative system headed by chiefs 
loyal to the king (6). 
The Imbokodvo National Movement swept to power in the first 
Westminster style elections held in 1967, demonstrating the king's 
virtually unchallenged political authority. 	 His political party 
held all the elected seats in the House of Assembly, his personal 
appointees filled the Senate, and his hand picked choice - Prince 
Makhosini, leader of the Imbokodvo - was Prime Minister. 	 By 
1968, Sobhuza, who had been recognised only as a paramount chief 
by the British administration in the 1950s, was not only king of 
the Swazi nation but also king of the newly independent sovereign 
state of Swaziland (7). 
In 1973, the king suspended the constitution, banned all political 
parties and public meetings, and announced that he would rule by 
decree until such time as a new and more appropriate constitution 
had been framed. 	 A new constitution was not approved by the king 
until 1978. 	 Elections under the new constitution were held in 
the same year. 	 Selection of members for the new Parliament was 
indirect, with the traditional tinkhundla (regional grouping of 
chiefs) forwarding candidates to the king for his approval. 	 The 
king could reject candidates and appoint others. 	 Political parties 
and public meetings were, and still are, banned. 	 Voting in the 
tinkhundla areas, presided over by the king's representatives, 
was by public, not secret, ballot. 	 Voters chose an electoral 
college, which, in turn, elected 24 MPs and 6 Senators from within 
its own ranks. 	 The king appointed 10 additional MPs and another 
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10 Senators, the Prime Minister and cabinet, and, through them, 
senior government officials. 
The centre of political power was not the modern Parliament but 
the royal kraal at Lobamba. 	 All decisions were taken by the king. 
The Prime Minister and other ministers were summoned to Lobamba 
to report and receive instructions and they needed, and sought, 
the king's approval before acting on any matter. 	 Parliament's 
role was limited to debating the issues of modern government, 
advising the king when requested, and carrying out his policies. 
The people who wielded power in the modern system of government 
were those who had been appointed by the king and held his trust 
and, as the mass cabinet dismissals of 1979 demonstrated, they held 
office entirely at the king's pleasure. 	 A demonstration of 
unquestioning loyalty and service was the way to advancement not 
ambition, skill, or drive (8) and signs of critical inquiry were 
regarded as disloyal and disruptive and very quickly nipped in 
the bud. 
After the king's death in October 1982, the traditional liqoqo, 
not the modern Parliament, emerged as the supreme power. 	 The 
liqoqo, by that time, consisted of an inner council of fourteen 
of the 'old guard' appointed by the king shortly before his death. 
By 1983, the liqoqo had assumed extraordinary power and had made 
it abundantly clear that traditionalism, referred to in terms of 
'Swazi law and custom', was the dominant force in Swazi politics 
and that it would use and, where necessary, change the modern 
political and judicial system to serve its own ends. 
Tradition and conservatism 
The remarkable homogeneity of the Swazi people, the undisputed 
authority of the traditional Swazi monarchy, and the strength and 
persistence of Swazi tradition are closely interlinked. 	 In 
spite of, and partly in response to, the strains and stresses 
resulting from social and economic changes, Swazi society places 
great emphasis on traditionalism and conservative values and 
Swazi traditional institutions and customs play "extremely 
powerful roles in the regulation and conduct of daily life" (9). 
The homestead still remains the principal locus of domestic life 
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for most Swazis, including professionals, civil servants, teachers 
and workers in the modern sector. 	 Cattle are still a store of 
wealth and a symbol of prestige and the homestead's cattle byre 
still has great ritual as well as practical significance. 	 Blood 
relationships, the kinship system, and a rough hierarchy of clans 
and lineages (headed by the royal Dlamini clan) are still very 
important. 	 The king's regiments, based on a system of age cohorts, 
still exist and take important roles in national ritual, serve as 
labour battalions for the king and nobility, and serve as a 
principal vehicle for the reproduction and imparting of traditional 
values (10). 
The traditional religion of the Swazi people revolves round the 
ancestral cult. 	 Christian missions, since the mid nineteenth 
century, have challenged traditional spiritualism and contributed 
to evangelism and also to education and health care. 	 Since the 
1930s, however, growing numbers of Swazi converts have been drawn 
towards separatist sects, often of Zionist persuasion, which are 
characterised by exclusively black pastorates and services that 
combine Christian dogma and liturgy with traditional customs. 
In spite of missionary efforts, the propitiation and the presentation 
of offerings to ancestral spirits has persisted and medicine men 
(tinyanga) and diviners (tangoma), whose powers are said to be 
derived from and sanctioned by ancestral spirits, are habitually 
consulted. 	 There is, also, still a widespread belief in the 
powers of muti (a form of witchcraft and sorcery) and, since 1973, 
the incidence of ritual muti murders has reached epidemic 
proportions (11) and given rise to great concern in the national 
press. 
Traditional rituals and ceremonies have retained their symbolic 
and practical importance. 	 The most important of these, until the 
king's death, was the Incwala ceremony. 	 The Incwala lasts for 
roughly three weeks every year. 	 It reinforces the legitimacy of 
the monarchy and renews the strength and virility of the king, 
and consequently, the Swazi nation. 	 The ceremony is lengthy 
and complex in its symbolism, embracing every significant element 
of Swazi society, and re-affirms the power of the king and the 
allegiance owed to him by the nation. 	 The king is central to 
every facet of the ceremony; 	 when there is no king, there is no 
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Incwala (12). 	 For anyone else to attempt to perform the Incwala  
is treason and, though other ceremonies have continued and will 
continue, there can be no Incwala until Sobhuza's successor 
reaches majority and is installed as king. 
The economy  
The most striking feature of Swaziland's economy is that it is a 
peripheral 	 economy, 	 closely 	 inter-linked 	 with 	 and 	 heavily 
dependent on the Republic of South Africa. 	 Internally, it is 
a dual economy in so far as a prosperous, advanced modern sector 
exists alongside and overlaps with an unproductive, backward 
traditional sector. 	 The modern sector has been and is still 
largely dominated by foreign capital and foreign expertise, much 
of it South African. 	 While the traditional sector has stagnated, 
the rapid growth of the modern sector has given Swaziland an enviable 
record of economic growth. 
(a) Agriculture  
Agriculture in Swaziland is characterised by the co-existence of 
a modern industrial and commercial sector based on individual title 
deeds on freehold land and almost wholly controlled by non Swazi 
interests, on the one hand, and a stagnant traditional sector based 
on traditional forms of land ownership and production on the other. 
The modern agricultural sector operates on freehold land, which 
accounts for about 40 per cent of all agricultural land. 	 On 
freehold land there is an individual tenure system where ownership 
is clearly and unambiguously defined and land can be sold or used 
as security. 	 The traditional sector operates on the remaining 
60 per cent of agricultural land, which is Swazi Nation Land "held 
in trust by the king for the benefit of the Swazi people" and on 
which "there is no private ownership" (13). 
	 The king bestows on- 
his chiefs the right to allocate land among their subjects on a 
right-to-use basis. 	 Although individuals are seldom deprived 
of their land, they have no real security of tenure and they cannot 
sell the land or use it as security for credit. 
At independence, individual tenure farms (ITFs) on freehold land 
had been almost exclusively owned by foreign companies and 
individuals. 
	 By 1980, less than half the freehold land in 
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Swaziland was owned by foreign interests (14). 
	 Much of the 
foreign owned freehold land was not productively used - in many 
cases owners of ITFs were absent in South Africa - and contributed 
"little or nothing to agriculture" (15). 
	 The ITFs that were 
productive and that had supported the establishment and growth of 
the modern sector were the foreign owned large agricultural estates 
and commercial forests that were capital-intensive, technologically 
advanced, and well managed. 	 Some ITFs were run by government 
bodies such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Prisons Department, 
and the Defence Force. 
	 Others were owned and operated by Tibiyo  
Taka Ngwane, a parastatal development and investment corporation 
controlled by the king. 	 The Department of Economic Planning 
estimated that the modern agricultural sector had "experienced an 
average growth rate of 12.9 per cent" between 1978 and 1981 (16). 
It has been estimated that 70 per cent of the population live 
on Swazi Nation Land and about half depend entirely on traditional 
agriculture for their livelihood (17). 	 There are about 50,000 
Swazi Nation Farms (SNFs) with an average size of about 3 hectares 
(18). 	 These farms are run largely on traditional lines, 
employing family labour and draught animals and producing mainly 
for subsistence. 	 Swazi Nation Land is not husbanded and improved 
as is individual tenure land. 	 The threat that land usage rights 
can be withdrawn, however rarely exercised, contributes to a sense 
of insecurity that inhibits both development and productivity of 
the land. 	 Conspicuous improvement of the land or innovation in 
its use is often frowned upon by the more conservative chiefs, many 
of whom have the reputation of regarding improvements to the land 
as threats to their traditional authority (19). 
	 A combination 
of factors - the land tenure system, traditional methods, extremely 
limited credit and marketing facilities - have all contributed 
to the low productivity of SNFs and a stagnant traditional 
agricultural sector. 
The traditional view that a man's status and wealth can be judged 
by the number of cattle he owns still holds good; cattle are a 
universally recognised store of wealth and symbol of status. 
The traditional land tenure system allows for free grazing of 
unlimited numbers of cattle. 
	 Over 80 per cent of Swazi Nation 
land is used as grazing land (20) and Swaziland has one of the 
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highest densities of livestock in Africa (21). 	 As a result, attempts 
to improve and develop traditional agriculture have been thwarted 
by overstocking, indiscriminate grazing and the associated problems 
of soil erosion and poor quality livestock. 
Farmers on SNFs produce mainly for subsistence but they do not 
grow enough food to feed themselves and their families. 	 A survey 
of rural homesteads estimated that, on average, cash income 
accounted for more than half of total homestead income in 1982 
and that about three quarters of this cash income was generated 
from wage employment in Swaziland and remittances from migrant 
workers in South Africa (22). 	 The rural homestead had been 
progressively integrated into the modern economy and it made more 
sense to earn a wage to buy the balance of food requirements 
(imported from South Africa), to pay school fees, and to provide 
other requirements such as fuel, clothing, household goods, 
transport, and so on (imported from South Africa). 	 The survey 
also indicated that there were "extreme" disparities between 
homesteads with one in ten being relatively wealthy and one in 
five "impoverished" (23). 
(b) Rural Development Areas  
The Rural Development Areas (RDAs) scheme was initiated by the 
British administration prior to independence in 1966. 	 The idea 
was that large tracts of Swazi Nation Land would be designated 
RDAs and form the nucleus around which all development programmes 
would be planned and implemented. 	 The RDAs project was an 
ambitious scheme of rural social engineering directed towards 
improving the quality of rural life through land development, 
intensive farming, and the creation of improved communications, 
marketing, and social services backed up by a network of extensive 
rural extension services. 	 It was supported initially by British 
aid and later by capital funding and technical assistance from the 
British Government, USAID, and other donors. 	 It was planned that, 
by the 1980s, there would be fourteen RDAs covering between 50 and 
60 per cent of Swazi Nation Land. 	 By 1981, the RDA programme 
covered approximately 50 per cent of Swazi Nation Land and 47 
per cent of the estimated total rural population (24). 
The RDAs scheme was not a success. 	 It "consistently fell short 
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of achievement, sometimes seriously" (25). 	 Maize production 
declined, the incidence of cash cropping did not show any 
substantial improvement and "may have provided lower average 
return to labour than even the traditional cropping pattern", 
the degradation of natural pastures continued through overstocking 
which had "reached a point where animal nutrition" was "being 
severely affected" (26). 	 A number of factors contributed to the 
failure of the RDAs scheme - traditional land tenure, adherence 
to customary methods, the continuation of overstocking and 
indiscriminate grazing, the lack of trained and skilled manpower, 
inadequate organisation and management, and the lack of effective 
planning and implementation by Government (27). 
	 Productivity on 
Swazi Nation Land declined by minus 1.7 per cent during 1978 to 
1981; the rate of rural-urban migration rose (28). 
(c) The modern sector  
The modern sector of the Swazi economy depends very largely on 
commercial and industrial agriculture. 	 The largest agriculturally 
based industries are sugar refining and woodpulp processing; 
other important industries are fruit canning, meat packing, and 
cotton ginning. 	 These industries have been largely responsible 
for Swaziland's enviable record of economic growth. 	 The sugar 
industry is the country's largest employer and an important source 
of government tax revenue through a special sugar levy. 	 It has 
grown impressively since its beginnings in the late 1950s. 	 In 
1972, it contributed 20 per cent of the country's foreign 
exchange earnings; 	 by 1981, its contribution was 40 per cent. 
In 1981, the modern agricultural sector, as a whole, accounted for 
65 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 42 per cent of 
private sector paid employment (29). 
Swaziland's natural resource based industries were started, and 
are still dominated and largely controlled, by British and South 
African capital. 
	 Although efforts have been made in recent years 
to reduce the country's dependence on a few foreign owned large 
agricultural estates and commercial timber plantations (30), 
Swaziland is still largely dependent on a few foreign owned and 
foreign run establishmnets for most of its industrial and 
commercial agricultural production. 	 The woodpulp industry, for 
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example, consists of Peak Timbers (a subsidiary of the South 
African conglomerate Anglo American) and Usutu Pulp (owned by 
Courtaulds and the Commonwealth Development Corporation and in the 
process of being sold to Anglo American). 	 The sugar industry, 
based on three large estates at Mhlume, Big Bend and Simunye, is 
still largely controlled by the CDC, Tate and Lyle, and Lonhro. 
The sugar and woodpulp industries are, in turn, dependent on 
international markets and world prices over which Swaziland has 
little or no control. 	 As Swaziland's third development plan 
pointed out, a drop in world market prices for sugar or woodpulp 
"will have a grave impact on the whole of Swaziland's economy 
and will seriously affect Government's revenue" (31), which is 
what happened in the early 1980s (32). 
Swaziland's mining industry has also been dominated by British 
and South African capital. 	 A British company still owns 60 
per cent of Havelock Asbestos Mines; 	 Anglo American was the main 
developer of iron ore deposits at Ngwenya and, through a local 
subsidiary, operates the coal mine at Mpaka. 	 The iron ore 
deposits at Ngwenya were exhausted in 1981; 	 and the importance 
of the mining sector in the national economy declined rapidly in 
the late 1970s/early 1980s - between 1977 and 1981, the asbestos 
and coal mines' share of paid employment fell from 5 to 0.3 per 
cent and the value of their exports fell from 17 to 6 per cent (33). 
Early hopes for tourism as a major industry have not been fully 
realised. 	 Swaziland's tourist industry depends on South African 
visitors to the four Holiday Inns and gambling casinos operated 
by South African and American capital. 	 These establishments 
enjoyed an initial surge of popularity in the early 1970s but the 
establishment of similar facilities in South African homelands 
closer to the large cities of South Africa - most notably 
Bophuthatswana's lavish Sun City, only a two and a half hour drive 
from Johannesburg - has meant that Swaziland's anticipated growth 
in tourism has not met initial expectations. 
Other efforts to diversify Swaziland's economy have centred on 
attempts to develop a light industrial base through two parastatal 
organisations - the National Industrial Development Corporation 
of Swaziland (NIDCS) and its subsidiary, the Small Enterprises 
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Development Company (SEDCO). 	 NIDCS seeks to attract foreign 
investment and create employment by offering generous incentives 
to potential investors. 	 SEDCO aims to develop locally owned 
enterprises. 	 Their efforts have been limited by inadequate 
management, similar, and in some cases 	 more attractive, incentives 
offered by South African homelands, the small size of the Swazi 
market, and the intractable problem of competing with South African 
industries; 	 but they have resulted in the establishment of a 
number of small businesses at the country's main industrial site 
at Matsapha and also in Mbabane, though these are heavily 
subsidised by central Government (34). 
The modern sector of Swaziland's economy has been developed, and 
is still dominated and largely controlled, by foreign capital and 
the availability of foreign professional and technical manpower. 
Foreign influence permeates the whole of the modern sector. 	 Most 
of Swaziland's import and export trade is controlled by South 
African interests. 	 British (Barclays Bank) and South African 
(Standard Bank) capital dominates Swaziland's banking network. 
Swaziland's beer industry is effectively controlled by South 
African Breweries through a local subsidiary. 	 Some idea of the 
way in which South African interests have moved in to dominate 
and control much of Swaziland's economy can be illustrated by the 
activities of South African industrialist, Nathan Kirsh. 	 Through 
his various enterprises, principally the holding company Swaki, 
Kirsh 	 dominates 	 Swaziland's 	 maize 	 importation 	 and 	 milling 
businesses; 	 owns the lucrative Datsun and Mercedes Benz car 
franchises; 	 controls the two largest trade, hardware, and 
agricultural wholesale houses (Metro and Swaziland Wholesale); 
owns a timber estate and plastics and medical drugs factories; 
and is the developer of the country's two largest and most modern 
shopping complexes (35). 
Foreign capital and foreign skills had created a rapidly growing 
and prosperous modern sector but, as a 1977 ILO study pointed out, 
the benefits of economic growth had not reached the overwhelming 
majority of the Swazi population and, "despite apparent prosperity, 
poverty affects a large proportion of the population" in both rural 
and urban areas. 	 The report pointed to wide disparities in the 
incomes of Swazis and non Swazis, in the incomes of urban and 
-128- 
rural Swazis, and in the incomes of Swazis within urban and rural 
areas. 	 It also pointed to the large numbers of the 'working 
poor' in both rural and urban, mainly in rural, areas; 	 and warned 
of the growing problems of unemployment, particularly among primary 
and junior secondary school leavers, and rural-urban migration 
(36). 	 During the third plan period, Swazi commentaries described 
rising levels of unemployment, increasing numbers of jobless 
school leavers, widening disparities between and within urban 
and rural sectors, and growing problems of rural-urban migration 
(37) 
(d) Tibiyo Taka Ngwane  
As already indicated, the Swazi monarchy controls the traditional 
economy through a system of land tenure on Swazi Nation Land 
('held in trust for the nation'), operated through the traditional 
system of appointed chiefs and their delegated officials. 	 Since 
independence, the monarchy, through Tibiyo Taka Ngwane and its 
alliance with foreign capital, has progressively established 
itself within the modern sector of Swaziland's economy. 
Tibiyo Taka Ngwane, which means 'the wealth of the Swazi Nation', 
is a parastatal development and investment corporation controlled 
by the king. 	 The independence constitution had vested control 
over Swaziland's mineral wealth in the king 'in trust for the 
nation' and, in 1968, Sobhuza established the Tibiyo Fund into 
which all revenues derived from mineral royalties were to be 
deposited. 	 Tibiyo, as it is generally referred to, acquired 
interests in foreign owned asbestos, iron ore, and coal and used 
these proceeds to expand its interests into agribusiness, industry 
and tourism by acquiring shareholdings in a large number of foreign 
owned companies. 	 It participates in joint ventures with foreign 
investors - for example, the Royal Swazi Airlines, the Royal 
Swaziland Sugar Corporation, a bank, and the insurance monopoly, 
Tibiyo Insurance brokers (38). 	 It also owns its own newspaper, 
the Swazi Observer, which began publication in 1981. 
No one knows how successful these ventures have been since there 
is no public accountability of Tibiyo's balance sheet and it is 
immune from taxation. 	 The airline reportedly loses E3 to E4 
million a year; 	 a new clothing factory at Nhlangano stands idle, 
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a monument to inadequate market research; 	 the Swazi Observer 
is a poor second to the longer established and more professional 
Times of Swaziland; 	 and an ocean shipping line was a spectacular 
fiasco. 	 But Tibiyo has accumulated enough capital to establish 
a second fund, Tisuka Taka Ngwane, in 1975, to manage the original 
mineral royalties with Tibiyo becoming self financing through its 
other holdings and ventures (39). 
Tibiyo claims to have brought great benefits to the people of 
Swaziland by acting as "a stimulus and catalyst of progress and 
development" and by "striving vigorously towards self sufficiency 
in food production". 	 It has bought back 40,000 hectares of land 
from foreign control for Swazi use, mainly for "major development 
projects" - owned wholly or in part by Tibiyo - but also for "Swazi 
traditional occupation" - in some cases it would seem for re-
settlement schemes necessitated by the siting of Tibiyo projects 
on Swazi Nation Land (40). 	 It also claims that it is the Swazi 
Nation that has the real ownership of Tibiyo - like Swazi Nation 
Land, it is held by the king 'in trust for the nation' - and that 
all Swazis 
"have the right to know about Tibiyo activities - how 
it works and what it does. 	 As in all national matters, 
all Swazis have the right to appeal to the king with 
any query about the activities of Tibiyo" (41). 
In fact, few Swazis know the details of Tibiyo's operations. 	 It 
operates independently of central government and appears, in many 
ways, "to have taken on a sort of statehood of its own" (42). 
The third national development plan, for example, does not once 
mention Tibiyo by name; 	 nor does the Department of Economic 
Planning's Economic Review 1978-1982. 	 Tibiyo is referred to as 
the Swazi Nation in the third plan (43) and as the Trust Fund in 
the economic review (44). 	 Tlbiyo's resources were, until his 
death, entirely under the control of the king and its board of 
trustees, which he appointed and which served at his pleasure. 
Its accounts are not subject to parliamentary or public scrutiny; 
it is immune from any form of taxation; 
	 and its revenues accrue, 
not to the Ministry of Finance in Mbabane, but to Tibiyo House 
at Lozithehlezi, the king's palace at Lobamba. 
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Tibiyo's accumulation of wealth, and the power that goes with it, 
has been achieved, not through an alliance with the modern system 
of central government, but through alliances with foreign capital 
and foreign interests. 	 Until the king's death, great power was 
held by a small circle of men who directed or adivsed Tibiyo - 
Sishayi Nxumalo (a former cabinet minister, the king's roving 
ambassador, and secretary to the Tibiyo Board) and three foreigners, 
Robert D Friedlander (Tibiyo's legal adviser), Goshe Szokolay 
(manager of the Simunye sugar complex), and industrialist Nathan 
Kirsh. 	 This close circle was said to have "amassed between them 
enormous influence over major decision making in Swaziland" (45), 
and decisions taken in the name of Tibiyo or to further its 
interests could not only run counter to, but could also over-ride, 
those taken by central government and incorporated into national 
development plans and central government estimates. 
Central Government funds were used to make substantial 'loans' to 
Tibiyo to support the operation of the Royal Swazi Airline (46), 
and capital loans negotiated by Governement were used for 'on- 
lending' to the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation (47). 
	 An 
estimated E60 million investment in a single ITF (the Simunye 
sugar complex) had exceeded E140 million by 1981, and was expected 
to make further demands on public funds. 
	 Over the same period, 
the second and third national plan goals for agricultural 
development in rural areas were underspent by 60 per cent. 
	 Like 
other Tibiyo enterprises, Simunye opted for high mechanisation 
as against intensive wage employment when official Government 
policy stressed the need for small scale, labour intensive 
agricultural enterprises (48). 
	 Tibiyo conducted its own 
negotiations with foreign companies and at times with donor 
agencies without reference to the Department of Economic Planning, 
which was in theory responsible for all aid negotiations. 
	 There 
were instances, for example, a proposed hydro electric scheme, 
when Tibiyo appeared to be in direct competition with central 
Government (49). 
(e) Dependence on South Africa  
The Swazi economy, through Swaziland's membership of the Rand 
Monetary Area and the South African Customs Union, is closely 
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interlinked with, heavily dependent on, and largely controlled by 
the economy of the Republic of South Africa. 	 Swaziland's 
incorporation into the Rand Monetary Area pegs the Swazi lilangeni 
(plural emalengeni) to the rand. 	 As a result, Swaziland has been 
unable to influence monetary policies that affect its economy; 
it has had little room for manoeuvre in attempts to counteract 
the devaluation of the rand and the spill over effects of rapid 
inflation in South Africa; 	 and it has been unable to control the 
outflow of capital to South Africa (50). 
The Customs Union pool provides more than half of Swaziland's 
total revenue. 	 As the third national development plan makes 
clear, payments from the Customs Union are made according to a 
complex formula and, as a result, the revenue bears no direct 
relation to the current level of economic activity in Swaziland 
and the rate of revenue is "outside the control" of the 
Government of Swaziland (51). 	 Government revenue depended, 
almost entirely, on payments from the South African Customs 
Union and on trade and income taxes levied on the private sector 
of the modern economy, which was still largely dominated and 
controlled by foreign capital and foreign expertise, much of it 
South African. 	 During the third plan period, Customs Union 
payments accounted for 66 per cent, and the sugar export levy, 
company taxes, and personal income taxes for over 30 per cent of 
total Government revenue (52). 
Under the customs agreement, trade consists almost entirely of 
the export of raw materials from Swaziland to South Africa and the 
import of manufactured goods from South Africa to Swaziland -
goods that are much more profitable and duty free under the 
agreement. 	 Swaziland imports 95 per cent of its goods from 
South Africa (53) and has built up a huge trade deficit. 	 South 
Africa retains the right to determine customs, excise, and sales 
duty tariffs and does so in its own interests; 	 and, in spite of 
the agreement's provisions for the free interchange of goods, 
South Africa, has a virtual monopoly of import and export traffic. 
South Africa can prevent the establishment of industries in 
Swaziland that it fears will provide unwanted competition simply 
by announcing that it is not prepared to buy their products 
(54). 
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Swaziland depends on South Africa for its staple diet. 	 In recent 
decades, the increase in Swaziland's grain dependency on South 
Africa has been dramatic. 	 Swazi imports, which averaged 3,000 
metric tons a year during the 1950s, rose to an annual average 
of 28,000 metric tons a year during the 1970s when more than 
E1,000,000 was spent each year on maize imports (55). 	 Recent 
studies have shown that at least half of all Swazi homesteads 
are deficit producers of maize (56). 	 Efforts to boost maize 
production have had consistently disappointing results and 
dependency on South Africa has increased. 
Swaziland 	 also depends on South Africa for employment for a 
substantial portion of its labour force - estimated at roughly a 
third of total paid employment. 	 Swaziland has been incorporated 
into South Africa's migrant labour catchment area for the better 
part of a century and the migration of Swazi workers on six to 
nine month contracts in search of higher wages and better 
conditions of service in the mines of South Africa has been an 
established and well recognised feature of the economy. 	 Most 
Swazi workers in South Africa are employed in the mines; 	 others 
work for individual firms, on farms, and in domestic service. 
In a sense, "Swaziland may have been able to export its unemployment 
and underemployment with advantage" but any fall in the demand 
for Swazi labour in the mines of South Africa would, quite clearly, 
have serious consequences for the Swazi economy (57). 
In 1979, Swaziland was one of the founder members of the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), formed by 
nine states in the region increasingly apprehensive about their 
dependence on South Africa and hoping to lessen this dependence 
through the co-ordination of economic programmes for regional 
development - programmes which would depend on the availability 
of international aid. 	 SADCC has not, so far, made any impression 
on South Africa's overwhelming economic power in the region and 
Swaziland's membership has not affected what has been described 
as "its growing economic clientage to South Africa" (58). 	 Nor 
has Swaziland's membership of the OAU weakened its close and co-
operative political ties with South Africa. 
Lesotho shares a number of 	 features with Swaziland. 
	 It is one 
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of the smallest countries in Africa in size and population, and 
its boundaries enclose a single group of people. 	 It is landlocked, 
and completely surrounded by South Africa. 	 It is a member of the 
Customs Union Pool and the Rand Monetary Area, and its economy is 
closely interlinked with and heavily dependent upon that of 
South Africa. 	 But the Lesotho monarchy has little if any 
authority, and it plays little part in the conduct of political 
and economic affairs. 	 A closer parallel, for all its differences, 
could well be Malawi with what amounts to a secular monarchy and 
a Tibiyo-like Presidential holding company cum state monopoly. 
As indicated throughout this chapter, what gives Swaziland its 
distinctive character is the combination of the undisputed 
authority of 	 a traditional monarchy, supported by the power and 
persistence of Swazi law and custom and the homogeneity of the 
Swazi Nation; 	 the monarchy's increasing participation in the 
modern economy through Tibiyo and its alliances with foreign 
interests, and in particular South African interests; 	 and 
Swaziland's over-all dependence upon, and close political links 
with, South Africa. 
Chapter 6 describes the Swazi education and training system, 
and the array of donors providing aid for education in Swaziland. 
Along with this chapter, it provides a background for examination 
of the planning and development of secondary education in later 
chapters. 
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6 THE EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEM 
This chapter describes the education and training system in 
Swaziland with particular reference to the period covered by the 
Third National Development Plan 1978/79 - 1982/83. 	 The first 
section describes the formal education and training system, the 
second covers non-formal education and training programmes. 	 A 
third section lists the areas in which a variety of donor agencies 
provided aid for education, and refers to the different kinds of 
assistance provided for secondary education. 
The first two sections are based on two comprehensive and detailed 
sector reviews. 	 The first, prepared by a visiting UNESCO/World 
Bank mission, was published by UNESCO in 1979 (1). 	 The second, 
prepared by a team of 'experts' provided by a consortium of donor 
agencies, was published by the Government of Swaziland in 1981 (2). 
This documentation is supported by statistical analysis prepared 
by the UNESCO educational planning project in the Ministry of 
Education, and referred to in the text. 	 Information on aid for 
education is drawn from papers prepared by the UNESCO planning 
project in 1978 (3) and 1982 (4), and is supported by reference 
to the education and training chapter in Swaziland's second national 
development plan 1973-1977 (5). 	 There are no detailed references 
to aid for education in the third national development plan. 
The formal education and training system  
The following account of the Swazi education and training system 
indicates that the educational legacies of the British colonial 
administration can be seen in structures, patterns of assessment, 
curricula, and the use of English as the language of instruction. 
The structure of the formal education and training system, shown 
in Chart 1, was a carry over from the British administration, 
and had remained virtually unchanged since independence. 	 During 
this time, the education system had expanded rapidly. 	 Table 1 
indicates that enrolments had doubled at primary level, more than 
tripled at junior secondary level, and increased almost elevenfold 
at senior secondary level. 
(a) Pre-school education  
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The responsibility for pre-school education was transferred from 
the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Education in 1980. 
Although the Ministry of Education had over-all responsibility, 
it did not build, equip, maintain, staff, or operate pre-schools. 
Nor did it control their programmes and activities. 	 The onus of 
responding to public demand for pre-school education rested with 
local communities and private initiative. 	 It was estimated that, 
by 1981, there were 64 pre-schools, which catered for between 
eight and nine per cent of children in the three to five year age 
group. 
(b) Primary education  
Primary education was a seven year cycle (Grades 1 to 7) and was 
intended, in theory, for the 6 to 12 year age group. 	 Except in 
a very few 'English medium' schools, Siswati was the language of 
instruction for the first three years, after which English was the 
language of instruction throughout the school system. 	 At the end 
of Grade 7, pupils took a locally set and administered Primary 
Certificate Examination (PCE). 	 Table 5 indicates that, during 
the third plan period, over 70 per cent passed the PCE each year 
and thus were eligible for entry to junior secondary school. 
The Report of the National Education Commission, 1975 (recalling 
the recommendation made at the 1961 Addis Ababa conference) 
recommended 1980 as the target date for the achievement of universal 
primary education (6). 
	
This was changed to 1985 in the third 
national development plan (7). 	 It was claimed that UPE had been 
'achieved' by 1980, when it was estimated that, for the first 
time, there were more than enough places in primary schools for 
all the children in the 6 to 12 year age group. 
However, places were not the same thing as enrolment. 	 Although 
there had been a progressive increase in the number and the 
proportion of 6 to 12 year olds enrolled in primary schools, less 
than 80 per cent were receiving primary education. 	 the out of 
age problem persisted and accounted for about 22 per cent of total 
enrolment in 1980. 	 One reason why out of age pupils remained 
such a significant fraction of primary school enrolments was the 
pattern of entry into Grade 1, the age distribution of new entrants 
ranging from 5 to 17. 	 Another was the high level of repetition 
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and drop out throughout the primary system (Table 7). 
Statistical information on primary schools, enrolments, pupil 
teacher ratios, and the composition of the teaching force is 
given in Tables 2 to 5. 
(c) Secondary education  
The seven year primary cycle was followed by five years of 
secondary education, which was divided into junior secondary 
(three years) and senior secondary (two years). 	 There were two 
kinds of secondary school in Swaziland, junior secondary schools 
and high schools. 	 Junior secondary schools had only junior 
secondary classes (Forms 1 to 3); 	 high schools had both junior 
secondary (Forms 1 to 3) and senior secondary classes (Forms 
4 and 5). 	 Apart from two schools which offered Cambridge 
Overseas HSC courses, secondary education ended at Form 5. 
At the end of Form 3 , pupils took the Junior Certificate 
Examination (JCE), which was set and administered by a regional 
examination council for Lesotho and Swaziland, though still broadly 
patterned on British examinations. 	 Further education and training 
opportunities which were available after junior secondary school 
included entry to high school, craft training at the Swaziland 
College of Technology (SCOT), primary teacher training, and health 
training programmes. 	 Over the third plan period, the proportion 
of junior secondary graduates entering high school increased from 
around 50 per cent to over 60 per cent (Table 17). 
At the end of high school, pupils sat the Cambridge Overseas 
School Certificate (COSC) examination. 	 Further education and 
training opportunities after Form 5, based on results in the 
COSC examination, included entry to degree and diploma courses at 
the university, technician training at SCOT, secondary teacher 
training, and training programmes at the Institute of Health 
Science and the College of Nursing. 
Though it had started from a small base, secondary education had 
expanded rapidly since independence. 	 It was estimated that, 
in 1980, 46 per cent of the junior secondary age group and 20 
per cent of the senior secondary age group was enrolled in secondary 
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school. 	 This expansion had been particularly marked in high 
schools, where enrolments had increased from around 520 in 1968 
to 5,417 in 1982, reflecting a strong and insistent popular demand 
for the rapid and continued expansion of senior secondary education 
and Government's preparedness to cater for this demand. 	 Tables 
15 and 18 indicate that the expansion of secondary education had 
been accompanied by a decline in the results in the JCE and, more 
specifically, in the COSC examination. 
Statistical information on secondary schools, on junior and senior 
secondary enrolments, pupil teacher ratios, and the composition 
of the secondary school teaching force is given in Tables 8 to 12. 
(d) Further and higher education and training  
Apart from a number of teacher training programmes (described 
below), the Ministry of Education was not responsible for further 
education and training. 	 The Department of Establishments and 
Training administered the system of grants for students in post 
secondary education and controlled the disbursement of overseas 
scholarships. 	 The Ministry of Health had over-all responsibility 
for the training of nurses and health assistants. 
	
The Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister was responsible for the financing and 
administration of SCOT and for the operation of the National 
Employment Service, which provided careers guidance for secondary 
school pupils. 
SCOT was founded in 1946 as a trade school. 
	 It was later upgraded 
to become the Swaziland Industrial Training Institute and, when 
technician courses were introduced in 1974, it was upgraded again 
and its name changed to the Swaziland College of Technology. 
	 It 
was mainly concerned with the training of middle level technicians 
and skilled craftsmen, and with secretarial and commercial training, 
tested and certificated by the British City and Guilds and Pitman 
examining boards. 	 In addition, it provided two year secondary 
teacher 
	 training 	 courses 	 in 	 technical 	 subjects 	 (Woodwork, 
Metalwork, and Technical Drawing) and Commerce. 
From 1964 to 1975, the University College of Swaziland (UCS) 
formed part of the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. 
After Lesotho's withdrawal and the break up of UBLS in 1975, the 
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University of Botswana and Swaziland was established with two 
constituent colleges of equal status providing complementary 
programmes. 	 In 1982, the University of Swaziland (UNISWA) 
became a university in its own right. 
	 UNISWA was an autonomous 
body with its own University Council responsible for the government, 
control, and administration of the university. 	 It was responsible 
for the preparation and control of its own budget and for the 
preparation of its own development plans. 
	 It was housed on 
two separate campuses, one at Kwaluseni (Humanities, Science, 
Social Science, and Education), and one at Luyengo (Agriculture 
and Home Economics). 
	 Enrolments of Swazi students in degree and 
diploma courses over the third plan period are shown in Table 20. 
(e) Teacher training  
The Ministry of Education had over-all responsibility for primary 
teacher training at William Pitcher College, a government college 
which also trained secondary school teachers, and at Nazarene 
Teacher Training College, which had been founded, and was still 
administered, by the Nazarene Mission. 
	 A third primary teacher 
training college, Ngwane Teachers' College was opened in 1982. 
The minimum entry requirement for primary teacher training was a 
pass in JCE. 	 On the successful completion of a two year course, 
graduates were awarded a Primary Teachers' Certificate. 
	 The 
university moderated examinations and awarded certification. 
An in-service training programme to upgrade 600 partially qualified 
primary school teachers was started at William Pitcher in 1973. 
The three year course was a combination of training in the college, 
correspondence assignments, and on-the-job tuition. 
	 Later, the 
programme was modified from three to two years and provided in-
service initial training for nearly 1,000 unqualified teachers 
in the primary school system. 
	 Teachers who qualified through the 
in-service programme were awarded certificates by the Ministry of 
Education. 	 With the opening of Ngwane, the in-service programme 
was phased out in 1982 (8). 
	
Outputs from all primary teacher 
training programmes over the third plan period are shown in Table 
22. 
Secondary school teachers were trained at two levels, a two year 
post School Certificate course leading to a Diploma in Education, 
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and a four year university course leading to a first degree with 
a Concurrent Diploma in Education (CDE). 	 Although there were no 
official guidelines, it was generally accepted, in principle if 
not in practice, that teachers with a 	 two year diploma were 
qualified to teach at junior secondary level and that university 
graduates, with or without a CDE, were qualified to teach at 
senior secondary level. 
Secondary teacher training was spread across a variety of 
institutions administered by different agencies. 	 The Ministry 
of Education was responsible for a two year diploma course in 
general subjects at William Pitcher. 	 The Luyengo campus of the 
university was responsible for a two year diploma course for 
teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics, and SCOT provided two 
year training courses for teachers of technical subjects and 
Commerce. 	 Teachers who trained at William Pitcher and Luyengo 
were awarded diplomas by the university, those who trained at 
SCOT were awarded teaching certificates by the Ministry of 
Education. 	 The entry requirement for two year secondary teacher 
training programmes was, in theory, a COSC with at least four 
credits though, in practice, this requirement was not enforced. 
The Kwaluseni campus of the university was responsible for graduate 
teacher training programmes, through the award of a CDE, in the 
humanities and the sciences, and it also offered a four year B 
Ed degree course. 	 Out-puts from all secondary teacher training 
programmes over the third plan period are shown in Table 23. 
(f) Curriculum development  
The curriculum in both primary and secondary schools had remained 
virtually unchanged since independence, in spite of regular 
pronouncements that it was 'unduly academic' and proposals to 
make it more 'relevant' and more 'practical'. 
	 Curriculum 
development efforts were spread across a primary curriculum unit 
established in 1973, a secondary curriculum unit set up in 1978, 
various subject panels, and the Ministry of Education inspectorate. 
Progress in developing primary and secondary curricula was slow 
and fragmentary and little had been accomplished by the end of 
the third plan period (9). 
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Non-Formal education and training  
There were a number of non-formal education and training programmes 
for adults and young people organised by different ministries and 
other agencies. 	 The operation and over-all effectiveness of 
these programmes was limited by inadequate staffing, ineffective 
management, minimal co-ordination both at field level and at 
headquarters in individual ministries, and Government's inability 
to effect any real inter-ministerial co-operation (10). 
(a) The Ministry of Agriculture  
The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for crop, livestock, 
and forestry extension services and for the implementation of 
the Rural Development Areas (RDAs) programme. 
	 It was also 
responsible for four Farmer Training Centres, a national Home 
Economics programme, and a vocational 'women in development' scheme. 
Ministry extension staff and supporting specialists constituted 
the largest body of people engaged in non-formal education and 
training in Swaziland. 
(b) The Ministry of Commerce  
The Ministry of Commerce was responsible for the development of 
the co-operative movement. 	 It operated a co-operative development 
training centre, and organised savings and credit unions and 
farmers' co-operatives. 	 It was also responsible for the development 
of rural handicraft centres and the administration of a handicrafts 
training centre. 
(c) The Deputy Prime Minister's Office  
The Deputy Prime Minister's Office was responsible for the 
Swaziland Broadcasting Service (SBS), which, at the beginning of 
the third plan period, broadcast 17 hours of educational programmes 
each week. 	 Plans to develop radio education during the third plan 
period and for it to be "closely integrated with curriculum reform, 
teacher training, and correspondence studies" (11) were not 
carried through and 
	 there was no mention of SBS or radio education 
in the Ministry of Education's review of the implementation of the 
third development plan. 
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(d) The university  
The university's Division of Extra Mural Studies (DEMS) started 
in 1974. 	 It provided five different types of part time courses: 
'bridging' courses to prepare for the COSC examination, 'self help' 
courses for personal improvement, secretarial courses, a diploma 
course in adult education, and a course in business studies. 
By far the most popular were the 'bridging' courses to prepare 
for the COSC examination. 
(e) The Ministry of Education  
During the third plan period, the Ministry of Education assumed 
responsibility for second chance general education, vocational, 
and adult literacy programmes that had been developed outside the 
ministry. 
The Swaziland International Education Centre (SIEC) was established 
by DANIDA in 1972 to develop JCE correspondence courses. 	 In 1977, 
it began to develop correspondence courses in a number of subjects 
for the COSC examination. 	 The centre was also responsible for 
a vocational training programme, run largely along self help lines, 
which trained a small number of secondary school leavers and drop 
outs in furniture making techniques. 	 The Ministry of Education 
assumed responsibility for SIEC in 1978 and, in 1981, its name was 
changed to the Emlalatini Development Centre. 
The Sebenta National Institute (SEBENTA) started in 1961 as a 
voluntary organisation with the aim of eradicating illiteracy and 
promoting community development. 	 Since 1972, SEBENTA had been 
governed by a Board of Directors and had concentrated on the 
promotion of an adult literacy campaign. 	 It was responsible for 
literacy work throughout Swaziland, mainly in the rural areas, for 
the training of staff, the production of materials, and the 
administration and supervision of classes. 
	
In 1980, Government 
support for SEBENTA was transferred from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs to the Ministry of Education. 
The Ministry of Education was, however, responsible for the initial 
establishment of the seven rural education centres (RECs) which 
started operating in 1978. 	 RECs were attached to junior 
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secondary schools in rural areas and were expected to use school 
facilities and equipment to provide non-formal education and 
training programmes for adults and young people outside regular 
school hours. 	 These programmes would be based on community 
needs, with special emphasis on vocational skills. 	 It was intended 
that RECs would become community resource centres and act as a 
focus for all the non-formal education and training programmes 
organised by different ministries and other agencies within the 
areas in which they were situated. 
(f) Voluntary agencies  
The Ministry of Education also provided limited support for two 
small vocational training programmes for secondary school leavers 
and drop outs, run along self help lines. 	 These were organised 
by voluntary agencies and attached to secondary schools, the 
School of Appropriate Farm Technology (SAFT) attached to St 
Mary's Secondary School at Lobamba, and the Salesian Industrial 
Training Centre (SITC) attached to the Salesian High School in 
Manzini. 
Aid for education 
As indicated in chapter 3, the various donor agencies had their 
own policies and procedures which determined the countries in which 
they preferred to work, the activities they were prepared to 
support, 	 and the particular forms of assistance they were prepared 
to provide. 	 Aid for education in Swaziland was provided by a 
variety of multilateral and bilateral donor agencies in the form 
of capital funding and technical assistance. 
	 It covered all 
levels of the education system from pre-primary to the university, 
and it included formal and non-formal education and training 
programmes. 	 The following paragraphs describe the activities 
supported by an array of donors, and the kinds of assistance they 
provided. 
The capital investment programme for education in Swaziland 
depended, to a large extent, on the availability of external aid. 
The second national development plan noted that most of the 
"considerable capital expenditure" needed to implement planned 
developments in education would "have to be sought from aid donors" 
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(12) and, although the third national development plan made no 
mention of capital aid for education, 59 per cent of the Ministry 
of Education total capital budget over the plan period was expected 
to be financed from external sources (Table 26). 
The expansion of primary education was supported by capital 
funding from SIDA and, after 1980, by a World Bank loan. 	 The 
expansion and development of secondary education, which had 
depended in previous years on capital aid from Britain, was 
supported by loans from the World Bank. 	 The Bank also provided 
loans for the expansion of William Pitcher and Nazarene teacher 
training colleges, the establishment of a curriculum development 
and education materials production centre, the extension and 
development of SCOT, and other capital projects in the education 
sector. 	 The establishment of the new primary teacher training 
college was funded by capital grants from EDF under Lome 1 and 2. 
The development of the university depended on capital aid from 
a variety of donors, including Britain, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, 
the United States, EDF, FAO, and the World Bank. 
The primary teaching force had been virtually completed localised 
by the beginning of the third plan period (Table 4). 	 In other 
sectors, the development of education was supported, to a 
greater or lesser extent, by the availability of expatriate 
personnel provided by a variety of donors or directly employed by 
the Government on 'local expatriate' contract. 	 Primary teacher 
training was still supported, to some extent, by expatriate 
personnel and the in-service programme which had been initially 
established with support from UNESCO, UNICEF, and ODA, was still 
supported by ODA and the Dutch government. 
Although the number and proportion of expatriate teachers in 
secondary schools fell over the plan period (Tables 10 and 11), 
they continued to fill key posts in the teaching of Mathematics, 
Science, and technical subjects. 	 Secondary teacher training 
programmes at William Pitcher and the Kwaluseni campus of the 
university were supported by technical assistance provided by 
ODA and other donors. 	 A SIDA/FAO project was responsible for the 
training of teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics at Luyengo, 
and ODA technical assistance was responsible for teacher training 
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programmes in technical subjects at SCOT. 	 Other programmes at 
SCOT depended on the provision of technical assistance from ODA and 
ILO. 	 The development of the university was supported by expatriate 
personnel provided by ODA, UNESCO, and other donors. 
Curriculum development depended, almost entirely, on external 
assistance. 	 USAID was responsible for the establishment and 
operation of the primary curriculum unit (PCU) and SIDA/UNESCO 
for the establishment and operation of the secondary curriculum 
unit (SCU). 
	
It was intended that the SCU would develop curricula 
for junior secondary schools in Science, Development Studies, 
Elementary Technology, Commercial Studies, and Home Economics. 
ODA personnel in key posts in the Ministry of Education inspectorate 
and at William Pitcher were responsible for the development of a 
secondary school curriculum for Mathematics, and the ODA Schools 
Agriculture Project (SAP) for the development of primary and 
secondary curricula in Agriculture. 
Donors provided assistance for non-formal education and training 
programmes. 
	
The RDAs scheme depended on capital funding and 
technical assistance from the British Government, USAID, and other 
donors. 	 Agricultural extension services, the Home Economics 
programme, and the 'women in development' scheme were supported 
by FAO. 	 The development of co-operatives was supported by FAO 
and ILO. 
	 The establishment and operation of the handicrafts 
training centre was supported by capital funding and technical 
assistance from the Republic of China. 
	 Plans for the development 
of radio education were based on the expectation of external aid 
following the visit of a UNESCO/SIDA mission in 1977. 
The development of pre-school education was supported by capital 
funding and technical assistance provided by UNICEF. 
	 DEMS was 
supported by USAID, and SEBENTA by UNESCO. 
	 SIEC was established 
by DANIDA, and Danish technical assistance was responsible for the 
administration and operation of correspondence courses and the 
vocational training programme until 1978. 
	 The World Bank 
proposed the idea of the RECs and provided a loan for their 
establishment. 	 During the third plan period, the development of 
the RECs depended almost entirely on Peace Corps volunteers. 
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Educational administration had been almost completely localised 
by the beginning of the third plan period but the Ministry of 
Education still relied on donor assistance to staff a number of 
key posts. 	 During the plan period, ODA provided inspectors of 
schools for Mathematics and technical subjects. 	 The second of 
these posts was taken over by SIDA/UNESCO during the second half 
of the plan period. 	 SAP was responsible for the development of 
the teaching of Agriculture in primary and secondary schools. 
CIDA provided 'experts' in educational administration and adult 
education for the first half of the plan period. 	 UNESCO 
established an educational planning project in the Ministry of 
Education, and provided technical assistance for the SIDA 
Primary School Building Unit (PSBU) and the World Bank Swaziland 
Project for Educational Development (SPED). 
Aid for education, in the form of capital funding and technical 
assistance, was a fact of life in Swaziland. 	 In a number of 
crucial areas (for example, curriculum development, schools 
agriculture, the training of teachers of practical subjects, 
educational planning and school building) donor projects and 
programmes appeared to have virtually assumed responsibility for 
the planning and development of education, and in particular for 
the planning and development of secondary education. 
Aid for secondary education was conditioned not only by the amount 
of aid the various donor agencies were prepared to make available 
for secondary education in Swaziland, but also by the different 
kinds of assistance they were prepared to provide. 	 In general 
(13), World Bank support for education in developing countries was 
provided in the form of loans for capital investment. 	 UNESCO 
acted as an executing agency, providing 'experts' as advisers in 
projects funded through UNDP country programmes, co-operative 
agreements with the World Bank, and in some instances joint 
agreements with other agencies such as SIDA. 	 The greater part 
of ODA support was provided in the form of technical assistance. 
SIDA provided most of its support in the form of capital grants, 
though at times it provided funding for technical assistance 
projects executed by one or other of the UN agencies. 	 The 
American Peace Corps Service provided technical assistance in 
the form of volunteers, usually in teaching posts in secondary schools. 
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In Swaziland, aid for capital investment in secondary education 
was provided almost entirely by the World Bank in the form of 
three over-lapping loans through SPED in 1975, 1977, and 1980 
(14). 	 SIDA provided capital grants for the construction of 
primary, but not secondary, schools though it was prepared to 
provide funding to support technical assistance projects in 
secondary curriculum development (through UNESCO) and secondary 
teacher training (through FAO). 	 UNESCO provided 'experts' as 
advisers in self contained projects identified with particular 
programmes and activities: educational planning (UNDP), SPED 
(World Bank), and curriculum development (SIDA). 	 FAO provided 
'experts' as advisers in the SIDA funded Agriculture/Home Economics 
teacher training project. 	 ODA had provided capital grants for 
secondary education in previous years, but the main thrust of its 
aid programme was the provision of technical assistance in 
operational rather than advisory positions. 	 ODA personnel 
worked in a variety of situations: 	 in self contained projects 
such as SAP and the teacher training project at SCOT, in key 
positions in the Ministry of Education and at William Pitcher, as 
teachers of technical subjects in secondary schools, and as 
lecturers at SCOT. 	 Most Peace Corps volunteers worked as 
teachers in secondary schools. 	 Some worked as co-ordinators 
of RECs and in other non-formal education and training programmes, 
and at various times Peace Corps provided a volunteer to work in 
the UNESCO educational planning project. 
The next chapter describes three aspects of the Swazi approach to 
secondary education. 	 Later chapters examine in more detail 
donor intervention in the planning and development of secondary 
education, and analyse the conflict between this intervention 
and the Swazi approach to secondary education. 
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7 THE SWAZI APPROACH TO SECONDARY EDUCATION 
The three sections in this chapter describe three aspects of the 
Swazi approach to secondary education. 	 Reference to chapter 4 
and to the account which follows indicates a number of broad 
similarities between these aspects of the Swazi approach and the 
approaches to secondary education in other African countries. 
The Swazi model of education described in section 1 was similar 
in broad outline to those in other African countries, in its adop-
tion of the principle of education as an inalienable right, and 
its preparedness to respond to popular pressures. 	 Section 2 
describes a lack of co-ordination and control over the financing 
of secondary education which could be generalised, in varying 
degrees, across other African countries. 	 It examines the part 
played by private costs in the financing of secondary education, 
and the consequent shifts in responsibility for decision making 
and widening in inequalities between schools, which were emerging 
features in many African countries (1). 	 The account of a 
largely non-interventionist approach to the administration of 
secondary education in section 3, and of the operation of a school 
fees system in section 2, describe the main symptoms of the 'sit-out' 
option in a Swazi setting. 
There were broad similarities in approach to secondary education 
in African countries. 	 There were also important differences 
arising out of the diverse conditions and variety of settings 
across African countries, illustrated by the different patterns 
of secondary education development in, for example, Kenya, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. 	 The particular nature 
of the Swazi approach was shaped by distinctively Swazi charac- 
teristics. 	 At various points in the account which follows 
reference is made to the part played in this process by the 
traditional 	 monarchy's 	 unchallenged 	 authority 	 over 	 virtually 
every aspect of life in Swaziland, the prevailing Swazi view of 
the particularity and autonomy of the Swazi Nation, and the 
importance of Swazi traditional structures and processes. 	 The 
strength and persistence of the Swazi approach were deeply rooted 
in and nurtured by the strength and persistence of Swazi 
traditional institutions. 
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The Swazi model of education 
The main features of the Swazi model of education were outlined 
in two Swazi documents: 	 the Imbokodvo Manifesto, 1972 and the 
Report of the National Education Commission, 1975. 	 Both were 
sanctioned by royal authority and their influence was powerful 
and far reaching. 	 The Manifesto was the official policy 
document of the Imbokodvo National Movement. 	 It was written by 
Prince Makhosini, chosen by the king to lead the Movement and to 
be Swaziland's first Prime Minister. 	 It was in effect a royal 
proclamation. 	 The National Education Commission was established 
by the king through Cabinet, and the NEC report made it clear 
that its work and its recommendations were guided by and based on 
the policies contained in the Manifesto (2). 
The two documents had the status of being Swazi statements of 
Swazi policy. 	 Official Government publications and national 
development plans prepared with donor assistance were not accorded 
the same status and were rarely, if ever, referred to by politicians 
and senior civil servants. 	 In a speech in 1981 on educational 
planning and policy in Swaziland the Permanent Secretary for 
Education (3) described Swazi educational policy as firmly based 
on the Manifesto and the NEC report. 	 The NEC was described as 
"composed of Swazis" and its recommendations "determined the type 
of education that was relevant to the realities of the economy and 
society of the kingdom of Swaziland". 	 There was no mention of 
any other Government publication or any reference to a national 
development plan. 
As represented in the Manifesto (4), the Swazi approach to 
education was based on the fundamental principle that "education 
is an inalienable right for every child and every citizen to 
receive to the limit of his/her capabilities". 	 This principle 
was linked with a view of education that took little or no account 
of the idea of education as a basic factor in economic development 
and which was in many ways a throwback to an earlier, more 
'humanistic' ideology. 	 According to the Manifesto (5), "the 
major objective (of education) is the improvement of the 
individual". 	 The NEC report (6) asserted that "human development 
is the great aim of education", but it saw this development in 
-154- 
terms of catering for "the spiritual, intellectual and physical 
needs of the nation's citizens" not in terms of human resource 
development for economic growth. 
Acceptance of the principle embodied in the Manifesto that everyone 
had a right to an education geared to his own needs was tantamount 
to a commitment to an educational development policy of expansion 
at all levels, limited only by the nature and extent of popular 
demand for education and by Government's ability to make education 
available. 	 The need to respond to popular pressures was an 
inbuilt feature of the Swazi model, advocating what Mosteller 
described (7) as an 'open banquet' approach to educational 
development. 	 The NEC report (8) made it clear that Government's 
main task was "to cater for the ever increasing demand for 
secondary school places", and much of the report was taken up 
with detailed recommendations for expansion of the existing 
system of secondary education. 
There were strong and insistent popular pressures for the rapid 
expansion of secondary, and in particular senior secondary 
education, shaped to a large extent by existing links between 
secondary education and employment opportunities in the modern 
sector and by the enormous private rewards associated with the 
higher levels of education (9). 
	 The demand for secondary 
education had been added to by pressures emanating from the 
expansion of the lower levels of the system, by the rapid 
expansion of secondary education in previous years, and by 
proposals for increased expansion in the NEC report. 
A second main principle in the Manifesto (10) was that education 
"must be work oriented from the primary to the highest levels", 
and the academic bias inherited from a colonial past "must be 
uprooted". 	 The Manifesto and the NEC report (11) proposed the 
diversification of the secondary curriculum through the inclusion 
of practical subjects and the addition of "vocational training 
of different kinds" in secondary schools and training institutions. 
These proposals echoed exhortations in colonial reports and in donor 
agency proposals for education for rural development. 
	 But it 
was significant that the development of vocational education and 
training programmes was seen largely in terms of the expansion of 
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the existing system of senior secondary education through the 
addition of technical and vocational streams, according to pupils' 
interests and abilities. 
It would have been a foolhardy politician or civil servant who 
chose to question the policies enshrined in the Manifesto and 
reiterated in the NEC report, even when they might appear to run 
counter to considerations based on manpower requirements, 
efficiency criteria, or professional concerns for quality. 
Two major policy statements by the Minister for Education in 
1980 (12) and 1983 (13), like every other policy statement from 
the Ministry, referred to the Manifesto and the NEC report and 
made detailed mention of education as an inalienable right, the 
major objective of education as improving the individual, and 
the need for education to cater for the spiritual, intellectual 
and physical needs of the nation's citizens. 	 They reaffirmed 
the 	 need 	 for 	 education to be work 	 oriented, 	 and 	 rationalised 
proposals for the expansion of senior secondary education in 
terms of catering for individual interests and abilities through 
the addition of vocational and technical streams. 
The over-riding principle on which the Swazi model of education 
was based was summed up in statements by the Permanent Secretary 
for Education in 1981 (14) and 1982 (15). 	 Education was an 
inalienable right; 	 it should cater to the needs and development 
of the individual; 	 Government's task was to make education 
available to all who wanted it, according to their needs. 
	 This 
was the view that found expression in the 1981 Education Act, 
which charged the Minister for Education with responsibility for 
"providing a comprehensive education service" and for taking 
"such steps as may be necessary to contribute to the 
spiritual, 	 moral, 	 mental 	 and 	 physical 	 development 
of the people by ensuring that ... educational 
facilities are available to all to meet their needs" 
(16). 
The financing of secondary education  
There were two systems of resource acquisition and allocation 
for secondary education. 	 The first consisted of central 
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Government budgetary procedures for the planning and allocation 
of resources, in which the Ministry of Education participated 
only peripherally. 	 The second depended on parental contributions 
in the form of fees paid directly to secondary schools, and it 
operated independently from and outside the control of the 
Ministry of Education. 
(a) The Ministry of Education: budget preparation  
Within the modern system of government, control of the national 
budget was exercised by the three central agencies in the Prime 
Minister's Office: 	 the Ministry of Finance, the Department of 
Economic Planning, and the Department of Establishments and 
Training. 	 Decisions on budgetary allocations between and 
within individual ministries were taken by a Budget Committee, 
which consisted of the Permanent Secretaries of the three central 
agencies. 	 This committee was advised by working parties drawn 
from the central agencies, and worked within broad outlines set 
by Cabinet. 	 Its decisions were communicated to the various line 
ministries by the Department of Economic Planning. 
The Ministry of Education capital and recurrent budget requests 
were prepared by separate sections of the ministry in consultation 
with and under the general direction of the Permanent Secretary 
for Education. 	 Estimates of capital requirements were prepared 
by the educational planning section and submitted to the Department 
of Economic Planning. 	 Recurrent estimates were prepared by the 
accounts section and submitted to the Department of Establishments 
and Training. 	 This split was linked with two different systems 
of resource acquisition. 	 The capital budget was related, to a 
large extent, to Economic Planning's ability to find donor funds. 
The recurrent budget was determined primarily by the level of 
Government revenue, which (as indicated earlier) depended on 
Customs Union payments and trade and income taxes. 
All decisions relating to the allocation of resources for education 
were taken by Economic Planning and Establishments and Training. 
The Ministry of Education might be consulted from time to time 
during the preparation of the budget but there was little evidence 
that such consultation was perceived by the ministry as influential 
in the decision making process, and the ministry was "in the 
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unfortunate position of having to be responsible for a budget 
for which it has minimal responsibility in setting" (17). 	 The 
Ministry of Education's main role in the preparation of its 
capital budget was restricted to ensuring that the appropriate 
forms, sent to the ministry by the Department of Economic 
Planning, were filled in accurately and submitted on time (18). 
Within the ministry, the educational planning section complained 
that District Education Officers and inspectors of schools did 
not complete these forms correctly or return them on time. 
DEOs and inspectors complained, with some justification, that the 
forms were unnecessarily complicated and time consuming, and 
that their submissions, even when filled in correctly, appeared 
to have little effect on decisions made in the Department of 
Economic Planning (19). 
Priorities were established by the Department of Economic 
Planning without reference to the Ministry's stated priorities. 
A Ministry of Education report, prepared by the educational 
planning section, pointed out that every year there was "a 
considerable change of priorities of which the Ministry of 
Education knows nothing about"; 	 that it was not clear what criteria 
were used "in determining sectoral and project allocations in the 
Ministry of Education capital budget"; 	 that the ministry was not 
provided with "a ceiling, indicating what resources are available 
to it"; 	 and that the ministry received no "clear guidelines" 
from the Department of Economic Planning on the criteria to be 
used in establishing priorities (20). 
Preparation of recurrent estimates was restricted almost entirely 
to salary costs (see Table 27). 	 The basis for the ministry's 
annual budget was the Establishment Register prepared each year 
by the Department of Establishments and Training. 	 The 1981 sector 
review described a situation in which 
"unfortunately, there is little relationship between 
the basis used for recurrent budget by the Ministry of 
Education, the Establishment Register and what is 
actually happening in the school system". 
There was, for example, no increase in the number of teaching posts 
in the Establishment Register between 1980 and 1981 in spite of 
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the opening of new schools and an increase in the number of 
teachers employed (21). 	 It was not clear whether this was 
primarily a result of the ministry's failure to request additional 
posts or reluctance on the part of Establishments and Training to 
establish them. 
A fundamental weakness in the preparation of the Ministry of 
Education annual budget was the lack of co-ordination between the 
preparation and submission of capital and recurrent requests, and 
this split was "critical in the failure to relate the implications 
of capital and recurrent budget" (22). 
	 This lack of co-ordination 
was a reflection of the way in which the central agencies operated. 
It was not uncommon to find that, while Economic Planning had 
approved the construction of educational facilities, no provision 
had been made by Establishments and Training to establish the posts 
needed to staff them (23). 
	 Nor was it uncommon for a donor agency 
to sign a joint agreement with Economic Planning which included 
the establishment of 'counterpart' posts to find later that no 
provision had been made, or was likely to be made, for these posts 
by Establishments and Training (24). 
These two central agencies appeared to exercise virtually absolute 
authority over decisions relating to the planning and allocation 
of resources for education. 	 A report by a CIDA consultant (25) 
noted that it was relatively futile for the Ministry of Education 
to attempt to establish priorities for educational development 
when its participation in the planning and allocation of resources 
to support the implementation of these priorities was no more than 
peripheral. 	 But, in spite of their bureaucratic procedures and 
apparent authority, the central agencies did not have the 
administrative capacity to follow through on the decisions made 
in the annual budget or to control what was happening in individual 
ministries. 	 The Ministry of Education regularly employed more 
teachers than indicated in the Establishment Register and regularly 
overspent its recurrent budget (26), and at headquarters the 
ministry operated with a 'shadow' establishment, where either 
more or fewer people were doing the jobs provided for in the official 
establishment (27). 	 In addition, there was another system of 
resource acquisition and allocation within the secondary school 
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system, which is described at (b) below, and which operated 
independently from and largely outside the control of the ministry 
and the central agencies. 
The authority of the central agencies was restricted by the fact 
that the national budget, like every other aspect of modern 
government, was subject to 	 the king's wishes and required his 
approval. 	 The preparation and implementation of the budget was 
curtailed by the monarchy's demands on available resources either 
directly (28) or through Tibiyo. 	 The king's own views, the needs 
of Tibiyo, the counsel of his closest advisers, and appeals and 
grievances expressed through traditional channels carried more 
weight and took precedence over the workings of central Government. 
Funds already allocated could be withdrawn by royal command, as 
they were early in the third plan period to bail the Royal Swazi 
Airline out of financial difficulties. 	 Decisions taken by 
central Government could be reversed, as they were when unqualified 
teachers extra to requirements in secondary schools taken off 
the payroll in December 1982 were reinstated in January 1983 after 
representations to the king at the royal kraal. 
(b) The secondary school system: school fees  
Government's share of the total cost of secondary education was 
limited to the payment of teachers' salaries and boarding subsidies 
in seven secondary schools, and an increasing part of the cost of 
secondary education had been shifted to the private sector in the 
form of school fees (29). 	 In 1978/79, teachers' salaries 	 accounted 
for 86 per cent of approved estimates for recurrent expenditure 
for secondary education and for 91 per cent of actual expenditure, 
and for 96 per cent of approved estimates and for 94 per cent of 
actual expenditure in 1982/83 (Table 27). 
	 The financing of other 
recurrent expenditures depended on school fees paid by parents, 
and collected, spent, and accounted for by headmasters. 
The amount of fees charged varied widely from school to school. 
The schools themselves determined what fees they would charge, 
what they would be used for, and when and by how much they would 
be increased without reference to the Ministry of Education. 
The "heavy reliance on private costs" meant that "the wealthy 
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schools can provide better opportunities for children". 
	 The 
school fee system led to "great inequalities" and, 
"despite the availability of classrooms and teachers the 
resources necessary for teaching and learning are 
unequitably distributed and in all cases these resources 
depend upon parental contributions and local wealth" 
(30). 
There were wide variations in the way school fees were charged and 
collected. 	 Some schools charged a composite fee to cover all 
recurrent expenditures. 	 Others charged a school fee plus additional 
fees which could be intended for a wide variety of purposes - text 
books, equipment, school uniform, medical treatment, a mid day 
meal, sports, entertainment, and so on - though there was little 
evidence that such fees "bear any relationship to expenditures for 
these functions". 	 In most schools the increased costs associated 
with the teaching of practical subjects were shifted on to parents 
by charging separate fees, a Woodwork fee, a Home Economics fee, 
or an Agriculture fee (31). 
Diversification of the 
of factors, not the 
willingness to support 
the payment of fees. 
secondary curriculum depended upon a number 
least of which was parental ability and 
the teaching of practical subjects through 
Reports on school visits by secondary 
practical inspectors commented on a widespread reluctance to pay 
subject fees and the consequent restrictions on diversification. 
The 1981 sector review described a situation in which the 
diversification of secondary education was restricted, and the 
curriculum continued to reflect public demand for the more 
vocational bias of the formal academic system of secondary 
education (32). 	 Attempts at diversification and vocationalisation 
of secondary curricula have often been unsuccessfully implemented, 
ineffective in meeting stated objectives, or treated with 
indifference or hostility by pupils and parents. 	 In Swaziland, 
the operation of a school fee system enabled parents and local 
communities to bring direct influence to bear in curtailing such 
attempts. 
Secondary schools charged a building fee as a condition of 
attendance, and in some instances these fees were supplemented 
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by community funds, controlled and administered by local chiefs. 
The wealthier schools and communities generated substantial 
building funds, which were outside the control of the Ministry of 
Education. 	 In theory, Ministry of Education approval was necessary 
for the construction of any educational facility but additions to 
existing schools were often built without either the knowledge or 
approval of the District Education Office or ministry headquarters, 
although approval was often obtained for large projects such as 
the construction of a new school. 	 Consequently, although 
there was a substantial private sector building programme, funded 
through school building fees, it was difficult to know exactly how 
much private construction was taking place, and where it was taking 
place, at any given time. 	 From the Ministry of Education point 
of view, a considerable portion of the total school building 
programme was essentially unplanned. 	 All private construction 
was invariably followed by a demand for teachers, a demand which 
the ministry found difficult to refuse, and which placed additional 
strains on its recurrent budget. 	 The CIDA report on educational 
finance in Swaziland referred to a situation in which "richer 
areas build classrooms and demand and usually get teachers while 
in poorer areas pupil teacher ratios increase and educational 
support dwindles" (33). 
The generation of school and community building funds enabled 
schools and communities to circumvent World Bank insistence on 
more efficient use of plant and equipment incorporated into 
specifications for new junior secondary schools. 	 On completion 
of a SPED school, the local community's first step was to build 
an additional classroom, following accepted practice in other 
secondary schools and obviating the need for changes in school 
organisation. 	 The next step was often the generation of additional 
building funds, the building of extra classrooms, and a demand for 
upgrading to a high school. 	 These demands were made through Swazi 
traditional channels, through local chiefs or by direct community 
representation to the king at Lobamba. 
The Ministry of Education exercised no control over school fees. 
There was no limit to the purposes for which fees could be charged, 
no limit to the amount that could be charged, no check on how 
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fees were collected, what happened to them after they were collected, 
or how they were spent. 
	
In the schools the administration and 
control of school fees was "considerably less than optimal", and 
methods of classifying and accounting for expenditure were 
described as "arbitrary and sometimes whimsical". 	 Record keeping 
was "chaotic". 	 Schools were rarely, if ever, audited. 	 Except 
in the largest well established schools there were no written 
statements of required fees and no financial statements. 
Headmasters were often vague as to what fees were charged, for 
what purposes, and how much they amounted to. 	 In some schools 
it was impossible to find out what fees had been collected, for 
what purposes, and what they had been spent on (34). 
There was a great deal of inefficiency and waste in the collection 
and expenditure of school fees. 	 Headmasters claimed, with some 
justification, that they were not trained to keep accounts. 
The CIDA report alleged that direct access to school funds and 
lack of financial accountability resulted in misappropriation 
as well as mismanagement and, 
"while many heads recognise that the monies they deal 
with are those of the school and the community, there 
appears to be far too many who view these funds with 
a proprietary interest" (35). 
There were procedures for disciplinary action and penalties for 
the misappropriation of school funds (36). 
	 These procedures 
were rarely, if ever, initiated and penalties were not imposed, 
even in serious cases of misappropriation (37). 
The administration of secondary education  
The following account examines the administration of secondary 
education in two parts. 	 The first describes the Ministry of 
Education's organisational structures and operational procedures. 
The second describes the staffing and organisation in secondary 
schools. 
(a) The Ministry of Education  
The organisational structure of the Ministry of Education was a 
legacy of the British administration in Swaziland. 
	 Chart 2 
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indicates that the ministry had over-all responsibility for 
primary and secondary education and some teacher training programmes, 
and that its staff were based at headquarters and in the four 
district education offices. 	 Apart from the addition of donor 
projects in curriculum development, educational planning, and 
school building, this structure had remained virtually unchanged 
since independence. 
The ministry had been directly responsible for the management of 
primary education through the district education offices. 	 A 
small secondary school system had been administered largely by 
voluntary agencies, and the role of the ministry, working 
through a small secondary schools inspectorate, had been 
supportive rather than supervisory. 	 Expatriate headmasters had 
enjoyed a large measure of autonomy in staffing, curricular 
organisation, admissions, and the collection and spending of 
school fees. 	 In the years after independence, the ministry 
experienced increasing difficulty in responding to demands arising 
out of the rapid expansion of secondary education and the need to 
assume responsibility for a national system of primary and 
secondary education. 	 By the beginning of the third plan period, 
it was clear that the ministry's capacity for effective management 
and supervision of a rapidly expanding secondary education 
system was still largely undeveloped (38). 
In theory, over-all responsibility for the administration and 
professional supervision of secondary education was vested in a 
Chief Inspector Secondary. 	 His responsibilities (39) included 
the staffing of secondary schools, the maintenance of staff and 
pupil discipline, the proper and correct use of school funds, and 
the provision of equipment and furniture, as well as the inspection 
of schools and the organisation of in-service courses for teachers. 
He was also responsible for the development of relevant curricula 
and the proper organisation of the SCU, though the ministry's 
organisational chart showed the SCU reporting directly to the 
Director of Education. 	 In practice, the ministry exercised 
little control over what happened in secondary schools, and provided 
little in the way of professional support and guidance. 
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As in the past, District Education Officers were responsible for 
the administration and inspection of primary schools, and they 
reported to a Chief Inspector Primary. 	 In addition, they were 
expected to be responsible for "the over-all educational 
administration of the district", reporting to the CIS on "all 
matters relating to secondary education" (40). 	 DEOs were products 
of the primary system, and they had no experience of the organisation 
and administration of secondary education. 	 The grading of their 
posts did not reflect their additional responsibilities or their 
status as leaders of a district team; 	 and the qualifications 
required for the post of DEO were lower than those needed by a 
secondary school teacher. 	 They were reluctant to 'interfere' in 
secondary schools, the more so as they were finding it difficult 
enough trying to cope with the demands of an expanding primary 
school system, a task not made any easier by unfilled primary 
inspector posts and frequent changes of staff (41). 	 Their annual 
reports (42) made it clear that most of their time was taken up 
with routine administrative matters concerning primary schools, 
meetings with local communities, and arrangements for tours of the 
district by politicians and senior civil servants. 	 They had no 
contact with secondary schools and their reports made no mention 
of secondary education. 
Senior Inspectors of Schools worked out of headquarters and, in 
theory, reported to the CIS. 	 Ministry of Education annual reports 
(43) made it clear that Senior Inspectors saw themselves as subject 
specialists, and they had little wish to take over responsibility 
for the general administration of secondary education. 	 The 
number of Senior Inspectors had increased considerably since 
independence. 	 Their effectiveness as inspectors of secondary 
schools was limited by a shortage of suitably experienced and 
competent staff, by the lack of clearly defined responsibilites, 
by their reluctant entanglement in routine administrative matters, 
and by their involvement, as and when the need arose, in a variety 
of tasks that had little or nothing to do with the professional 
supervision of secondary schools (44). 	 They were also expected 
to have wide ranging responsibilities for the teaching, development 
of curricula, and examinations not only in secondary but in primary 
education and teacher training as well (45). 
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There was little attempt to direct and co-ordinate the work of 
Senior Inspectors, to plan itineraries and to ensure that secondary 
schools were regularly visited and reported on. 	 Inspectors, 
left largely to their own devices, went their separate ways, 
pursued their own interests (curricular and extra-curricular), 
and grappled with their own problems. 	 Ministry of Education 
annual reports (46) indicated that, with a few notable exceptions, 
inspectors' visits and reports on schools tended to be infrequent 
and irregular, and in-service courses were few and far between. 
As analysis of the ministry's management and supervisory procedures, 
carried out by the educational planning section in 1981 (47), 
found that there were secondary schools that had not seen an 
inspector for five years, and that there were teachers with a 
number of years experience who had never had an inspection visit 
and who were still technically on probation. 
Organisational structures inherited from the British administration 
were still in place, and schedules of duties and lines of 
responsibility and reporting were updated during the third plan 
period. 	 But, in practice, they played little part in the way 
the Ministry of Education operated, and they had been replaced by 
a less formal Swazi way of doing things. 	 Schedules of duties and 
formal reporting procedures had given way to personal instruction 
on an ad hoc basis and an increasing reliance on an oral tradition 
for the taking and communication of decisions. 
	
Ministry officials 
were reluctant to commit anything to paper, and there was a strong 
tendency to wait for instruction even in routine matters, to avoid 
taking decisions, and to refer even minor matters to a higher 
level (48). 
This approach was linked with the nature of the political process. 
Decisions on educational matters, like everything else in 
Swaziland, were either taken by the king or were subject to his 
approval. 	 The king could be involved in decision making at all 
levels, for example, the posting of teachers, the location of 
new schools, admissions to Form I, or proposed changes in school 
uniform. 	 These decisions, or approval for them, could be 
influenced by a variety of factors, including the king's own 
wishes, the counsel of his closest advisers, and representations 
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by chiefs and communities through traditional channels. 	 Within 
the Swazi context unquestioning loyalty and service were the way 
to promotion and preference, not initiative and drive. 	 It was 
more politic for ministry officials to wait for and carry out 
instructions as and when they were communicated, rather than 
initiate action which might possibly be seen as running counter 
to popular expectations or conflicting with the interests of those 
with influence in the traditional hierarchy. 
(b) The secondary schools  
It theory, the Chief Inspector Secondary was responsible for the 
staffing of secondary schools and for the appointment, posting, 
and transfer of all secondary school teachers. 	 In practice, 
teachers were appointed, posted, and transferred in a variety of 
ways involving senior ministry officials, the accounts section, 
the schools themselves, pressures from local communities, and 
representations from individual teachers, often without reference 
to the CIS. 	 No particular official or section within the 
ministry exercised over-all control over the staffing of secondary 
schools (49). 
	
One result was that secondary education was 
heavily overstaffed. 	 The third plan target of a ratio of pupil 
to qualified teacher of 25 to 1 had been achieved by the beginning 
of the plan period (Table 12) and, using this ratio as a yardstick, 
there were 94 more qualified teachers (9 per cent) than needed in 
1981 and 72 (7 per cent) than were needed in 1982. 	 The application 
of an over-all pupil Leacher ratio of 25 to 1 (including qualified 
and unqualified teachers) indicated that secondary education was 
overstaffed by more than 40 per cent in 1981 and 1982 (50). 
There was a substantial increase over the plan period in the 
number and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers and a corres-
ponding drop in the number and proportion of non Swazi teachers 
in secondary schools (Table 11). 	 In many cases, experienced 
expatriate teachers had been replaced by newly qualified, 
inadequately trained Swazi teachers, the majority of whom had not 
fulfilled the minimum entry requirement of at least four COSC 
credits for the training courses they had completed (51), and by 
Peace Corps volunteers, and about a quarter were teachers from 
South Africa, other African countries, Sri Lanka, and Western 
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Europe employed on 'local expatriate' contracts. 
It was not only experienced expatriate teachers who were leaving 
the secondary teaching force. 	 Sgwane, in a 'critical appraisal 
of secondary education policies in Swaziland', drew attention to 
the low morale and the high turn-over of Swazi staff in secondary 
schools (52). 
	
In spite of salary increases in 1977 and 1981, 
salaries and conditions of service still lagged behind those in 
the public service and were nowhere near as good as those found 
in the private sector. 	 There was a strong tendency for the better 
qualified and more ambitious to leave teaching, when the opportunity 
presented itself, for higher salaries and better conditions of 
service and fringe benefits in the public and private sectors (53). 
At the same time, the best qualified senior secondary school 
graduates did not enter teacher training. 	 Sgwane described 
teacher training in Swaziland as "the dumping ground where rejects 
from the education system find temporary refuge" (54), and a 
combination of a low level of intake and inadequate courses 
resulted in an 'unsatisfactory' output from teacher training 
programmes (55). 
Reports prepared by the educational planning section (56) drew 
attention to the number of unqualified teachers in secondary 
schools, wide variations in the distribution of teachers, the 
under utilisation of qualified teachers, and the lack of organi- 
sational structures in many schools. 	 In spite of the increase 
in the number and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers, and the 
fact that there were more qualified teachers in secondary schools 
than could be reasonably justified, the number of unqualified 
teachers increased over the plan period from 289 in 1978 to 374 
in 1982, an increase of almost 30 per cent. 	 However, in view of 
the expansion of enrolment during this period, the proportion of 
unqualified teachers in the secondary teaching force remained 
fairly constant over the plan period at around 25 per cent (Table 
10). 	 All junior secondary schools employed unqualified teachers, 
and in two thirds over a third of the staff was unqualified. 	 In 
one school nine out of a staff of 12 were unqualified, in another 
14 out of 18. 	 A quarter of all high schools had no unqualified 
teachers. 
	 The rest employed at least one unqualified teacher, 
and in a quarter of all high schools a third or more of the staff 
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was unqualified. 	 In one high school 18 out of 41 teachers were 
unqualified, in another 12 out of 33, and in a third 11 out of 27. 
In 1982 the over-all pupil teacher ratio in all secondary schools 
was 18 to 1 (Table 12) but in individual schools it ranged from 
13 to 1 at one end of the scale to 33 to 1 at at the other. 
There were often shortages, even in schools with a surplus of 
qualified staff, of teachers of particular subjects. 	 In many 
cases schools had too many teachers of some subjects and not 
enough, or none at all, of others. 	 In 1981 the average teaching 
load for all teachers was 22 lessons out of a notional timetable 
of 45 lessons a week, but in individual schools average teaching 
loads ranged from 15 to 30 lessons a week. 	 In theory, the 
adoption of a recommended average teaching load of 30 lessons a 
week would have dispensed with the need for unqualified teachers. 
In many schools curricular organisation and timetabling were 
governed not so much by educational considerations as by the 
availability or otherwise of subject teachers, by what particular 
teachers were prepared or not prepared to teach, and by the 
headmaster's lack of administrative know how and his inability 
to direct and organise the work of his staff. 	 There were schools 
where unqualified teachers were responsible for 	 the teaching of 
core subjects such as English and Mathematics, and where unqualified 
teachers taught more lessons a week than qualified staff. 	 Sgwane 
(57) described a secondary education system characterised by 
inexperienced teachers, shortages of teachers in particular 
subject areas, and the poor quality of instruction. 
	 Secondary 
schools taught an incomplete curriculum, basic formal skills were 
not effectively transmitted, and there were wide differences in 
the status and quality of secondary schools. 
In Swaziland the quality of education was measured in terms of 
examination results, in particular the results of the COSC 
examination. 
	 The popular view, as expressed by the Times of 
Swaziland (58), that "it is now an accepted fact that the standard 
of education in Swaziland has fallen drastically in the past few 
years", centred on a series of disappointing COSC examination 
results. 	 The COSC was a "vitally important examination" and 
every year an increasing number of candidates was "bitterly 
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disappointed". 	 The introduction of a fourth class pass did 
nothing to lessen the disappointment. 	 It was regarded as a fail, 
and success in the COSC examination was still measured in terms 
of a class 1, 2, or 3 pass (59). 	 The increase in the number of 
entries, from 240 at independence to over 2,000 by the end of the 
plan period, had been accompanied by a significant decline in the 
proportion of candidates who passed the examination, from 75 per 
cent in 1968 to 30 per cent in 1982 (Table 18). 	 Wide variations 
between schools and the successful performance of a small number 
of schools every year was a characteristic feature of the COSC 
examination results over the plan period (see Table 19). 
Wastage through repetition and drop out was an endemic feature of 
education in Swaziland. 	 A theoretical model, constructed by the 
educational planning section and based on 1979 rates of repetition 
and drop out, suggested that a Grade 1 cohort of 1,000 pupils would 
produce 60 entrants for the COSC examination, of which no more than 
20 could be expected to obtain a class 1, 2, or 3 pass (60). 
Donor analysis in 1981 and 1982 (61) indicated that the internal 
efficiency of secondary education had declined over the last decade. 
It was estimated that in 1981 it took nearly 17 pupil years at 
junior secondary level to produce a class 1 or 2 pass in the JCE, 
more than two and a half times longer than it had taken in 1970; 
and nearly 9 pupil years at high school level to produce a 
class 1, 2, or 3 pass in the COSC examination, more than two and 
a half times as long as in 1970. 
	 Within the Swazi context 
everyone had a right to an education geared to his own needs, and 
it would be unfair to deny pupils the chance to learn at their 
own speed (62). 
	
Popular pressures demanded, and expected, that 
failures in the PCE and JCE would be given a second chance (and 
a third and fourth if necessary) within the existing education 
system (63). 
In a paper on the need to establish criteria for the staffing of 
secondary schools (64), the educational planning section pointed 
out that the majority of secondary school headmasters were "no 
longer as mature and experienced as they would have been in the 
past", when they would have had "the opportunity to work for a 
number of years as head of department and deputy headmaster before 
being appointed as secondary school headmasters". 	 Although 
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secondary education had expanded rapidly and the number of 
schools had increased, for most teachers the opportunity to work 
as head of department or deputy headmaster was severely limited. 
There had been no attempt to establish appropriate organisational 
structures in recently established or upgraded schools. 	 In 1982 
two thirds of all secondary schools had no established post for 
a deputy headmaster. 	 The older, well established schools had 
posts for heads of department. 	 One school had eight out of a 
staff of 32, another had five out of 26. 	 The majority of schools 
had none at all. 	 In many cases headmasters with limited 
experience had been appointed to schools with no deputy headmaster, 
no supporting organisational structure, and little or no hope of 
advice and assistance from qualified and experienced staff. 	 The 
ministry provided little in the way of professional support and 
guidance and exercised little control over what happened in 
secondary schools, and inexperienced headmasters were left to cope 
as best they could. 
In a speech to mark the inauguration of the Swaziland Teaching Service 
Commission in 1983, the Minister for Education (65) emphasised 
that the Commission had been established to "provide effective 
control of the teaching service 
possibilities of favouritism and 
promotion and appointments", and 
establishment", to "reduce the 
nepotism in matters concerning 
to make recommendations "on how 
efficiently we should run our schools". 	 He issued what the 
Times of Swaziland described as "a stern warning - threatening to 
punish lazy teachers", described "widespread laxity among members 
of the teaching profession, including headmasters", referred to 
"absenteeism, drunkenness during school hours, abscondment and 
all forms of immorality", and drew attention to the need for 
"firm control on school heads" or school administration would 
"continue to be in a shambles as it is today". 
There was no indication in the Minister's speech that the Ministry 
of Education could be held responsible for the administrative 
shambles or the widespread incidence of unprofessional conduct. 
Nor was there any suggestion that the ministry had a responsibility 
to provide what Beeby described as the authoritative support 
(66) needed in a rapidly expanding system of secondary education 
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largely staffed by teachers and headmasters who lacked the 
experience and professionalism to make effective use of the 
autonomy that was still allowed to secondary schools. 	 It was not 
so much that the ministry had somehow lost control of secondary 
education, but rather that it had never made any determined 
effort to assume control. 	 Given the nature of the Swazi approach 
to educational administration, it was unlikely that the Teaching 
Service Commission would display any greater determination. 
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8 DONOR INTERVENTION IN THE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
SECONDARY EDUCATION IN SWAZILAND 
This chapter describes donor intervention in the planning and 
development of secondary education and training with particular 
reference to aid for educational planning, the preparation of the 
education chapter of Swaziland's Third National Development Plan  
1978/79 - 1982/83, and the projects provided by various donor 
agencies during the third plan. 
The first section indicates the importance donors attached to aid 
for educational planning, and describes donor assistance in the 
establishment and operation of national economic planning, 
manpower analysis, and educational planning. 	 It refers to donor 
concern for what were regarded as persistent weaknesses in Swazi 
planning and management of education, and planning and co-
ordination of aid to education. 
The second examines the part played by donor assistance in the 
formulation of an education policy geared to the production of 
manpower for development, and in particular to the needs of rural 
change and modernisation. 	 It describes how donor policies for 
secondary education and training described in chapter 2, and 
projects donors were prepared to support, were incorporated into 
the education plan. 	 Together, the first two sections indicate 
that donor assistance provided the sound framework of educational 
planning, the arrangements for project preparation and planning 
and co-ordination of aid, and the comprehensive education plan 
that donors, themselves, insisted on as requirements for aid to 
education. 
The third section describes donor preferences for particular 
kinds of assistance, and the projects various donor agencies were 
prepared to provide for the development of secondary education 
and training during the third plan period. 	 It examines the ways 
in which aid to education was shaped by donor views on 'what was 
best' for education in Swaziland, the operation of donor agency 
policies and procedures, their concern for the most effective use 
of the aid they provided, and a tendency for donors to regard 
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Swaziland as a willing, and more or less passive, recipient of 
donor funding and donor expertise. 	 A final section refers to the 
restrictions imposed on the impact of aid to education by 
limitations in planning and co-ordination on the donor side. 
While the following account describes the specific array of donors 
and their 'experts' brought to bear upon the planning and development 
of secondary education and training in Swaziland during the third 
plan period, general analysis in chapter 3 indicates a number of 
broad similarities in the responsible interventionism of donor 
agencies in Swaziland and in other African countries. 	 Patterns 
of aid provision varied from country to country, but donor 
intervention in Swaziland and in other African countries was shaped, 
to a considerable extent, by a number of common donor concerns and 
broad similarities in donor agency policies and procedures, and 
there was a strong tendency for donors to provide similar kinds 
of assistance in support of a view of 'what was best' for education 
that was generalised across African countries. 
Aid for educational planning  
Before independence, development plans drawn up by the British 
administration had been closely tied to the disbursement of aid 
from Britain (1). 	 With the coming of independence, and the 
expectation of substantial aid not only from Britain but also from 
a variety of other donors, the outgoing British administration drew 
up Swaziland's first Post Independence Development Plan to 
identify and support proposals for international aid (2). 	 It also 
set up a central planning agency with over-all responsibility 
for national development planning and the planning and co- 
ordination of external assistance (3). 
	
The establishment and 
operation of the Department of Economic Planning depended almost 
entirely on the availability of technical assistance, provided 
at first by ODA and later by a variety of donors. 	 At one time and 
another the post of Chief Economic Planner and other senior 
technical posts were filled by 'experts' provided by ODA, UNDP, 
CFTC, EEC, and GTZ. 
The manpower surveys produced by Economic Planning in 1969 (4) and 
1974 (5) were limited in coverage and methodology (6). 	 Examination 
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of the relevant documentation (7) indicates that they were not drawn 
up 	 in 	 time for the preparation of the first or second national 
development plans, and that neither was considered to be of much 
assistance in the preparation of the 1976 University of Botswana 
and Swaziland Development Plan. 	 The report of an ILO mission which 
visited Swaziland in 1976 (8) noted the absence of any proper and 
up to date manpower survey, and stressed that "the urgent need for 
a detailed and continuous manpower assessment and planning exercise 
cannot be overestimated". 	 The report's findings and recommendations 
reflected donor insistence on careful manpower analysis as a basis 
for educational planning, and donor conviction that the only way 
to provide this was through technical assistance. 	 Towards the 
end of 1976, two manpower planning specialists, provided by ODA 
and attached to Economic Planning, started work on a comprehensive 
survey of the supply and demand for skilled manpower in Swaziland. 
Their findings and recommendations, and the way they were incorporated 
into the third national development plan, are discussed in the next 
section. 
The UNESCO educational planning project, set up in late 1975, was 
located in the Ministry of Education. 	 It is clear from joint 
agreements (9) and project reviews (10) that it was designed to 
fulfill donor criteria for the provision of aid for education. 
Its main objectives were the preparation of a comprehensive education 
plan, and the development of appropriate systems for monitoring 
and implementation; 	 the planning and co-ordination of aid for 
education, and the preparation of related documentation; 	 and the 
development of a national capacity for systematic education planning 
through the appointment and training of 'counterparts', and the 
establishment of an educational planning section in the ministry. 
The establishment and continued operation of educational planning 
depended upon the availability of donor assistance and, when the 
UNESCO project was operational, it was for all practical purposes 
the Ministry of Education planning section (11). 	 The importance 
donors attached to educational planning was indicated by their 
preparedness to support the UNESCO project (12). 	 At first, the 
project was funded completely through the UNDP country programme 
in Swaziland. 	 During the UNDP financial crisis of 1977, one 
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'expert' post was taken over and funded by USAID. At a later date, 
when there were further cutbacks in the UNDP country programme for 
Swaziland, the three UNESCO 'expert' posts were funded at one time 
and another by UNDP, the World Bank (through SPED), and SIDA. 
At various times, the American Peace Corps Volunteer Service 
provided assistance in the form of a volunteer attached to the 
project. 
The activities and outputs of the educational planning project were 
described in Ministry of Education annual reports (13) and project 
reviews (14). 
	
The project established a detailed and comprehensive 
information base- through periodic collection, analysis, and reporting 
on educational and financial data. 	 It acted as a resource centre, 
providing the Ministry of Education with regular and systematic 
information on the education and training system. 	 It prepared, 
submitted, and monitored the ministry's annual capital budget, 
and its building programme. 	 It was actively involved in the 
preparation of education and training sector reviews. 	 It carried 
out school mapping exercises, analytical surveys, and research 
studies and its reports on these activities provided information, 
identified constraints, highlighted problem areas, and suggested 
alternative strategies. 	 It prepared the education chapter for 
the third development plan (discussed more fully in the next 
section), monitored and evaluated plan implementation, and drew 
up the education chapter for the fourth development plan. 
The project was actively involved in establishing educational needs 
and priorities, identifying suitable projects, and preparing and 
submitting proposals for external assistance - laying the groundwork 
for the establishment of major projects in the education sector. 
It serviced the needs of visiting missions and consultants, as well 
as those of donor agency representatives in Swaziland. 	 It arranged 
meetings, worked out itineraries, and provided information and 
documentation tailored to the needs of different donors. 	 It was 
involved in project identification and appraisal, and monitoring 
and evaluation missions; 	 it assisted in the preparation of project 
documentation; and it participated fully in aid negotiations. 
At times, the aid dialogue in Swaziland appeared to be a one-sided 
affair with donor perspectives heavily represented on both sides 
of the negotiations. 
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Donor intervention, and in particular aid for educational planning, 
was shaped by strong donor concern for what were regarded as 
persistent weaknesses in Swazi planning and management of education, 
and planning and co-ordination of aid for education. 	 Documentation 
drawn up by donor agencies (15) and prepared with donor assistance 
(16) drew attention to the Ministry of Education's inadequate 
organisational structures and ineffective operational procedures. 
From a donor perspective, the ministry's capacity for effective 
management and control of the education system and for providing 
teachers with regular and well informed professional guidance and 
supervision had not kept pace with the demands generated by an 
expanding and developing education and training system. 	 The 
planning and management of education was severely limited by an 
ad hoc approach, a lack of co-ordination, and a decline in pro- 
fessionalism and commitment. 	 The various commentaries described 
a weak and stagnating educational administration, on the point of 
collapse, and badly in need of strengthening and re-organisation. 
Reports drawn up by the educational planning project, other 
'experts' working in the ministry, and visiting missions and 
consultants reiterated long standing donor concerns for improved 
planning and management, proper advisory and supervision services, 
and more efficient use of available resources, categorised by 
Williams as the work-out option for educational planning. 	 These 
reports made detailed and comprehensive recommendations for the 
strengthening and re-organisation of the Ministry of Education (17); 
for co-ordination in budget preparation and increased ministry 
involvement in the planning and allocation of resources for education 
(18); 	 for a systematic approach to the planning and co-ordination 
of the various 'curriculum development and teacher training pro- 
grammes (19); 
	
and for the formal establishment of an educational 
planning section within the ministry, with its own structures and 
its own clearly defined and delimited functions and responsibilities 
(20). 
A Guide to School Regulations and Procedures prepared by the CIDA 
'expert' in educational administration, and published by the 
Ministry of Education in 1979 (21), included sections on school 
organisation, staff and pupil discipline, and the administration 
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and control of school funds. 	 Later documentation prepared by the 
educational planning project and visiting consultants drew attention 
to inefficiency and inequalities in the provision of secondary 
education, weaknesses in school management and the administration 
and control of school fees, and the ministry's lack of control over 
what was happening in secondary schools. 	 They made detailed 
recommendations for the setting, collection, expenditure, and 
accounting of school fees (22); 
	
for the establishment of clear 
guidelines for curricular organisation, staffing criteria, and 
teacher utilisation (23); 	 for the rationalisation of organisational 
structures in secondary schools (24); 	 and for greater effectiveness 
in Ministry of Education management and inspection procedures (25). 
Most of the recommendations in the reports referred to above were 
incorporated into the 1981 education and training sector review. 
The education plan  
This section describes the part played by donor 'experts' in 
formulating policy for the development of secondary education and 
training, and the incorporation into the Swazi education plan of 
donor policies advocated in documentation prepared by 'experts' 
and with donor assistance. 	 As indicated in the Ministry of 
Education 1977 annual report (26), the UNESCO educational planning 
project was responsible for drawing up the education chapter of 
the third national development plan, in consultation with the 
Department of Economic Planning. 
(a) Policy formulation  
The third development plan noted (27) that the Ministry of Education 
development strategy over the plan period was based on two 
planning documents published by the ministry, and that strategies 
for the development of technical and vocational training were based 
on the projections in the ODA manpower survey. 
	 Current Trends  
in Educational Policy, published in 1976, was produced by a working 
group within the ministry, with substantial advice and assistance 
from the UNESCO educational planning project. 
	 A Financial and  
Statistical Analysis of Swaziland's Educational System with  
Projections to 1985, published in 1977, was the work of the UNESCO 
'expert' in the economics of education. 
	
A report of the ODA 
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manpower survey prepared by Colclough and Digby, the two manpower 
planning 'experts' provided by ODA, with the title Skills for the  
Future: 	 Education and Manpower Perspectives in Swaziland was 
published by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in 
1978. 
Current Trends proposed (28) a "comprehensive and homogeneous 
approach" to the development of secondary education and training 
which would "provide for the different levels and kinds of manpower 
needs, from self-employment to modern sector high level skill". 
Junior secondary education, seen in terms of the last three years 
of a ten year course of basic education, would be terminal for the 
great majority of children. 	 The curriculum would be vocationalised, 
by the inclusion of practical subjects, to prepare this majority 
for self-employment in rural areas. 	 The vocationalisation of 
junior secondary education would be reinforced by further vocational 
training programmes in district vocational training centres, 
"aiming at the specific needs of the district". 
The development of senior secondary education would be selectively 
and carefully planned according to manpower requirements, an 
assessment 	 of 	 pupil 	 ability, 	 and 	 financial 	 constraints. 
Enrolments would be strictly limited according to manpower re-
quirements, and high schools would provide technical and vocational 
as well as academic programmes. 	 Access to senior secondary 
education would be rationed, and entry would be "determined 
according to the results of a very selective examination". 	 Since 
senior secondary education was expensive, every effort must be made 
to improve the internal efficiency of education at this level. The 
development of technical training would be governed by similar 
considerations, and entry to technical courses at SCOT would be 
"on a very selective basis and according to manpower requirements". 
The formal system of secondary education and training would be 
complemented by non-formal education and training programmes in 
rural education centres. 
	 Each centre would be attached to a 
junior secondary school, share the school's facilities and 
equipment, and integrate its work with that of the school. 	 RECs 
would be "geared to the economic development of rural areas" 
and would provide vocational training programmes for adults and 
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school leavers, 
"concentrating on self-employment skills or small commercial 
enterprises or training suitable to the employment 
opportunities available in the area served by the 
Centre" (29). 
The Financial and Statistical Analysis set enrolment targets 
(Tables 13 and 14), specified teacher requirements (Tables 22 and 
23), and estimated costs (30) for the policy recommendations in 
Current Trends. 
	 It was estimated that the Ministry of Education 
recurrent budget would need to grow at the rate of 11 per cent to 
support proposals for the development of primary, secondary, and 
higher education as outlined in Current Trends. 
	 This estimate 
was based on the expectation of a gradual increase in junior 
secondary enrolments, and an anticipated cut back in entry to 
senior secondary education. 
	 Enrolment projections for senior 
secondary education were based on estimates of what manpower 
requirements were likely to be, and the assumption that entry to 
high schools would be limited to those pupils with a class 1 or 
2 pass in the JCE (31). 
Skills for the Future reiterated and supported the strategy for 
the development of secondary education and training as outlined 
in Current Trends. 
	 Colclough and Digby emphasised the need for 
the vocationalisation of junior secondary education adapted to the 
needs of a subsistence economy and the development of rural areas. 
They warned of the growing problem of surpluses of educated manpower, 
endorsed the idea of junior secondary education as terminal for 
the majority, and advocated the strict rationing of places in high 
schools (32). 
	 They recommended the expansion of further education 
and training institutions, and stressed the need "to plan their 
capacity in line with the country's need for vocational skills". 
This would entail the establishment of the proposed district 
vocational training centres, considerable expansion of craft 
training at SCOT, and a doubling of SCOT's planned capacity for 
secretarial and commercial courses (33). 
The recommendations 	 in Skills for the Future were shaped by 
two main considerations (34). 
	 The first was that the growing 
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problem of unemployed secondary school leavers, already noted in 
the ILO report (35), would become "dramatically worse over the next 
few years". 	 The second was the need for a rapid improvement in 
the efficiency of the education and training system to gear it to 
the production of the right kinds of manpower, and so rectify the 
situation, described in the ILO report, in which "by and large the 
present educational and training system is producing students who 
are either unemployable or for whom there is very little demand" 
(36). 
The majority of pupils who completed the junior secondary course 
would not be able to find jobs in the formal sector. 	 There was, 
therefore, a need to vocationalise junior secondary education and 
gear it to development efforts in rural areas for the "greater 
benefit" of this majority "whose destinies lie in rural rather than 
urban work". 	 The recent growth of senior secondary education could 
not be justified 	 "on the basis of either employment needs or 
equity considerations" and, though it might be 
"thought to be easier, in the short term, to yield to the 
pressures to continue the expansion, the longer term 
costs - political, economic and social - will be much 
greater than the benefits of so doing". 
Senior secondary education was expensive and should not be 
expanded faster than was really necessary, particularly in 
circumstances where Swaziland's limited resources could be more 
profitably used. 	 What was needed was an educational development 
policy directed towards a major effort to improve social and 
economic opportunities for the rural masses, the great majority 
of the population who would "remain untouched by formal sector 
growth" (37). 
Reference to chapter 2 indicates that the strategy for the 
development of secondary education and training outlined above 
incorporated the main features of the education for rural development 
strategy, and in particular the main features of the World Bank 
lending policy as contained in the 1974 Education Sector Working 
Paper. 	 The one variation was that, while the Bank tended to see 
basic education in terms of primary schooling, in Swaziland it was 
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seen in terms of a ten year course of basic education encompassing 
primary and lower secondary schooling. 	 This issue is referred 
to again in the next chapter in discussion of the part played by 
the Swazi model of education in the preparation of the education 
plan. 
(b) The plan  
As indicated in the references cited in the following paragraphs, 
the proposals for the development of secondary education and 
training in Current Trends and Skills for the Future which are 
outlined above were incorporated directly into the education plan. 
From this perspective, the planned development of secondary 
education and training could be seen as part of a broadly based 
manpower strategy, outlined in Chapter 5 of the national develop-
ment plan (38), which would "entail efforts to shape education and 
training for maximum employability and productivity". 	 Over the 
plan period education would be "re-structured in order to fit the 
manpower needs of the country". 	 The two main components of this 
re-structuring would be "the re-orientation of education towards 
practical rather than academic pursuits", and the expansion of 
"the capacity of post-junior secondary training institutions to 
meet manpower requirements". 
What was needed, according to the education plan set out in Chapter 
15, was "training in practical skills with immediate applicability 
to the problems of a subsistence economy and a rural environment". 
The junior secondary curriculum would be 
"revised through the inclusion of practical subjects 
with a bias towards preparing the majority of those who 
complete the course for employment and self-employment 
opportunities". 
The development of junior secondary education as "three years of 
post-primary 	 training 	 with 	 a 	 strong 	 practical 	 orientation" 
would prepare school leavers "for actual conditions of life and 
work" and provide them with the basic skills to support Government 
programmes for the development of the rural economy (39). 
Entry to senior secondary education would be restricted according 
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to manpower requirements. 	 The intended diversification of 
secondary education would include senior secondary education, and 
the "orientation towards practical and technical pursuits" would 
gear it to the production of the critical skills needed for economic 
development. 	 It was "vital, economically and socially, to ensure 
that the output from senior secondary schools is closely geared 
to employment opportunities" to avoid the problems associated with 
surpluses of educated manpower and unemployed high school leavers. 
Entry to high school would be restricted to manpower requirements, 
and limited to those pupils who obtained a first or second class 
pass in the JCE (40). 
Junior secondary education would provide "practical courses to 
prepare students for rural occupations". 	 At the same time, it 
would also prepare them for further vocational training. 
Vocational training programmes would develop "a reservoir of 
urgently required skills responding to the needs of industrial and 
agricultural developments in various parts of the country" (41). 
Government planned to establish "the first two of a series of 
vocational training centres in the districts". 	 These centres 
would "serve the development needs of rural areas with skilled and 
semi-skilled manpower, thus providing secondary school leavers with 
training and employment" (42). 	 The facilities at SCOT would be 
expanded to enable the college "to meet its greatly increased 
responsibilities to produce the qualified manpower needed for 
Swaziland's development" (43). 
It was "expected that some post-primary and post-secondary training" 
could be "accomplished through non-formal education programmes 
provided by education centres situated in rural areas", but the 
plan tended to see RECs more in terms of a social experiment in 
adult education. 	 They would "provide courses according to the 
expressed needs of the communities which they serve"; 	 they would 
"make their facilities available to the various extension services 
of Government"; 	 and the Ministry of Education would co-ordinate 
and integrate the development of the RECs "with other adult training 
programmes organised by various ministries and agencies" (44). 
Plan proposals for the development of secondary education and 
training depended on, and were arranged to accommodate, donor 
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agency projects and programmes. 	 Proposals for the establishment 
of the RECs had been included in the 1975 World Bank loan and the 
centres were expected to start operating in the first year of the 
third plan period. 	 The vocationalisation of secondary education 
depended on the extension of existing projects and programmes such 
as ODA's schools agriculture project and its technical education 
programme; 	 the facilities and equipment to be provided under the 
Bank's 1975 and 1977 loans; 	 and the establishment of proposed 
projects in curriculum development (SIDA/UNESCO) and teacher 
training (SIDA/FAO), which were incorporated into joint agreements 
with the Bank, and for which the educational planning project had 
laid the groundwork. 	 The inclusion of proposals for the esta- 
blishment of district vocational training centres was based on the 
expectation of external assistance following a project identification 
report funded by the Bank and prepared by the World ORT Union (45). 
Donor projects  
The theory that donors responded to official requests for aid 
from Government was spelled out in a paper prepared by the UNESCO 
educational planning project for the Ministry of Education. 	 As 
a sovereign independent state, Swaziland was expected to formulate 
its own educational development policy, establish its own priorities, 
and make its own assessment of where external assistance was 
needed and how it could be most profitably used to support the 
implementation of national goals and objectives (46). 	 Donor 
agencies and Government subscribed officially to the theory of 
donors acting at the request of Government. 	 But, as indicated 
in the account that follows, in practice donor commitment to the 
theory of responsiveness was tempered by their own views on aid 
for education, as indicated in the opening paragraphs of this 
chapter and in general analysis in chapter 3. 
The various donor agencies had their own policies and procedures 
which determined the kind of assistance they were prepared to offer, 
and the ways in which they were prepared to provide it. 	 Project 
documentation (47) indicated that they entered aid negotiations 
with their own definite views on Swazi educational needs and 
priorities, and they specified, often in considerable detail, the 
projects they were prepared to provide and the conditions attached 
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to their provision. 	 As already indicated, donor views on 'what 
was best' for education in Swaziland rested on the idea of education 
as human resource development, and as an instrument for economic 
and social change. 	 Donor projects provided aid for the diver- 
sification of the junior secondary curriculum and related teacher 
training programmes, the extension of craft and commercial 
training, and the development of non-formal education and training 
programmes. 
Government was ill equipped to provide the clearly defined 
priorities, the extensive statistical information, and the detailed 
project documentation insisted upon in a variety of styles and 
formats by the various donor agencies (48), and referred to in 
general discussion of the aid dialogue in chapter 3. 	 In the 
absence of clearly defined educational priorities and detailed 
requests from Government, donor agencies identified what they 
regarded as suitable projects and ventriloquised requests and 
supporting documentation for their proposals. 	 Project documentation 
was prepared by 'experts' in the UNESCO planning project, by 
visiting missions, and in some instances by consultants provided 
by donors expressly for the purpose (49). 	 The education and 
training sector reviews prepared by donor agencies, and referred 
to in chapter 6, were used to identify and support proposals for 
aid for education. 	 They specified major problem areas, established 
educational priorities, and made detailed recommendations for 
areas for external assistance. 
	
The first was published by UNESCO 
as an agency document and presented to Government. 	 The second, 
drawn up by a team of consultants provided by EEC, USAID, ODA, 
and CIDA, and supported by the UNESCO educational planning 
project, was ventriloquised as a Government document. 
The design of donor projects was shaped by strong agency concerns 
for the most effective use of the aid they provided. 	 The search 
for situations in which aid could be expected to have the maximum 
possible impact through the application of a 'multiplier effect' 
was indicated in their preferences for particular kinds of 
assistance. 
	
Donors looked for institution building projects in 
areas such as planning and administration, curriculum development 
and teacher training; 	 for the placement of 'experts' in positions 
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where it was expected they would be able to exert influence in the 
planning and development of key parts of the education system; 
and for experimental projects, such as RECs, which were intended 
to be replicated and generalised across the education system. 
The various donor agencies funded self contained projects 
identified with and responsible for particular programmes and 
activites. 	 UNESCO was responsible for the establishment and 
operation of the Ministry of Education planning section and the 
secondary curriculum unit, FAO for the training programme for 
Agriculture/Home 	 Economics 	 teachers, 	 ODA 	 for 	 the 
	 schools 
agriculture programme and the teacher training programme in 
technical subjects at SCOT. 	 The various kinds of technical 
assistance provided by ODA were packaged so as to support key 
parts of the education system. 	 The SCOT project, the placement 
of 'experts' in key positions in the ministry and at William 
Pitcher, and the provision of specialist teachers were identified 
with and responsible for the development of technical subjects 
and Mathematics in secondary schools. 
	 The placement of 'experts' 
with responsibility for educational administration and adult and 
non-formal education was designed to bring pressure to bear on 
what CIDA regarded as key parts of the education system. 
The various ways in which donors sought to exercise control over 
the operation of the projects they funded, and ensure their 
effective implementation, have been referred to in general 
discussion of the aid dialogue in chapter 3. 
	 Joint agreements 
and reports of project implementation (50) indicated that donor 
projects were designed as comprehensive packages intended to cover 
as many critical factors as possible. 
	 They included provision 
for 'expert' staff and a senior 'expert' as project manager, 
'counterparts' and project related training, administrative and 
support staff, transport, and equipment. 
	 Project implementation 
was tied to agency procedures for the disbursement, expenditure, 
and accounting of project funds. 
	 Donors insisted on the setting 
of deadlines for the production of project outputs and the 
achievement of project objectives, and on the systematic checking 
of project implementation through frequent progress reports, regular 
monitoring and evaluation missions, and periodic reviews of progress 
and problems. 
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In some instances, donors insisted on analytical surveys, research 
studies, and reviews of educational development funded by project 
funds or through country aid programmes. 	 Reports funded 
through SPED, for example, included proposals for technical and 
vocational education (51), school leaver tracer studies (52), 
a wastage analysis in primary schools (53), an evaluation of RECs 
(54), and a study of the utilisation of teachers in secondary 
schools (55). 
	
Most of these reports, written by 'experts' in the 
UNESCO educational planning section and by visiting missions and 
consultants were ventriloquised as Government documents. 
A characteristic feature of donor intervention was a continual 
stream of visiting missions and consultants seeking information, 
and drawing up reports. 	 More often than not, these reports were 
written outside Swaziland and were not available to Government until 
some considerable time after the mission or consultant had left 
the country. 	 Some reports, such as the CIDA report referred to 
in chapter 7, were based on field research. 
	
Others consisted of 
little more than information provided by the UNESCO planning project 
and re-working of information in earlier reports, accompanied by 
recommendations for further missions and consultancies (56). 
Reliance on a single donor for capital aid for secondary education 
placed Government at a disadvantage in the aid dialogue, the more 
so as World Bank assistance through SPED was packaged in the form 
of a sectoral agreement. 	 The result was that Government was made 
an offer it could hardly refuse, and the Bank appeared to exert 
considerable influence in the formulation of educational policies. 
Joint agreements referred to in Ministry of Education annual reports 
(57) indicated that Bank assistance for the construction of secondary 
schools was conditional on Government adoption of policies for 
diversification of the junior secondary curriculum, the establishment 
of RECs, and the development of non-formal education and training 
programmes. 
The Bank was not prepared to fund the total cost of capital develop- 
ment projects. 	 As a condition of Swaziland's credit effectiveness, 
substantial local funding, over 40 per cent of total construction 
costs, had to be commited to SPED projects (58), tying Government 
resources to the implementation of Bank projects and Bank policies. 
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The need to match the Bank contribution over the plan period was 
reflected in a larger allocation for the development of secondary 
education that envisaged in the education plan (Tables 28 and 29). 
In addition, Government was responsible for long term salary costs 
generated by the project and, however generous its terms might be, 
it had eventually to meet the interest on and repay the loan for 
the total SPED package (including technical assistance, procurement 
costs, missions and consultants), not merely the total construction 
costs. 
The Bank's sectoral approach and Swaziland's reliance on a single 
donor for capital investment in the secondary sector limited 
Government's room for manoeuvre in negotiations about conditions 
attached to the provision of aid. 	 The Bank brought pressure to 
bear for a number of changes in existing administrative and 
organisational arrangements which, as indicated in Ministry of 
Education annual reports (59), were agreed to reluctantly by 
Government, and never fully accepted. 	 The Bank insisted on the 
establishment of a project implementation unit, and on its placement 
in the Ministry of Education rather than the Ministry of Works, 
which was responsible for all Government building programmes. 
SPED was tied to Bank specifications for the design of school 
buildings and for materials, furniture and equipment, and to Bank 
procedures for tendering, construction, and procurement. 	 Junior 
secondary schools built by SPED were designed to promote a more 
efficient use of plant and equipment through a reduction in the 
number of classrooms, changes in school organisation, and their 
use as RECs. 
Joint agreements made it clear (60) that the Bank's continued 
support for education in Swaziland was conditional on Government 
agreement to establish programmes, provided through external 
assistance, for the diversification of the junior secondary 
curriculum and the training of teachers of practical subjects. 
UNESCO provided assistance for the development of a junior 
secondary curriculum, FAO for the training of Agriculture and 
Home Economics teachers, and ODA extended its assistance for the 
training of teachers of technical subjects and the schools 
agriculture project. 	 The parcelling out of areas of assistance 
and the provision of projects designed to complement and support 
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each other were indications of donor attempts to increase the 
effectiveness of their aid through collaboration and co-ordination 
of their efforts. 	 SPED operated under a UNESCO/World Bank co- 
operative agreement, SIDA funded joint projects executed by 
UNESCO and FAO, a consortium of donors initiated and produced the 
1981 education and training sector review. 	 Donor collaboration 
appeared to strengthen their control over the aid dialogue, 
encourage attempts to influence Swazi educational policies and 
priorities, and give them a large measure of responsibility for 
the planning and co-ordination of aid. 
The impact of aid for education  
Aid for education was designed to have an influence, and it appeared 
to exert considerable influence, in the planning and development 
of secondary education. 	 Donors had virtually assumed responsibility 
for educational planning, the planning and co-ordination of aid, 
and the preparation and drawing up of the Swazi education plan. 
The plan incorporated donor policies and priorities for secondary 
education and training, and plan preparation was conditioned by 
the availability of aid and the inclusion of projects that donors 
were prepared to support. 	 Crucial areas in the development of 
secondary education had been virtually taken over by donor projects 
drawn up by visiting missions, implemented through technical 
assistance, and controlled and monitored by agency procedures. 
But the influence aid for education was intended to exert was 
restricted by limitations in planning and administration on the 
donor side, as indicated in general analysis of the impact of 
donor intervention in chapter 3. 	 There were weaknesses in 
project design, delays in project implementation, and problems in 
the provision of 'experts' and other forms of assistance. 	 In 
some instances, plant, furniture, and equipment provided according 
to agency specifications proved to be inappropriate for Swazi 
conditions and for the purposes for which it was intended. 
Expensive metalwork and woodwork equipment provided through SPED 
turned out to be too sophisticated not only for junior secondary 
school pupils but also for locally trained technical subjects 
teachers (61), and far too sophisticated for the non-formal rural 
training programmes for which it was also intended. 
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In spite of donor attempts at the project design stage, there was 
little in the way of collaboration and co-ordination at the stage 
of project implementation. 	 Project documentation and documentation 
prepared with donor assistance (62) commented on 	 the lack of co- 
ordination between the curriculum development and teacher training 
projects which were in theory working together towards the 
diversification of the junior secondary curriculum. 	 There was 
no professional contact between the USAID and SIDA/UNESCO 
curriculum development projects, though they worked in the same 
building, and in theory were collaborating in the development 
of a ten year basic education curriculum (63). 	 Ministry of 
Education annual reports made it clear (64) that SPED and PSBU, 
though both were staffed by UNESCO 'experts' working in the same 
ministry, operated separately from each other according to 
different policies and procedures. 
Aid to education was very largely a collection of self contained 
package projects, working separately from each other, and depending 
on technical assistance and agency procedures for their imple- 
mentation. 	 But, as indicated in general analysis of the impact 
of donor intervention in chapter 3, the ways in which the various 
donor agencies sought to ensure the implementation of their 
projects limited the influence they brought to bear in the 
development of secondary education. 
	 When an aid project came to 
an end, it meant the end for all practical purposes of the 
programme or activity it had established or for which it had 
taken over responsibility. 	 The end of the SIDA/UNESCO curriculum 
development project in 1982 meant the end for all practical 
purposes of the secondary curriculum unit; 
	 and the end of the 
SIDA/FAO project at Luyengo and the ODA project at SCOT in 1983 
meant in effect the end of training programmes for teachers of 
practical subjects for junior secondary schools. 
Project implementation and the influence aid to education was 
intended to exert was restricted more critically by the Swazi 
approach to secondary education and the Swazi response to the 
responsible interventionism of donor agencies. 
	 The next chapter 
examines the ways in which the Swazi response restricted the 
influence donor intervention was intended to exert in the 
preparation of the education plan, educational planning, and 
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project implementation. 
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9 THE IMPACT OF DONOR INTERVENTION IN THE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF SECONDARY EDUCATION IN SWAZILAND 
The impact of donor intervention in the planning and development 
of secondary education was more apparent than real. 	 The account 
that follows examines the ways in which the influence aid for 
education was intended to exert was critically restricted by the 
persistence of the Swazi approach and the pragmatic nature of the 
Swazi response to donor intervention. 	 Section I describes the 
preparation of the education plan from a Swazi rather than a donor 
perspective, and Sections 2 and 3 describe the operation of 
educational planning and the implementation of donor projects during 
the plan period. 
Throughout the three sections there are references to the conflict 
between Swazi and international aid approaches to secondary education, 
lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies, and lack of Swazi 
support for aid projects designed to implement these policies. 
Lack of commitment was linked with an underlying resentment at what 
was seen as disregard on the donor side for Swazi preferences and 
aspirations, and attempts by donor agencies to bring undue influence 
to bear in the formulation and implementation of Swazi policies. 
From a donor perspective, lack of support for aid projects could 
be rationalised in terms of persistent weaknesses in Swazi planning 
and management, but there was a strong sense in which what was 
regarded as Swazi weakness in planning and management was a way 
of protecting the Swazi model from the responsible interventionism 
of donor agencies. 	 In the initial stages this form of protection 
might have been largely instinctive, but analysis suggests that 
lack of Swazi support for donor policies and projects was not 
always unintentional. 
Reference to chapter 4 and to the account which follows indicates 
a number of broad similarities between Swaziland and other African 
countries in the ways in which their approach to secondary 
education and their response to donor intervention limited the 
influence aid for education was expected to exert, and in the 
conditions that shaped this process. 	 But the persistence of the 
Swazi approach, the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to donor 
intervention, and the marked degree of protection afforded the 
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Swazi model of education were shaped by distinctively Swazi 
characteristics. 	 At various points in the account which follows 
reference is made to the part played in this process by an all 
pervasive political authority, rooted in the homogeneity of the 
Swazi Nation and the strength and continuity of Swazi traditional 
institutions and processes. 	 The chapter ends with brief 
reference to the. way in which Swaziland's over-all dependence on South 
Africa provided a form of security within which the traditional 
monarchy was enabled to exercise its authority. 
The education plan  
Chapter 8 described the impact of donor intervention in the 
preparation and presentation of Swaziland's education plan. 	 The 
account that follows describes the part played by the Swazi model 
of education in the formulation of policy for secondary education 
and training, and the incorporation into the education plan of 
Swazi policies and priorities. 	 This approach, that of telling 
the same story in a different way, entails a certain amount of 
repetition, but it illustrates the interplay of donor and Swazi 
approaches in the formulation of educational policy, the essentially 
diatomic nature of the education plan, and the dominant influence 
of the Swazi model of education. 
(a) Policy formulation  
As already indicated, Current Trends was drawn up by a working 
group in the Ministry of Education with advice and assistance 
from the UNESCO educational planning project, and its strategy 
for secondary education and training was shaped by donor policies 
and priorities. 	 At the same time, this strategy was shaped by 
the need for the working group, and the Ministry of Education, to 
demonstrate an allegiance to a royally sanctioned Swazi model of 
education by reaffirming the policies enshrined in the Manifesto  
and the NEC report. 	 Current Trends incorporated donor policies 
and priorities, but it was drawn up within limits set by a Swazi 
approach to education legitimated by an all pervasive and virtually 
unchallenged political authority. 
Proposals for the development of junior secondary education followed 
the NEC report in paying "great attention to social demand", and 
acknowledging that 
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"the pressures for expanding the capacity of junior 
secondary schools (are) already very strong, and cannot 
realistically be reversed. 	 Moreover, Government has 
accepted this expansion and is committed to it" (1). 
The inclusion of junior secondary education as part of a proposed 
ten year course of universal basic education was a convenient 
rationalisation for continued expansion at this level. 	 Reference 
to basic education, manpower for rural development, and social 
equity accommodated the NEC report's proposal to cater for the 
ever increasing demand for secondary school places within the 
framework of the education for rural development strategy. 
Proposals for the vocationalisation of junior secondary education 
as part of this strategy were supported in Swazi terms by direct 
reference to the notion of work oriented education in the 
Manifesto (2). 
The need to restrict the development of senior secondary education 
according to manpower requirements was set alongside proposals for 
the diversification of the senior secondary curriculum, supported 
by direct reference to the principle in the Manifesto that 
education must be work oriented from primary to the highest levels. 
As in the Manifesto and the NEC report, these proposals were seen 
largely in terms of catering for individual preferences and aptitudes, 
and of the expansion of senior secondary education through the 
addition of 'vocational and technical streams' in high schools 
and the development of 'parallel senior secondary courses' in 
district vocational training centres. 
	 It was expected that this 
expansion would provide places, and COSC examination passes, for 
non academic pupils (3). 
As Skills for the Future made clear (4), planned outputs from 
secondary schools and training institutions had been set by 
Government before work started on the ODA survey. 	 The supply side 
of the equation had been determined without reference to, and 
before any attempt had been made to assess, the likely demand for 
skilled manpower. 	 The report of the 1976 ILO mission had 
recommended the restriction of junior secondary education "in the 
light of the manpower needs of the nation" and to avoid the 
"economic and social repercussions" which would be caused by 
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"high unemployment among educated persons" (5). 
	 The ODA survey 
was carried out within limits set by an already established Swazi 
policy for continued expansion at this level. 	 The warning in 
Skills for the Future that the majority of junior secondary school 
leavers would be unemployed, and its recommendations for vocatio-
nalisation adapted to the needs of a subsistence economy and the 
development of rural areas were made within these limits. 
Proposals in Current Trends and Skills for the Future for the 
development of senior secondary education to be limited according 
to manpower requirements and financial constraints ran counter to 
strong and persistent political and social pressures for rapid and 
continued expansion at this level. 	 Preparedness to respond to 
these pressures was an inbuilt feature of the Swazi approach and 
it was hardly likely that Government would ever be seriously 
committed to a policy of restricted entry to high schools. 	 There 
had been no attempt to implement earlier proposals for a cut back 
in the expansion of senior secondary education. 
	 Enrolment targets 
for 1976 and 1977 included in Current Trends and the Financial and  
Statistical Analysis, and which appeared to have been accepted by 
Government, had not been achieved, and planned entry into Form 4 
had been exceeded by over 50 per cent in 1976 and 1977 (Table 14). 
The ODA survey had based its manpower supply estimates on these 
planned enrolments, and warned that the problem of unemployed 
secondary school leavers would become dramatically worse over the 
next few years. 	 Skills for the Future pointed out (6) that 
annual Form 5 enrolments were currently some 600 higher than 
planned and that, if the trend continued, the surplus of educated 
manpower from senior secondary schools, and the number of unemployed 
Form 5 leavers, would be twice as high as estimated. 
(b) The plan  
The main features of the Swazi model of education were incorporated 
into the education plan along with the donor policies and priorities 
referred to in the previous chapter. 
	 A characteristic feature 
of the Swazi education plan was a lack of coherence and consistency, 
which stemmed very largely from the attempt to include within it 
two contrasting approaches to education. 
	 At times, the two 
approaches appeared to be acommodated one within the other. 
	 At 
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others, they existed separately, side by side, as competing and 
contradictory policies. 
The opening sentence of the preamble to the education plan was a 
restatement and reaffirmation of the basic principle in the 
Manifesto: 	 "It is the right of every child to have access to 
education and to receive an education geared to his own needs". 
At the same time, "in a developing country such as Swaziland", 
the nation's limited resources "must be applied for the realisation 
of national goals" (7). 	 The Manifesto's second principle, that 
education must be work oriented, and its emphasis on the need to 
break with the colonial past, were also incorporated into the 
preamble. 	 The "traditional scholastic model" had for some time 
been "inappropriate for Swaziland", and what was needed was the 
re-orientation of the education system "towards practical rather 
than academic pursuits". 	 This proposal was linked with the 
education for rural development strategy through reference to the 
need to relate training in practical skills to the demands of a 
subsistence economy and a rural environment (8). 
The education plan followed the NEC report in that its major 
development objective was "to cope with the strong and diversified 
demand for education" (9), which was strongest and most insistent 
at the senior secondary level. 	 At the same time, as proposed in 
Current Trends and Skills for the Future, it was necessary to 
restrict the development of senior secondary education according 
to manpower requirements and financial constraints. 	 The plan 
gave no indication what these manpower requirements and financial 
constraints were likely to be, though these were available in 
Skills for the Future and the Financial and Statistical Analysis. 
The implications of a policy of restricted entry to high schools 
were not spelled out in terms of Form 4 and 5 places available 
over the plan period, and separate enrolment targets for junior 
and senior secondary education were not included in the plan, though 
these had been provided in Current Trends and the Financial and  
Statistical Analysis (Tables 13 and 14) and used in the ODA 
manpower survey. 
Government was never seriously committed to the idea that the 
development of senior secondary education should be determined by 
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financial constraints and according to manpower requirements. 
The education plan acommodated donor insistence on limiting 
development at this level by invoking the Manifesto's criteria of 
"merit and aptitude" for entry to secondary education (10). 	 It 
proposed "to restrict entry to senior secondary schools to holders 
of first and second class passes in the Junior Certificate 
Examination, subject to a decision by the Council of Ministers" 
(11). 	 This meant in effect that the matter would be referred to 
the king at Lobamba, and decided according to the principles in 
the Manifesto and the recommendations in the NEC report. 
Swaziland's over-all development objectives, outlined in Chapter 
3 of the national development plan (12), were economic growth, 
self-reliance, and social justice and stability. 	 While these 
objectives could be seen from a donor perspective as fitting with 
the education for rural development strategy, they were shaped by 
Swazi rather than donor considerations. 	 Education, as a social 
service, had a part to play in social justice and stability through 
increased and more widely spread provision. 	 It would contribute 
to self-reliance through the production of educated manpower to 
support "a vigorous localisation policy in the private and 
public sectors". 	 It was in this sense, as Chapter 3 made clear, 
that education and training programmes would be "tailored to the 
manpower needs of the nation" (13), and it was in this sense that 
the plan followed the policy in the Manifesto for transferring 
economic as well as political power "to the rightful owners - the 
Swazis" (14). 
Neither education nor manpower requirements were referred to in 
the context of economic growth, which was seen exclusively in 
terms of increased agricultural and industrial production in the 
modern sector. 	 There was no reference to the part that education 
might be expected to play in the transformation of the traditional 
rural economy. 	 Rural development was seen in terms of the 
commercialisation of traditional farming in the RDAs, and the 
wider spreading of social services financed by modern sector 
economic growth. 	 The plan's manpower strategy, outlined in 
Chapter 5, was based on the report of the ODA survey. 	 It proposed 
a re-structuring of the education system to meet the manpower 
requirements of the country, but it made no reference to 
-206- 
recommendations in the ODA report, or to proposals in the education 
chapter of the plan, for education and training to be geared to 
the needs of a subsistence economy and the development of rural 
areas. 
(c) Aid for education  
There were in effect two education plans, drawn up according to 
different assumptions, and shaped by conflicting approaches to 
education. 	 The first, as indicated in the previous chapter, was 
conditioned by the availability of aid for education and the 
inclusion of donor policies and priorities. 	 The second was 
shaped by the Swazi model of education and the need, for obvious 
political reasons, to reaffirm the policies and priorities set 
out in the Manifesto and the NEC report. 
Government was well aware that the provision of aid was linked with 
the preparation. of a national development plan. 	 Development 
plans before independence had been closely tied to the disbursement 
of aid from Britain (15). 	 The 1969 Post Independence Development  
Plan had been drawn up in the expectation of aid from Britain and 
a variety of other donors. 	 The Prime Minister had acknowledged 
in the 1969 plan that "to successfully carry out the country's 
investment and development programme Government needs external 
aid" (16), and had made it clear in the second development plan 
that "we do expect and hope that our friends will continue to 
help us" (17). 	 In the same way, the University Council 
acknowledged the support of donor agencies in the past "with both 
capital and technical assistance". 	 It was "of concern" that 
"the commitment of donors in the past to support higher level 
education should continue", and the 1976 university development 
plan had "been written with this aim in mind" (18). 
From a Swazi perspective the preparation of the education plan 
was largely conditioned by and geared to the production of an 
official document that would fit donor requirements, and which 
could be used by the various donor agencies to support proposals 
for projects in the education sector. 	 The incorporation of donor 
policies and priorities into the education plan did not necessarily 
imply a Swazi commitment, or indicate that Government had any 
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serious intention of trying to implement them. 
	 The education 
plan was not accorded the same status as a policy document as 
the Manifesto and the NEC report. 	 It was regarded as an expatriate 
rather than a Swazi document, and there was a sense in which it 
was 'written by expatriates for expatriates'. 
Government might be prepared to provide a token demonstration 
of commitment to donor policies and priorities, but it was not 
prepared to compi-omise the Swazi model of education. 
	
It insisted 
on the incorporation into the education plan of Swazi policies and 
priorities and, on one of the very rare occasions on which the 
plan was referred to, it was described as a continuation and 
confirmation of the Swazi policies in the Manifesto and the NEC 
report (19). 
	 Whatever the plan's declared intentions and 
objectives might appear to be from a donor perspective, from a 
Swazi perspective national policy for the development of secondary 
education rested squarely on the principle of education as an 
inalienable right and acceptance of Government's responsibility 
to make education available to all who wanted it, according to 
their needs. 
Educational planning  
Government might be prepared to accept assistance in educational 
planning to comply with requirements for aid and under pressure 
from donors, but it was never fully committed to the donor approach 
or the need to develop a national capacity for educational planning. 
Documentation prepared by donor agencies (20) and with donor 
assistance (21) made it clear that, in spite of persistent donor 
pressures, there was no attempt to establish an educational 
planning section in the Ministry of Education with its own 
structures and clearly defined functions and responsibilities. 
The establishment and operation of educational planning depended 
on donor assistance, and the UNESCO project was, for all practical 
purposes, the ministry educational 
	 planning section. 
	 When the 
project ceased to be operational in 1978 and 1979, educational 
planning virtually disappeared (22). 
	 When the project was 
operational, there were delays in establishing and filling 
'counterpart' posts, changes in personnel, and a marked reluctance 
on the part of the ministry to arrange that national staff 
attached to the project were engaged in planning activities (23). 
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The ministry regarded educational planning, whether carried out 
by donor 'experts' or national staff, as an imported, expatriate 
activity, a technical enterprise concerned almost exclusively with 
the collection of information on the education system and the 
preparation of statistical tables and enrolment projections (24). 
The Swazi view of educational planning and the donor tendency for 
self contained package projects combined to create the impression 
that expatriate staff constituted, almost by definition, a small 
technocratic elite, distanced by their status as 'advisers' and 
the nature of their work from other activities in the ministry, 
and insulated against the ordinary rough and tumble of what was 
happening in the education system (25). 
At the same time, there was a tendency to regard 'advisers' as 
operational within the ministry (26), and subject to its adminis- 
trative procedures. 
	
Project documentation (27) indicated that 
'experts' carried out routine administrative and management tasks, 
and they were expected, as and when the need arose, to involve 
themselves in activities in addition to, and in some instances 
instead of, those generally accepted as educational planning 
activities. 	 Awareness of inadequacies in Swazi administration 
linked with professional concern that things were not being done 
and needed to be done made these pressures difficult to resist. 
Project efforts to provide educational planning with over-all 
management and direction, and to identify and implement operational 
priorities, were restricted by the ministry's lack of commitment 
to what it regarded as an expatriate activity, the absorptive 
capacity of its ad hoc structures and procedures, and a tendency 
to expect 'experts' and national staff to take on a variety of 
extraneous tasks which directed time and effort away from 
fundamental planning activities (28). 
Swazi acceptance of the need for educational planning was a more 
or less mechanical reaction to donor requirements and donor 
pressures, and the application of international models of 
educational planning played little part in policy formulation 
and plan preparation. 	 As already indicated, Government made 
little use of the manpower analysis prepared by ODA 'experts'. 
There was no attempt to supplement the ODA survey by "smaller, 
more selective studies" as recommended in Skills for the Future 
(29), or to seek further assistance in preparation for the fourth 
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development plan. 	 Technical information made available by UNESCO 
'experts' in Current Trends and the Financial and Statistical  
Analysis played little part in the preparation of the education 
plan, and Government avoided the problems of resource allocation 
and ranking of priorities raised by analysis of the plan's 
financial implications. 
The incorporation of donor proposals for improved planning and 
management into official Government publications was little more 
than a token demonstration, and did not indicate any serious 
intention of trying to implement them. 	 A Guide to School  
Regulations and Procedures was published by the Ministry of 
Education and distributed to schools. 	 These regulations and 
procedures were rarely, if ever, referred to, the ministry made 
no attempt to enforce them, and they were regularly ignored by 
schools. 	 Nor was there any attempt to implement detailed and 
comprehensive recommendations, made in donor reports and reiterated 
in the 1981 sector review, for the rationalisation of the budget 
process and the more effective administration and control of school 
fees. 	 The UNESCO report on educational financing (30) noted that 
"both Government and local communities seem to be willing to 
maintain as much as possible the principles of free decisions by 
the schools". 	 The only attempt by the ministry to intervene in 
the school fees system was a proposal for the standardisation of 
school uniform (31), and this was quickly shelved following 
representations from local communities to the king at Lobamba. 
There was little room in the Swazi approach for donor notions of 
intervention and control. 	 As indicated in chapter 7, the ministry's 
inability to provide effective management and supervision of 
secondary education was linked with its reluctance to intervene 
directly or to assume responsibility for what happened in 
secondary schools. 	 Donor proposals which were critical of 
existing Swazi practice, which conflicted with the Swazi way of 
doing things, and which might have political and social repercussions 
stood little chance of being implemented, however rational they 
might appear from a donor perspective, and however much pressure 
was brought to bear by the various donor agencies. 	 In spite of 
donor pressures and exhortation, there was no attempt to implement 
the donor proposals for more effective management and supervision, 
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and increased ministry control of secondary education, which are 
referred to in chapter 8 and which appeared to be endorsed by 
incorporation into official documentation. 
On the one occasion donor influence resulted in direct intervention 
in secondary education the effect was shortlived. 	 Donor pressure 
for a more rational and efficient approach to educational 
expenditure, brought to bear through 'experts' in the three central 
agencies and supported by analytical surveys prepared by the 
UNESCO planning project, led to unqualified teachers employed on 
temporary terms and extra to requirements being taken off the 
Ministry of Education salary roll in December 1982. 	 After 
representations to the king at the royal kraal, they were reinstated 
in January 1983. 	 Almost immediately, without any supporting 
evidence or argument, the ministry proposed, and the central 
agencies accepted, further increases in the number of teachers 
required in the secondary school system (32). 
As indicated in chapter 7, the ministry's non-interventionist 
approach was linked with the nature of the traditional political 
process. 	 Within the Swazi context there was no room for the idea, 
as expressed by Eide (33), that educational planning "must primarily 
be conceived as a function of informative criticism, continuously 
involved in a critical analysis of current practices, procedures 
and policies". 
	 The function of educational planning was to 
support and justify existing Swazi policy and practice, not to 
draw attention to problem areas and make proposals for change. 
The ways in which the ministry sought to make use of donor expertise 
in educational planning were conditioned by donor requirements and 
donor pressures on the one hand, and on the other by Swazi 
expectations and Swazi pressures. 	 'Experts' found themselves 
being pushed towards a situation in which their main function, as 
far as the ministry was concerned, appeared to be that of 
providing senior officials with appropriate information, selective 
analysis and supporting argument to explain and legitimate 
existing policy and practice, and to justify ready made decisions 
taken without reference to the technical information and critical 
analysis made available by the planning project. 
Documentation drawn up with advice and assistance from the UNESCO 
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planning project was expected to support and legitimate Swazi 
policy in donor terms. 	 Policies for the continued expansion of 
secondary education were presented in terms of 'universal basic 
education' (34), and as an 'alternative strategy' for consolidation 
and re-orientation (35). 	 A school mapping exercise (36) was 
intended to provide technical corroboration for policy decisions 
that had already been taken in response to political and social 
pressures for more secondary school places. 	 The planning project 
was also expected to justify existing Swazi practices and procedures 
in the light of donor pressures for the more systematic 	 and 
efficient management of secondary education. 	 At various times, 
documentation prepared with project advice and assistance (37) 
attempted to explain the continuing employment of unqualified 
teachers on the grounds of subject shortages and reduced costs, 
and to justify over staffing and ministry over expenditure in terms 
of the demand for secondary education, the lack of alternative 
educational opportunities, and the need to update the Establishment  
Register. 
At the same time, the ministry tended to regard the planning project 
as a sort of public relations office which could provide, as and 
when the need arose, the necessary justification and supporting 
argument to vindicate existing policy and practice in terms of 
Swazi pressures and Swazi expectations. 	 Donor 'experts' 
assisted in drafting speeches and press releases (38) in which 
senior ministry officials outlined the progress made since 
independence in making secondary education more widely available; 
explained, and where necessary adjusted, policy and practice on 
entry to secondary schools, repeating, school uniform, and so on; 
and attempted to justify existing policy and practice in the face 
of disappointment and concern over issues such as COSC examination 
results, teachers' conditions of service, and school discipline. 
Statistical information and analytical surveys prepared by the 
UNESCO planning project and other donor 'experts' were rarely, 
if ever, used as a basis for decisions relating to the formulation 
and implementation of educational policy. 	 As indicated in chapter 
7, the briefly inherited traditions of a Western style administration 
had largely broken down and been replaced by a more traditional 
Swazi way of doing things. 	 Technical knowledge played little part 
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in the Swazi approach, which relied on a common oral tradition 
for the taking and communication of decisions, and which left ample 
room for Swazi manoeuvre and adjustment. 
The nature of the decision making process was shaped by the strength 
of traditional political authority and the persistence of Swazi 
law and custom, and conditioned by reference to a deeply rooted 
set of obligations based on kinship, clan, and lineage. 	 A common 
tradition shaped a Swazi network of power and patronage and 
allegiance and obligation, not readily accessible to donors and 
their 'experts', and which severely limited their room for 
manoeuvre in attempts to bring pressure to bear in educational 
decision making, and precluded the possibility of playing off one 
part of the Swazi system against another. 
It was not just that the colonial legacy of a Western style 
administration had largely broken down. 	 It had never worked in 
the way it was intended. 	 The real political power in Swaziland 
was vested in the king, and the modern system of government was 
an extension of and subordinate to his traditional powers as king 
of the Swazi Nation. 	 Decisions on educational matters, as on 
everything else, were taken by the king, or with reference to his 
wishes and subject to his approval. 	 On rare occasions when decisions 
taken in the name of central government conflicted with Swazi 
interests and expectations, they were quickly reversed after 
representations to the king through traditional channels. 
Educational planning operated within the modern system of government, 
but what happened in the planning and development of education in 
Swaziland was largely shaped by traditional forms of decision 
making that existed separately and worked independently from those 
ostensibly adopted by Government and recognised by donors and their 
'experts'. 	 The operation of Swazi traditional institutions and 
processes provided a single, all encompassing frame of reference, 
from which donors and their 'experts' were excluded. 
The persistence of the Swazi way of doing things placed donors at 
a disadvantage in aid negotiations, and Swazi resistance to donor 
pressures strengthened over the plan period. 	 Delays in aid 
negotiations on the Swazi side became more protracted, assurances 
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of support to monitoring and evaluation missions more perfunctory 
with little relationship to what was happening or what was likely 
to happen, and what appeared to be official acceptance of the 
1981 sector review was followed by serious reservations about its 
findings and recommendations when they were used to support 
proposals for new aid projects. 	 Government preparedness for the 
UNESCO planning project to be largely involved in aid negotiations 
(39) was a way of distancing Swazi priorities from the donor view 
of 'what was best' for Swaziland, and proposals arising out of these 
negotiations were rarely if ever seriously taken up on the Swazi 
side. 
	
Lack of Swazi commitment and support for existing projects 
became more noticeable, which (as already noted) led some agencies 
to withdraw funding from aid projects. 
Project implementation  
Chapter 8 has described how the implementation of aid projects 
was restricted by limitations in planning and administration on 
the donor side. 	 The account that follows examines the ways in 
which implementation was restricted and the influence aid for 
education was intended to exert was largely neutralised by the 
Swazi approach to secondary education, the Swazi response to donor 
intervention, and the nature of Swazi popular expectations for 
secondary education. 	 It focuses on three areas: diversification 
of the junior secondary curriculum, non-formal education and training 
programmes, and vocational training at SCOT. 	 It concludes with 
a brief reference to the distinctive combination of Swazi 
characteristics that strengthened Swazi resistance to donor 
intervention. 
(a) Diversification  
Government's major policy concern was to cater for popular pressures 
for the continued expansion of the existing system of secondary 
education. 	 While it was prepared to accept World Bank assistance 
for new schools to support the expansion of secondary education, 
it was never fully committed to the policy of curriculum diver-
sification and vocationalisation that was part of the SPED package. 
Aid projects for the diversification of the junior secondary 
curriculum were accepted under pressure from the Bank and other 
donor agencies, and as conditions attached by the Bank to the 
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provision of physical facilities necessary for continued expansion. 
Attempts at diversification depended almost entirely on donor 
initiative and donor effort. 	 In spite of official rhetoric 
in support of the principle in the Manifesto that education should 
be work oriented, Government provided little in the way of 
administrative or professional support, adequate funding, or 
national staff for aid projects designed to develop the teaching 
of practical subjects. 
There was no section in the Ministry of Education with over-all 
responsibility for curriculum development and/or teacher training. 
Project documentation (40) and documentation prepared with donor 
assistance (41) commented on the virtually complete lack of co-
ordination between the various curriculum development and teacher 
training programmes, and made it clear that the ministry provided 
little in the way of administrative and professional support for 
aid projects, or for Swazi programmes, in these areas. 
	
Donor 
proposals for the establishment of appropriate structures and 
procedures for improved planning and management of curriculum 
development and teacher training were largely disregarded, and 
attempts by the UNESCO planning project to provide some form of 
co-ordination were not encouraged. 
Curriculum development depended almost entirely on donor effort 
and donor support. 	 In spite of pressures from the various 
agencies, the ministry made little attempt to provide the support 
envisaged in joint agreements, or to co-ordinate the activities 
parcelled out between the SCU, the schools agriculture project, 
and 'experts' in the ministry and at William Pitcher though these 
activities were ostensibly directed towards the development of a 
junior secondary curriculum. 	 Little was achieved during the plan 
period in the development of a practically oriented junior 
secondary curriculum. 	 A member of the Swazi Parliament, who had 
retired as a Senior Inspector of Schools, regarded the ministry's 
lack of support for curriculum development projects and its lack 
of any attempt to co-ordinate their efforts as "evidence beyond 
a vestige of a doubt that curriculum development work is not taken 
seriously yet" (42). 
As noted in chapter 6, secondary teacher training was spread across 
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a variety of 	 institutions administered by different Swazi agencies. 
The ministry provided limited support for the training of general 
subjects teachers at William Pitcher. 	 Aid projects for the 
training of teachers of Agriculture and Home Economics at Luyengo 
and of technical and commercial subjects at SCOT were outside its 
immediate jurisdiction, and contact between these projects and the 
ministry was virtually non existent. 	 These projects received 
little support from the university on the one hand or the Deputy 
Prime Minister's Office on the other, and the Faculty of Agriculture 
and SCOT were more concerned with the administration of their own 
courses than with providing support for donor projects which were 
largely separate from their main concerns. 
Project documentation (43) and Ministry of Education annual reports 
(44) indicated that, in spite of joint agreements and persistent 
donor pressures, there were continuing problems in the provision 
of 'counterparts'. and the utilisation of project related training. 
There were lengthy delays in establishing 'counterpart' posts, 
further delays in making appointments to the few posts that were 
established, unexplained changes in personnel, and temporary 
makeshift arrangements in preparation for monitoring and evaluation 
missions sent out by the various donor agencies. 
	 There were delays 
in identifying suitable candidates for overseas training, and in 
making them available. 
	 In a number of instances, when candidates 
had been selected and had received overseas training, they were 
appointed to duties unrelated to the training they had undergone 
and outside the projects donors expected them to work in. 	 In 
some instances, they left the ministry for more attractive posts 
elsewhere. 	 When 'counterparts' were attached to donor projects, 
the ministry expected them to carry out a variety of tasks which 
had little if anything to do with project activities and project 
outputs. 
As a result, the implementation of aid projects depended upon the 
continued availability of 'experts' and their preparedness to take 
on operational tasks rather than the advisory roles specified 
in most joint agreements. 	 Projects lost the local character they 
were intended to have, as well as the institution building aims 
they set out to achieve (45). 	 The Swazi approach kept aid projects 
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apart from 	 each other and from other activities in the ministry 
and the education system as a whole, neutralising any real possibility 
of effective donor collaboration and co-ordination. 	 Project 
activities were regarded very largely as expatriate activities, 
carried out by foreign 'experts' in a variety of self contained 
projects funded by and identified with different donor agencies. 
Within the Swazi context, diversification was an imported activity, 
largely separate from Swazi aspirations for secondary education. 
Government provided little support during project implementation 
and, when donor funding and expatriate personnel were withdrawn, 
it made no effort to take over responsibility for what were 
regarded as donor programmes. 
The key post of Senior Inspector of Schools (Technical) was 
established as a result of donor pressure, and filled by donor 
'experts' provided in the first instance by ODA, and, after a gap 
of over a year with no one in post, by SIDA/UNESCO. 	 When there 
was an 'expert' in post, efforts to develop technical subjects in 
secondary schools were frustrated by lack of support and the 
absorptive capacity of the ministry's ad hoc structures and 
procedures. 	 The SIS (Technical) was expected to be responsible 
for both technical and commercial subjects in secondary schools, 
for some aspects of non-formal training (though these were never 
clearly specified), and for art and craft in primary schools, as 
well as undertaking routine administrative duties and various 
extraneous tasks, as when the need arose (46). 
	
There was no 
regular contact between the ministry and the SCU, and (as already 
noted) contact with the ODA teacher training programmes at SCOT 
was virtually non existent. 
	 Any attempt at co-operation between 
the SIS (Technical) and other programmes and activities in the 
same area tended to be informal and spasmodic. 
Reports and surveys (47) referred to the funding of technical and 
commercial subjects as unplanned and unrealistic, and to the way 
in which lack of administrative and professional support precluded 
any real possibility of effective management and supervision. 
SPED continued to provide plant and equipment but shortages of 
trained teachers, and the inefficient utilisation of available staff, 
meant that in a number of schools workshops remained unopened and 
equipment unused, while in other schools trained teachers coped 
as best they could with inadequate plant and equipment. 	 Teacher 
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training programmes were described as inadequate, and curricula 
for secondary schools and teacher training programmes as in need 
of a complete overhaul. 	 A final report prepared by the SIDA/ 
UNESCO 'expert' working as SIS (Technical) noted that ministry 
reluctance to provide adequate support raised doubts as to the 
seriousness of its commitment to the development of technical and 
commercial subjects, and curriculum diversification in general (48). 
What was achieved in attempts at diversification was largely the 
work of the ODA schools agriculture project, supported during the 
plan period by the SIDA/FAO teacher training project. 	 SAP started 
in 1973, and project documentation (49) indicated that ten years 
later it still relied almost entirely on expatriates in fully 
operational roles to staff its 15 professional, administrative, 
and support posts. 	 It had established its own organisational 
structure within the ministry and operated very largely, in Damiba's 
phrase (50), as "a state within the state". 	 By 1978 it had developed 
a junior secondary curriculum for agriculture, and by 1982 a new 
COSC Agriculture syllabus in conjunction with the Cambridge 
Examinations Syndicate. 	 By the end of the plan period the 
necessary facilities, staff, and administrative and professional 
support had been provided for the teaching of Agriculture in nearly 
two thirds of Swaziland's secondary schools (51). 	 The results 
achieved by SAP derived from its long term involvement in the 
development of the teaching of Agriculture in Swaziland, its 
operational rather than advisory approach, and its operation as 
a self contained, administration proof project. 
However effectively implemented in donor terms, and however well 
insulated against the Swazi approach donor projects might appear 
to be, attempts at diversification through SAP and other aid 
projects were largely neutralised by popular expectations for 
secondary education and the ministry's reluctance to intervene in 
what happened in secondary schools. 
	 Strong and insistent popular 
pressures were directed towards rapid linear expansion of the 
existing system of secondary education. 	 As noted in chapter 7, 
the operation of a school fee system, and the independence it 
afforded to secondary schools, enabled parents and communities to 
bring direct pressure to bear in resisting attempts at diversification 
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and, in spite of donor efforts, the junior secondary curriculum 
continued to reflect popular demand for the formal academic system 
of secondary education. 	 The ministry was not prepared to insist 
on curricular guidelines for secondary schools and, in spite of 
determined and sustained efforts by SAP, development of the teaching 
of Agriculture, along with other practical subjects, was not taken 
seriously in most secondary schools (52). 	 More often than not, 
very small numbers of pupils were ineffectively taught for a 
minimal amount of time (53). 
In the early years of the plan period, donors tended to regard 
lack of Swazi suport for aid projects largely in terms of 
weaknesses in Swazi planning and management and shortages of 
suitably qualified Swazi manpower (54), and this was reflected in 
their preference for self contained package projects and their 
reliance on expatriate personnel. 	 The basic weakness in this 
approach, as indicated in chapter 8, was that the conditions 
intended to ensure effective project implementation also tended 
to ensure that the activity for which the project was responsible 
would come to an end when donor support was withdrawn. As 
already noted, a basic lack of Swazi commitment to donor policies 
meant lack of support for projects designed to implement them 
and, when a donor project came to an end, the programme it had 
established and for which it had assumed responsibility came to 
an end. 
Towards the end of the plan period, some donors, disillusioned by 
lack of Government commitment to project objectives and lack of 
support for project implementation, withdrew their support. 
The SIDA/UNESCO secondary curriculum project came to an end in 
1982; 	 the SIDA/FAO teacher training project at Luyengo and the 
ODA teacher training project at SCOT came to an end in 1983. 
The end of these projects meant the end, for all practical 
purposes, of the secondary curriculum unit and of training 
programmes for teachers of practical subjects for junior secondary 
schools. 	 There was every indication that the eventual withdrawal 
of ODA support for the schools agriculture project would mean the 
end of any sustained effort to develop the teaching of Agriculture 
in secondary schools, and with the withdrawal of donor support 
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for diversification the secondary education system would quickly 
return to normality. 
(b) Non-formal education and training  
The Ministry of Education had no previous experience of non-formal 
education and training, and there was no section in the ministry 
with over-all responsibility for non-formal education and training 
programmes. 	 The post of SIS (Adult Education), established in 
the first place through donor pressure to accommodate a CIDA 
'expert', was an ad hoc arrangement with the SIS working out of 
headquarters and in theory reporting to the Chief Inspector 
Secondary. 	 Responsibility for various aspects of non-formal 
education and training was ostensibly shared out between the SIS 
(Adult Education), the SIS (Technical), and the schools agriculture 
project. 	 These areas of responsibility were never clearly defined, 
and there was considerable overlap and confusion. 
It was never quite clear exactly where responsibility for the 
development of rural education centres was supposed to lie. 	 Reports 
on the RECs (55) made it clear that their operation was severely 
limited by inadequate funding, a lack of administrative and 
supervisory support, and the fact that there was no official 
establishment for staffing them. 
	 Throughout the plan period, 
the task of initiating and organising community support and 
participation, and of developing and teaching REC courses, was 
undertaken almost entirely by Peace Corps volunteers on two year 
contracts. 	 Their task was made more difficult by a lack of 
support from the junior secondary schools to which RECs were 
attached. 	 Headmasters regarded RECs as separate programmes for 
which they had little or no responsibility. 
	 They were unwilling 
to arrange school timetables 	 to accommodate REC classes or to allow 
RECs to make use of school facilities and equipment (56). 
As noted in chapter 8, the REC project was thrust upon Government 
as part of an offer it could hardly refuse. 
	 Discussions with 
senior officials left little doubt that from the Swazi side 
acceptance of the project had been regarded as the price to be 
paid for World Bank assistance in the building of new secondary 
schools, and that from the beginning Government had no serious 
intention of using junior secondary schools as RECs, of developing 
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non-formal education and training programmes, or of providing 
support for donor efforts in this area. 
	 The fact that the REC 
project never got off the ground can be traced to a basic lack 
of commitment on the part of Government, and lack of support 
from those for whom the RECs were intended. 
The expected local community support for RECs did not materialise. 
Ministry of Education annual reports (57) and a report prepared 
for the World Bank (58) made it clear that Form 3 leavers and 
drop outs from junior secondary schools showed no interest in 
RECs and made no use of them. 
	 Nor did RECs attract many adult 
learners. 	 It had been anticipated in the joint agreement drawn 
up by the World Bank that each REC would cater for around 1,000 
adult learners a year. 	 It was estimated that "in 1979 and 1980 
there were only 688 participants in all RECs together". 
	
Roughly 
three quarters of these were women, nearly all enrolled in sewing, 
knitting, and cookery courses. 	 By 1981 one REC was no longer 
operating, there were no enrolment figures available from a second, 
a third had 20 adult learners, and a fourth had 32. 
	 The RECs 
were not used by other ministries and other agencies and they had 
not become community resource centres as envisaged in the Bank's 
joint agreement. 	 In negotiations for the fourth phase of SPED 
the fact that the RECs were not working strengthened Swazi resistance 
to a proposed extension of the REC project. 
	 In 1983 the Bank 
agreed to temporarily shelve plans for the establishment of 
additional RECs pending the findings of a further evaluation 
report. 
Other attempts to provide non-formal education and training 
programmes owed little to Ministry of Education initiative or 
support. 
	 The Emlalatini Development Centre (established and 
supported until 1978 by DANIDA) was inadequately funded and 
inadequately staffed (59) and relied heavily on a small nucleus 
of staff on local expatriate contracts. 
	 The EDC vocational 
training programme (established by DANIDA) was taken over by a 
single Peace Corps volunteer, and had to be "virtually self 
supporting" (60). 
	 The establishment and continued operation 
of non-formal training programmes at the School of Appropriate 
Farm Technology and 	 the Salesian Industrial Training Centre 
depended almost entirely on voluntary agency initiative and the 
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availability of mission, local expatriate, and volunteer staff 
(61). 
(c) Vocational training at SCOT  
Similar conflict between Swazi and donor policy priorities, and 
a similar lack of Swazi commitment and a preparedness to make use 
of aid for purposes other than those for which it was intended, 
characterised the development of vocational training at SCOT. 
The development of SCOT ran counter to proposals for a cut back 
in technician training, the expansion of craft and commercial 
training, and the more efficient use of resources made in Skills  
for the Future (and incorporated into Chapter 5 of the development 
plan). 	 SCOT expanded its technician courses and cut back its 
craft and commercial courses to about half the level they had been 
in 1976 (62), which had been the baseline for these proposals. 
Documentation prepared by donor agencies (63) and with donor 
assistance (64) commented on the under utilisation of facilities 
and teaching staff, and pointed out that facilities provided 
through SPED and intended for craft training were being used to 
expand technician training. 	 Proposals for the more efficient use 
of resources and for the need to expand craft and commercial 
training were largely disregarded. 
Donor proposals for the expansion of craft and commercial 
training at SCOT had been seen as part of a broader strategy which 
included 	 the 	 establishment 	 of 	 district 	 vocational 	 training 
centres geared to local needs. 	 Although donors demonstrated a 
continuing interest in providing support for vocational training, 
no VTCs were established during the plan period. 	 Aid negotiations 
were hampered by conflicting donor and Swazi views on the type 
of institutions that were needed. 	 Donors were not prepared to 
support Government proposals for the establishment of a large 
"institute of crafts and technology, similar to SCOT", which 
Government claimed would "ease the burden on the present Swaziland 
College of Technology" (65). 	 Government, in turn, showed little 
interest in donor proposals for one year training programmes in 
small centres geared to the production of skilled craftsmen and 
clerical workers (66), and even less in proposals for low cost 
vocational centres, run along self help lines, which would provide 
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craft training geared to the needs of rural areas (67). 
(d) Swazi resistance 
Like everything else in Swaziland, the strength of Swazi resistance 
to donor intervention, and the marked degree of protection this 
afforded the Swazi model of education, was conditioned by the 
functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy, the persistence 
of Swazi traditional forms, and the prevailing Swazi view of the 
particularity and autonomy of the Swazi Nation. 	 What sets 
Swaziland apart from other African countries is the combination 
of distinctive Swazi characteristics that made for the conservation 
and consolidation of Swazi traditional structures and processes, 
and which enabled it to safeguard a remarkably homogeneous 
traditional system which had broken down elsewhere in Africa. 
Chapter 5 has referred to the historical and geographical factors 
which played a part in shaping this process, including a colonial 
administration that left Swazi traditional structures virtually 
intact and fixed Swaziland's boundaries to enclose a single group 
of people with a common language and a common tradition. 	 The 
power and influence of South African interests in the region also 
played a part in the fixing of Swaziland's boundaries. 
Chapter 5 has described the ways in which the Swazi economy is 
closely interlinked with and heavily dependent upon the economy 
of South Africa, and the part played by South African capital 
and South African interests in the development of the modern 
sector of 	 the Swazi economy. 	 Economic dependence and close 
political ties with South Africa (along with its geographical 
position and the remarkable homogeneity of its people) insulated 
Swaziland from the variety of post colonial influences that shaped 
events in many other African countries. 	 Swaziland was provided 
with a form of security within which Swazi traditional institutions 
and customs retained their symbolic and practical significance, 
and a traditional monarchy was enabled to maintain and expand its 
political power and establish itself within the modern economy 
through alliances with South African capital and South African 
interests. 
	
Over-all dependence on South Africa protected the 
Swazi traditional system, and gave it a marked degree of autonomy 
in dealing with pressures brought to bear by the various donor 
agencies. 
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The issue of dependence on South Africa is taken up in the next 
chapter in relation to the limited part played by secondary 
education and training in the process of economic and social 
change during the implementation of Swaziland's third education 
plan. 	 The account of plan implementation starts with description 
of Government's preparedness to respond to popular pressures for 
the expansion of secondary education. 
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10 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SWAZILAND'S THIRD EDUCATION PLAN 
This chapter describes the implementation of Swaziland's third 
education plan in terms of the development of secondary education, 
and the limited role that this development played in the process 
of economic and social change. 	 Reference to chapter 4 and to 
this chapter indicates a number of broad similarities between 
conditions in Swaziland and in other African countries, but the 
account which follows focuses on the particularity of the Swazi 
context and the distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics 
referred to in chapter 5. 
The development of secondary education, described in section 1, 
was shaped by the Swazi model of education, not by donor views of 
'what was best' for Swaziland. 	 The persistence of the Swazi 
approach and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to donor 
intervention precluded any possibility that donor policies 
incorporated into the education plan would be implemented in the 
way intended by the various donor agencies involved in the 
planning and development of secondary education in Swaziland. 
Had it been possible to implement donor policies, there was little 
if any chance that the development of secondary education would 
have brought about the kind of economic and social change envisaged 
in the international aid approach. 	 Section 2 indicates that Swazi 
economic and social structures were shaped by the vested interests 
of the Swazi monarchy, the operation of the mainly South African, 
foreign companies that dominated and largely controlled the modern 
sector of the Swazi economy, and Swaziland's over-all dependence 
on the economy of South Africa. 	 The development of secondary 
education and training played little part in this process. 
There was no slackening in the private demand for secondary 
education, in spite of growing numbers of jobless secondary 
school leavers. 
	 Section 3 describes the persistence of popular 
pressures for the expansion of secondary education, the conflict 
between Swazi and international approaches to secondary education, 
and the continuing dominance of the Swazi model of education. 
The development of secondary education  
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The Permanent Secretary for Education made it clear in a speech 
in 1981 that the development of education was guided by the 
fundamental principle enshrined in the Manifesto: 
"We believe that education is an inalienable right of 
every child, and every citizen of Swaziland should 
receive education up to the limit of his and her 
capabilities. 	 We have, therefore, expanded our 
education facilities to meet this demand" (1). 
As already indicated, this demand was strongest and most insistent 
for expansion of the existing system of formal secondary education, 
and in particular senior secondary education. 
The development of secondary education during the plan period was 
an ad hoc affair, shaped by popular pressures for rapid and 
continued expansion and Government's preparedness to respond to 
these pressures in attempts to 'make education available to all 
who wanted it'. 	 Swaziland had adopted what was virtually an open 
access approach not only for junior secondary (as in a number of 
other African countries) but also for senior secondary education, 
and had made more progress towards open access secondary education, 
and maintained this progress for longer, than in many African 
countries. 	 As already noted, diversification and the development 
of non-formal education and training programmes were not major 
policy concerns, and what limited progress was made in these areas 
depended on donor and voluntary agency initiative and support. 
Every year, around 75 per cent of those pupils who entered for the 
Primary Certificate Examination obtained a first, second, or third 
class pass (Table 5) and expected to continue into junior secondary 
school. 	 Every effort was made to provide sufficient places, when 
necessary by last minute, makeshift arrangements. 	 In 1980, 
for example, the Ministry of Education, in response to popular 
pressures, provided 560 additional Form I places by announcing, 
well after the start of the school year, that 14 junior secondary 
schools would take in an extra stream (2). 
For the few who passed the PCE and for one reason and another did 
not find places in Form I, and for a considerable number of those 
who failed, there was always the chance to repeat the last year 
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of primary school and try again. 	 Repetition was an inbuilt 
feature of the Swazi approach, supported and encouraged by verbal 
directives from politicians and senior ministry officials. 	 In 
a press interview the Deputy Minister for Education insisted that 
"children who had failed should be given a second chance to study 
and sit for examinations at the very schools they had attended 
last year" (3). 	 The continuation rate from primary to junior 
secondary was over 70 per cent a year, and it was estimated that 
education was being made available to over 85 per cent of those 
who completed the last year of primary school either by entry to 
Form I or through repetition of Grade 7 (Table 6). 
Junior secondary education was not regarded as terminal for the 
vast majority of its participants, as recommended in donor 
proposals. 	 Government made no attempt to restrict entry to high 
schools in line with manpower requirements or according to financial 
constraints. 	 Nor was there any attempt to ration access to 
senior secondary education based on assessment of ability as 
indicated by a class 1 or 2 pass in the Junior Certificate 
Examination. 
	 The only limits to the development of senior 
secondary education were the extent of social and political 
pressures for expansion and Government's ability to make education 
available. 
Every year demand and expectation were reflected and added to by 
verbal directives from the Ministry of Education urging headmasters 
to find places in Form 4 for as many class 3 passes as possible. 
Every year direct pressure was brought to bear on headmasters by 
parents and local communities, politicians, Government officials, 
local chiefs and others with influence in the traditional hierarchy. 
As Dlamini pointed out in a study of 'shortages and surpluses of 
educated manpower' in Swaziland (4), these pressures were extremely 
difficult for headmasters to resist. 	 The 1979 sector review 
(5) described a situation in which, in the absence of "fair and 
clear criteria for selection", entry to senior secondary education 
had become "a continuing battleground from one year to the next". 
It was as a battle that was being won by those with class 3 passes 
in the JCE. 	 Over the plan period the continuation rate from 
junior secondary to high school increased from 52 to 63 per cent, 
-232- 
and the proportion of class 3 passes gaining entry to high 
schools rose from 65 to 100 per cent. 	 Of those who entered for 
the JCE in 1981, 22 per cent obtained a class 1 or 2 pass; 	 63 
per cent of those who had entered found places in Form 4 in 
1982. 	 All those who had entered for the JCE in 1981 and obtained 
a class 3 pass found places in Form 4 in 1982 and they accounted 
for 64 per cent of the total new entry (Tables 16 and 17). 
Throughout the plan period, enrolment in senior secondary 
schools exceeded the targets set in the Financial and Statistical  
Analysis by more than 60 per cent (Table 14). 
Every year Government found ways of providing additional high 
school places. 	 In 1980, for example, the Ministry of Education 
in response to what it described as "the insistent demand for more 
senior secondary school places" provided an additional 360 Form 
4 places (6). 	 These places (like those in junior secondary schools) 
were made available by a ministry announcement, well after the start 
of the school year, that some high schools would admit an extra 
stream and a number of junior secondary schools would be upgraded. 
The ministry announced the provision of additional places, but it 
did not furnish schools with the facilities and equipment 
necessary to support this provision. 	 In spite of World Bank 
effort through SPED and building programmes funded by local 
community effort, the development of secondary education, in 
junior secondary and high schools, was characterised by a shortage 
of school buildings and equipment, overcrowded classrooms, and a 
continuing and increasing shortage of teachers' houses (7). 
Numerically there was no shortage of teachers to meet this expansion, 
by (as indicated in chapter 7) a growing proportion were in-
adequately trained and inexperienced, the number of unqualified 
teachers increased over the plan period, and there were wide 
variations in the distribution of teachers and the quality of 
instruction across secondary schools. 
The expansion of secondary education could be seen as contributing 
to the achievement of the third plan objective of social justice. 
Secondary education had been made available for more people in 
more parts of the country. 	 It was more widely spread and more 
equitably spread 	 It continued to cater, in equal measure, for 
boys and girls. 	 But inequalities between schools had persisted 
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and widened. 	 Sgwane described (8) a secondary school system 
characterised by glaring inequalities in the distribution of 
resources, significant variations in the quality of instruction, 
and wide differences in status and the market value of their 
qualifications between 'theoretically equal' schools. 
From a donor perspective (9), the decline in educational standards 
noted in chapter 7 was associated with the rapid and uncontrolled 
expansion of secondary education, and the Ministry of Education's 
inadequate management structures and procedures. 	 The ministry 
response to widespread Swazi concern over results in the COSC 
examination, as expressed by the Permanent Secretary (10) and 
Minister for Education (11), was that performance in COSC was 
bound to decline in Swaziland and in other African countries which 
were trying to replace a pre-independence system of restricted 
education with a system of mass education. 	 In a review of the 
education plan (12) the ministry claimed that an increase in the 
number of secondary school teachers, a reduction in the over-all 
pupil teacher ratio, and in particular an increase in the number 
and proportion of qualified Swazi teachers in secondary schools 
"should indicate a significant improvement in the quality of 
secondary education systematically throughout the plan period". 
Disentangling the elements which had a bearing on the quality of 
education, even when measured simply in terms of examination 
results, was a more complex process than suggested in donor analysis 
and ministry assertion. 	 Conditions associated with the qualitative 
erosion of secondary education were linked with rapid expansion 
and the ministry's lack of control over what happened in secondary 
schools. 	 But the problem was not so much that the expansion 
of secondary education had outstripped the ministry's capacity 
for effective management and supervision, as suggested in donor 
analysis, as that the ministry had never assumed full responsibility 
for secondary education and was unlikely to make any determined 
effort to do so. 	 As in the past, responsibility for what 
happened in secondary schools had to be taken on by the schools 
themselves. 	 One result of expansion, as noted in chapter 7, 
was that most secondary schools were ill equipped to take on 
this responsibility. 
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The account of the Swazi approach to secondary education in 
chapter 7 provides no support for ministry expectations of 
significant improvement in the quality of secondary education. 
Analysis of COSC examination results and secondary school staffing 
carried out by the UNESCO planning project provided no hard evidence 
to support arguments that qualified Swazi teachers, unqualified 
teachers, or pupil teacher ratios were in themselves decisive 
factors in school performance in the COSC examination. 	 What did 
emerge was that the half dozen or so schools that regularly 
achieved good results were the older, well established high schools 
with an experienced and competent headmaster, clearly defined 
organisational structures, a nucleus of experienced staff, adequate 
facilities, and the support of local communities. 
Economic and social change  
At (a) and (b) this section describes the development of the 
secondary education and training system in relation to donor 
policies to gear it to the production of manpower for the 
modern economy and for rural change and modernisation. 	 At (c) 
it describes the limited progress made in implementing Swazi 
policy for localisation of the private sector. 
(a) Manpower for development  
The basic assumption made in Skills for the Future was that the 
demand for skilled manpower over the plan period would increase 
at the same rate as economic growth. 	 Basing its economic 
forecast on 'likely developments and past trends', Government 
assumed that the rate of economic growth would continue, as it 
had done for the previous five years, at the comparatively 
rapid rate of an average of seven per cent a year (13). 	 Skills 
for the Future Warned that, even if this rate of economic growth 
was achieved, if the expansion of senior secondary education was 
cut back as envisaged in the Financial and Statistical Analysis, 
and if the private sector was completely localised, there would 
still be surpluses of educated Swazi manpower and a growing 
problem of unemployed secondary school leavers (14). 
In 1982, the Department of Economic Planning estimated that the 
average growth rate in the economy over the first four years of 
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the plan period was just over 2 per cent a year (15). 
	
As noted 
in chapter 5, the Swazi economy was vulnerable to fluctuations in 
international commodity markets and natural setbacks. 	 It was 
also vulnerable in so far as it was closely interlinked with and 
heavily dependent upon the economy of South Africa. 	 The slowing 
down in economic development was largely caused by a fall in world 
prices for sugar, woodpulp, and citrus fruit on which the Swazi 
economy depended (for example, the Tibiyo run Simunye sugar complex 
made a net loss of over E15 million in its first 16 months of 
operation), and by the spill over effects of recession and inflation 
in South Africa (16). 
	 It was added to by a drought, which 
threatened the production of sugar and cotton crops, and a cholera 
epidemic, which had an adverse effect on an already declining 
tourist industry (17). 	 By the end of the plan period, Swaziland 
was in the middle of an economic recession and the Deputy Minister 
for Finance warned that the country's "very serious economic and 
financial situation" was "likely to remain for a considerable period" 
(18). 
The Department of Economic Planning estimated the creation of 
new jobs over the. plan period at 2,400, as compared to the 4,000 
anticipated in Skills for the Future and the third development plan. 
The creation of new jobs in industry fell well below expectations. 
Plantation agriculture, run by foreign companies and by Tibiyo, 
continued to opt for high mechanisation as against intensive wage 
employment at a time when 'experts' in the Department of Economic 
Planning were stressing the need for more labour intensive 
production as the "over-riding objective of all development 
programmes" (19). 
The efforts made by NIDCS and its subsidiary SEDCO to attract 
foreign investment and to develop locally owned enterprises were 
limited by lack of planning and inadequate management, by the 
small size of the Swazi market and the more attractive incentives 
offered to investors in the South African homelands, by the 
intractable problem of having to compete with South African based 
industries, and by South African protectionist measures (20). 
In addition, NIDCS investment policy was heavily influenced by the 
vested interests of the king's foreign advisers, and it ran counter 
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to and took precedence over that officially endorsed by central 
government. 	 Two thirds of total investment in new enterprises 
over the plan period was spent on buildings, most of it on the 
construction of three warehouses for a South African owned 
wholesale group (a Nathan Kirsh company), while plans for Swazi 
based tanning, vegetable processing, and textile industries were 
not implemented (21). 
Matsebula, head of the Economics Department at UCS, argued that 
the slowing down in economic development coupled with an increase 
in the rate of population growth had led to a fall in living 
standards and a rise in urban unemployment (22). 	 At the end of 
the plan period the Minister for Works, Power and Communications 
described "a continuing loss of jobs" through redundancies and 
lay offs, and warned that Swaziland was facing "a very bleak 
period of unemployment" as foreign owned companies retrenched, 
transferred their investment to the South African homelands, or 
went out of business (23). 	 Changes in South Africa's migrant 
labour policy meant that the problem could no longer be exported 
as conveniently as in the past. 	 As the Department of Economic 
Planning pointed out, 
"the steady decline in the number of citizens working 
in the South African mines has further aggravated the 
problems of under-employment and unemployment in the 
economy" (24). 
As already noted, there had been no attempt to cut back the 
expansion of senior secondary education. 	 While the economy had 
not grown as fast as anticipated by Government, secondary education 
and in particular senior secondary education had expanded faster 
than envisaged in the Financial and Statistical Analysis and 
Skills for the Future. 	 Although there had been some growth in 
employment opportunities during the plan period, there was a 
distinct and widening gap between the supply and demand for 
skilled manpower. 	 It was estimated that the plateau of 'settled 
unemployment' of Form 3 leavers three years after leaving school 
had moved upwards from 12 per cent in 1976 to 23 per cent in 1978 
(25); 	 and that, in 1982, 59 per cent of Form 3 leavers and 65 per 
cent of Form 5 leavers were still unemployed five years after 
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leaving school (26). 	 In 1983 the Prime Minister warned that 
unemployment was "rising so rapidly" that the problem was "reaching 
crisis proportions". 	 The unemployment problem was "particularly 
critical among school leavers", and the indications were that it 
was "getting worse" (27). 
At the same time, there was "still a substantial shortage of 
skilled manpower in the country, especially ae the professional, 
semi-professional and artisan levels" (28). 	 Reports prepared 
by donor agencies (29) and with donor assistance (30) described 
the development of vocational training in Swaziland as an ad hoc  
development, limited by weaknesses in management and organisation, 
and arising from "a vague response to assumed needs" rather than 
from a soundly based and well defined development plan geared 
to the production of the critical skills needed by the economy. 
The cut back in craft and commercial training at SCOT had left a 
gap that had not been filled, and SCOT itself appeared to be 
trying to achieve a level and standards unrelated to the country's 
needs. 	 Planned output from SCOT ran counter 'to the manpower 
requirements in Skills for the Future, and the content and 
organisation of its courses did not fit with the needs of 
employers. 
As indicated in (c) below, little progress was made in localising 
the private sector. 	 The development of the modern sector of the 
Swazi economy had depended, and continued to depend, on foreign 
capital and the availability of expatriate professional and 
technical skills. 	 The production of Swazi manpower from the 
secondary school system and from SCOT had played little part in 
this development. 	 Employers were reluctant to localise, and 
their reluctance could be rationalised in terms of economic 
recession and by reference to an education and training system 
which had produced and continued to produce people who were, by 
and large, 'either unemployable or for whom there was very little 
demand'. 	 In 1982, von Wissel, who was then a member of 
Parliament and also President of 'the Federation of Swazi Employers, 
argued that the education and training system's failure to produce 
the 'required skills' needed by the economy was largely responsible 
for a decline in foreign investment and a continuing and increasing 
-238- 
dependence on expatriate skills and foreign imports (31). 
(b) Education for rural development  
Government was never committed to the education for rural development 
strategy insisted upon by donors and incorporated into the education 
plan. 	 But, as noted below, the problems of rural change and 
modernisation were not primarily educational. 	 There was nothing 
that formal or non-formal education and training programmes could 
have done that would, of itself, have brought about any significant 
change, even if Government had been prepared to make determined 
efforts to gear education to the needs of rural development. 
There was no suggestion in reports of rural development programmes 
(32) and school leaver tracer studies that secondary school leavers 
had found either employment or self employment opportunities 
in rural areas. 	 Nor was there any suggestion that those who 
had been taught Agriculture and other practical subjects had 
improved their chances of further training and employment in the 
modern sector. 	 Sullivan (33) concluded that there was "no 
systematic association" between the teaching of Agriculture and 
agricultural training and employment after school. 	 Eklund (34) 
suggested that taking practical subjects might well have reduced 
school leavers' chances of further training and employment. 	 The 
most practical subjects were still those regarded as academic, 
and which led, hopefully, to one of the available white collar 
jobs with a foreign owned company or Government department. 
The problem was not in the Ministry of Education's lack of support 
for donor attempts to gear secondary education to the needs of rural 
development, but in the stagnation of the traditional economy and 
the poverty and unemployment in rural areas. 	 As long as rural 
areas remained unproductive, unreformed, and unattractive, there 
was no real possibility that secondary school leavers would find, 
or for that matter would want to find, employment or self employment 
in the backwardness of the traditional rural economy. 	 Local 
communities would continue 'to resist attempts to vocationalise 
secondary education, and 'to insist on the more vocational bias of 
the existing system of formal academic secondary education. 
The main vehicle for rural development was the RDAs scheme 
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initiated by the British administration in 1966 and supported after 
independence by aid from the UK and various other donors. 	 As 
indicated in chapter 5, the RDAs scheme was not a success. 	 Maize 
production declined, the incidence of cash cropping did not show 
any substantial improvement, and destocking targets were never 
approached. 	 The dependence of rural homesteads on cash income 
from the modern sector increased, and a decline in rural incomes 
and production was accompanied by an exodus from the rural areas 
as the educated and semi educated moved to the towns in search of 
employment, and the uneducated looked for work in the cane fields, 
the canneries, and the saw mills (35). 
Magagula, head of the Faculty of Agriculture at Luyengo, described 
(36) the "vast masses of unemployed in rural areas" as a problem 
of "alarming proportions", and unemployment and under employment 
as Swaziland's "most pressing economic and social problems". 
The widening economic and social disparities between rural and 
urban areas had led to an "unprecendented" and "accelerating" 
rural-urban migration, "expanding the pool of poverty and unemploy- 
ment in the urban areas". 	 Rapid increases in population were 
"continually adding to the reserve army of Swaziland's unemployed 
and underprivileged". 	 Other Swazi commentaries (37) described 
rising levels of unemployment, increasing numbers of jobless 
school leavers, and widening disparities between and within urban 
and rural sectors. 
A combination of factors contributed to the failure of the RDAs 
scheme and the continuing backwardness of the traditional rural 
economy. 	 Donor attempts to improve agricultural productivity 
were thwarted by the traditional system of land tenure, adherence 
to customary methods of production, and the power and conservatism 
of the king's appointed chiefs. 	 The traditional view of cattle 
as symbols of wealth and status led to overstocking of poor quality 
beasts, indiscriminate grazing, and degradation of natural pastures. 
In addition, the operation of the RDAs scheme was restricted by 
shortage of trained and skilled manpower, lack of credit and 
marketing facilities, and inadequate organisation and management 
in the field; 	 and any chance donor efforts might have had of 
bringing about change in rural areas was largely neutralised by 
massive Government underspending on RDAs and lack of effective 
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planning and implementation. 	 As noted by Magagula (38), 
Government might pay lip service to the RDAs scheme, but it was 
not committed to donor policies for rural change and modernisation. 
Lack of Government commitment was conditioned by the power and 
vested interests of the Swazi monarchy. 	 Any attempt at rural change 
and modernisation would need to start from radical changes in 
existing political, economic, and social structures. 	 Booth 
pointed out (39) that changes in the structure of traditional 
agriculture, in particular changes in the traditional system of 
land tenure, "would involve a fundamental alteration in the 
underlying political system". 	 There was never any likelihood 
that a strong centralised monarchy would sanction political, 
economic, or social changes that appeared to threaten the 
traditional structures on which its power was based. 	 After the 
king's death, there was even less likelihood that the liqoqo would 
countenance any changes that ran counter to Swazi law and custom, 
and which might threaten its power and influence. 
Nor was there ever any likelihood that the monarchy would 
sanction changes that appeared to threaten the interests of 
Tibiyo. 	 Tibiyo's annexation of Government funds for large scale 
agriculture while the RDAs scheme was massively underspent, its 
proprietary interest in the most fertile tracts of Swazi Nation 
Land, and the resettlement schemes necessitated by the siting of 
its major development projects played a large part in the failure 
of rural development programmes and the continuing backwardness 
of the traditional economy. 
	 Tibiyo's accumulation of wealth, 
and the power that went with it, had been achieved through alliances 
with foreign, largely South African, capital. 	 Through its 
increasing involvement in agribusiness, Tibiyo's interests were 
linked with those of the handful of foreign companies that 
dominated and still largely controlled the modern agricultural 
sector. 	 It had a similar vested interest in the development 
of the modern sector, and in maintaining the conditions within which 
large scale agriculture operated so profitably. 
	 Proposals for 
changes in these conditions would meet with strong resistance 
from an alliance of powerful economic interests, those of the 
traditional monarchy as well as those of foreign capital. 
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Donor strategies for rural development were frustrated by South 
African domination of the modern sector of the Swazi economy and 
Swaziland's heavy dependence on 	 the economy of South Africa. 
Rural homesteads depended increasingly on cash income from wage 
employment in South African owned businesses and remittances from 
migrant workers in South Africa. 	 Increasing numbers left the rural 
areas in search of paid employment, rural productivity and rural 
incomes declined. 	 Efforts to boost maize production and to 
promote cash cropping were hardly likely to succeed in depressed 
rural areas deprived of the more ambitious and the more able 
bodied. 	 They were even less likely to succeed when South African 
maize, imported and distributed by a South African owned company, 
was readily available, and when cash income could buy the balance 
of food requirements, pay school fees, and provide other 
requirements made available by South African owned companies and 
through the free flow of goods from South Africa. 
The operation of the customs agreement, South African control over 
Swaziland's import and export traffic, and the free flow of goods 
from South Africa virtually destroyed any chance there might 
have been of establishing a network of small industries and 
commercial businesses intended to generate employment and self 
employment opportunities in the rural areas and to provide support 
for other rural development programmes. 	 South African interests 
would resist any proposals for change that appeared to challenge 
their domination and control of the modern sector of the Swazi 
economy, and there was no suggestion that South Africa would 
accept any changes that might reduce Swaziland's economic 
clientage or weaken its own overwhelming economic power in the 
region. 
(c) Localisation  
By the beginning of the third plan period, the modern sector of 
the Swazi economy already had an enviable record of growth and 
development. 	 As already noted, the production of Swazi manpower 
from the secondary education system and from SCOT had played 
little part in this development. 
	 Progress in the modern sector 
had been promoted and sustained by the operation of foreign 
capital and the application of foreign skills, and more recently 
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by Tibiyo's alliance with foreign capital and foreign interests. 
The problem in Swazi terms was not one of promoting economic 
development, as envisaged in the international aid approach, but 
of gaining control of an established and expanding modern economy. 
The public service had been virtually completely localised, apart 
from a number of professional and technical posts, before the 
start of the third plan. 	 Progress in the private sector had 
been disappointingly slow (40), and Government was in a dilemma 
over its declared policy of rapid and vigorous localisation. 
In effect, the problem resolved itself into a political choice 
between the competing, rather than complementary, demands of 
economic growth and localisation. 	 On the one hand Government 
needed to maintain an attractive investment climate for the 
foreign capital on which the development of the economy continued 
to depend, and for the expatriate management and the expatriate 
skills that went with it. 	 On the other, as Booth (41) pointed 
out, it needed to respond to mounting pressures from an educated, 
affluent, and ambitious elite which had permeated all levels of 
Government bureaucracy, but had not succeeded in passing beyond 
the mid level in the management of foreign owned companies, and 
which was becoming increasingly impatient at its exclusion from 
the upper levels in the private sector. 
Attempts to localise the upper levels of management in the private 
sector through the operation of a work permit system (as recommended 
in Skills for the Future) met with resistance from foreign owned 
companies, and the system was never consistently applied. 	 In 
some instances, these attempts produced threats of closure, which 
were followed by Government's granting of the required permits, 
as in the case of Metro Wholesale, Tracar, and Swazi Oil Seedmills 
(42), all of which were Nathan Kirsh enterprises. 	 In at least 
two instances, and probably more, problems in obtaining work 
permits for skilled expatriates had played a major part in 
companies transferring their investment to South African homelands 
(43). 	 Progress in localising the private sector continued to be 
disappointingly slow as far as the Swazi educated elite was 
concerned. 	 At the end of the plan period the modern sector of 
the Swazi economy was still dominated and largely controlled by 
foreign capital and foreign expertise. 	 The large agricultural 
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estates and timber plantations were "still mainly owned and managed 
by foreign companies" and Swaziland's banking system, tourist 
industry, trade, and commerce were still largely owned and 
operated by foreign companies and expatriate personnel (44). 
The declared policy in the Manifesto was for the transfer of 
economic as well as political power "to the rightful owners - the 
Swazis", and reference to this policy had supported proposals in 
the third development plan for vigorous localisation. 	 Analysis 
in chapter 5 of Swaziland's political, economic, and social 
structures indicates that in this context the monarchy regarded 
Tibiyo as representing the economic interests of the Swazi Nation. 
Tibiyo's increasing participation in the modern sector and its 
alliances with foreign interests did little to restrain the 
impatience of the Swazi educated elite. 	 Enterprises owned 
wholly 	 or in part by Tibiyo operated in the same way as foreign 
owned companies, and depended largely upon expatriate upper 
level management and expatriate professional and technical skills. 
Tibiyo's major objective was the accumulation of wealth and economic 
power for the monarchy, and it opted for procedures intended to 
achieve this objective rather than for localisation. 
The continuing expansion of secondary education did little to bring 
about localisation in the private sector at technician and craft 
levels. 	 The 1981 sector review described a situation in which 
most of the secondary school leavers who had found jobs were 
engaged 	 in clerical occupations and teaching. 	 There was "a 
chronic shortage of Swazis in jobs requiring a high degree of 
competence in technical or scientific fields" and "a prevailing 
shortage of middle level technicians and craft workers". 	 Many 
building firms, garages, and other enterprises were not only owned 
and operated by foreign companies and expatriate personnel, they 
were "manned by foreign craftsmen and artisans" (45). 	 Government 
was faced with the problems of growing unemployment among secondary 
school leavers, the continuing presence of expatriate technicians 
and craftsmen, 	 and a reluctance to localise on 	 the part of 
foreign owned enterprises supported by reference to an education 
and training system which continued to turn out people who were 
either unemployable or for whom there was very little demand. 
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The demand for secondary education  
For an increasing number of young people secondary education 
offered inadequate facilities, poor teaching, disappointing COSC 
results, and virtually no hope of further education and training 
or employment. 	 At the same time, more and more of the cost of 
secondary education was being shifted on to parents and local 
communities, involving greater sacrifices as incomes declined and 
the cost of living, fuelled by the spill over effects of 
inflation in South Africa, continued to rise. 	 But, in spite of 
persistently disappointing COSC results, growing numbers of 
jobless secondary school leavers, and -increases in school fees, 
there was no sign of any slackening in the demand for the 
continued expansion of secondary and in particular senior 
secondary education. 	 Popular pressures were still fed by 
expectations of the enormous rewards associated with the higher 
levels of education, and the increase in the number of unemployed 
secondary school leavers far from leading to a decline in the 
demand for secondary education led to even further expansion in 
this demand. 	 The odds might have lengthened but the chance, 
however slim, was still there and to miss out on secondary 
education was to miss that chance. 
There was no indication of any modification in the Swazi approach 
to secondary education. 	 In a speech at the opening of a new 
secondary school in 1982, the Prime Minister made it clear that 
Government expected the demand for more secondary education to 
continue, and that it would make every effort to cater for this 
demand (46). 
	
In 1983 the Ministry of Education proposed the 
establishment of seven new junior secondary and seven new high 
schools in response to what was described as the "tremendous" 
and "increasing demand" for secondary education, as a first step 
in a comprehensive exercise which would cover all areas of the 
country (47). 
The sections on education in Swaziland's Fourth National Development  
Plan 1983/84 - 1987/88 were finalised by 'experts' in the 
Department of Economic Planning with advice and assistance from 
the UNESCO education planning project. 	 The tension between 
conflicting Swazi and international approaches to secondary 
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education was summarised in the plan's review of secondary education 
and training: 
"The basic dilemma facing the country concerns the 
question of whether to continue the practice as 
developed in the period of the Third Plan to provide 
education according to social demand, or restrict 
access and advancement according to the ability of the 
pupil, financial resources of the country and employment 
prospects in the job market" (48). 
The donor policies which had been incorporated into the third 
plan dominated the fourth plan, to the exclusion of the Swazi 
approach to secondary education. 	 The development of secondary 
education was to be geared to manpower requirements and the needs 
of economic development (49). 
	
The Ministry of Education was 
committed to limiting entry to senior secondary education and 
controlling the development of secondary education according to 
the availability of financial and physical resources and the 
employment prospects of the country (50). 
Government resentment at what it regarded as unwarranted attempts 
to influence Swazi policy, in other sectors of the economy as 
well as in education, led to delays in finalisation and publication. 
The plan was not finalised until 1984. 	 Government acceptance 
was no more than a token demonstration of commitment and the 
plan had still not been published by mid 1985, more than two 
years after the beginning of the plan period. 	 By that time the 
Swazi approach to education had been reaffirmed through the 
publication by the Ministry of Education in mid 1985 of Reform  
through Dialogue:, Report of the National Education Review Commission. 
The Commission, set up by Cabinet (appointed and controlled by the 
liqoqo), included Government officials, representatives from the 
university, members of Parliament, and members of the Swazi National 
Council. 	 Its report was drawn up with assistance from a recons- 
tituted UNESCO planning project. 
The report's main objective was the reaffirmation and protection 
of the Swazi model of education. 	 It made it abundantly clear 
that its proposals followed on from and were legitimated in terms 
of the Manifesto, the NEC report, and the advice given to the 
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Swazi Nation at various times by the late King Sobhuza (51). 
Education was an inalienable right, what was expected of education 
in Swaziland was the encouragement and development of the individual, 
and Government's main task was to make education available to 
all who wanted it according to their needs (52). 	 At the same 
time, the report provided donors with a token demonstration of 
commitment to donor policies and priorities, which could be used 
to support proposals for aid to education. 	 As in Current Trends  
and the third plan, references to manpower for development, 
vocationalisation, and formal and non-formal training programmes 
were rationalised in terms of the expansion of the existing 
system of secondary and in particular senior secondary education 
(53). 
The long term recommendations in Reform through Dialogue proposed 
the democratisation of education at all levels up to and including 
senior secondary education. 	 Pre-school education was to be 
universal and free. 	 Universal primary education was to be 
extended from a seven to an eight year course, covering the 6-14 
age group. 	 The first four years of primary schooling would be 
free. 	 Universal primary education was to be followed by a four 
year course of secondary education, which would combine junior 
secondary and senior secondary schooling and cater for the 15-18 
age group. 	 As in the past, admission to secondary education 
would be "based on merit", available to all who qualified (54). 
In the immediate future, and in the long term, the development of 
secondary education would continue to be shaped by pressures 
generated by social demand and by Government's preparedness to 
respond to these pressures by making education available to all 
who wanted it. 
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CONCLUSION 
The three sections in this chapter focus on three issues arising 
out of the Swazi case study and analysis of the international aid 
approach to educational planning. 	 The first looks at what happened 
in Swaziland in broad terms as representative of a common African 
experience, pointing to the paradox that what donors regarded as 
serious weaknesses in educational planning in recipient countries 
was, in varying degrees, a way of protecting an African view of 
education from donor intervention. 
The next two sections examine the most important aspects of the 
Swazi experience, the exceptionally well protected nature of the 
Swazi case and the distinctive combination of Swazi characteristics 
that shaped it. 	 Section 2 describes a Swazi paradox in which 
extreme dependence on South Africa provided a form of security 
within which the Swazi monarchy was enabled to give full expression 
to a Swazi traditional system. 	 The functioning of a powerful 
traditional monarchy and the persistence of homogeneous traditional 
forms gave Swaziland a rare degree of autonomy in protecting the 
Swazi model of education from external pressures brought to bear 
through donor intervention in the planning and development of 
secondary education. 
The third section draws attention to the critical limitation in 
an international aid approach that regarded education primarily 
as a powerful instrument for economic and social change. 
	
It 
focuses more particularly on the exceptional nature of the Swazi 
experience, and on the fundamental restrictions imposed on 
economic and social change by the forces that shaped the Swazi 
paradox, the functioning of a powerful traditional monarchy and 
Swaziland's extreme dependence on South Africa. 
	 It concludes 
with further reference to the Swazi paradox of autonomy in 
dependency. 
The African experience  
The Swazi case exemplifies a general situation, in so far as 
what happened in the planning and development of secondary 
education in Swaziland can be seen as representative of a common 
experience, generalised in varying degrees across other African 
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countries. 
Donor intervention in Swaziland and in other African countries 
was shaped, to a considerable extent, by strong similarities in 
donor policies and procedures and common donor concerns for the 
most effective use of the aid they provided. 	 There was a strong 
tendency for donor agencies to provide similar kinds of assistance 
across African countries in support of a generalised view of 'what 
was best' for education and over-all development, to regard 
African countries as willing, and more or less passive, recipients 
of donor funding and donor expertise, and to expect that aid to 
education would exert a significant influence in the planning and 
development of secondary education and in the wider process of 
economic and social change. 
The Swazi model of education was similar in broad outline to 
those in other African countries, in its adoption of the principle 
of education as an inalienable right and its preparedness to 
respond to popular pressures for the expansion of secondary 
education. 	 The main features of the non-interventionist Swazi 
approach to educational planning and management can be generalised 
in varying degrees across other African countries. 	 The response 
to donor intervention in African countries was conditioned, to a 
large extent, by the availability and expectation of external 
aid, and tended towards the pragmatic rather than the passive. 
Swaziland was by no means the only African country in which there 
was a lack of commitment to donor policies and a lack of support 
for projects designed to implement them. 
There were broad similarities between Swaziland and other African 
countries in the ways in which their approach to secondary 
education and their response to donor intervention restricted the 
influence aid to education was intended to exert, and in the 
conditions that shaped this process. 
	 These similarities point 
to the paradox that characterised aid to education in African 
countries. 	 While donor agencies regarded the African approach 
as evidence of persistent weaknesses in planning and management 
in recipient countries, there was a sense in which it was a way 
of protecting a view of education which was at variance with the 
donor view of 'what was best'. 
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This might not always have been the intention, but the consequence 
was that, in varying degrees across African countries, the influence 
donor assistance was expected to exert was restricted, and national 
aspirations for secondary education were protected against donor 
intervention. 	 The planning and development of secondary 
education was shaped by an African approach to educational 
planning and the variety of societal institutions across African 
countries, rather than by the acceptance or imposition of 
international models and the responsible interventionism of 
donor agencies. 
These are broad generalisations which conceal significant 
differences between African countries. 	 There were similarities 
in approaches to secondary education. 	 There were also important 
differences in these approaches and in patterns of secondary 
education development, arising out of the variety of settings 
and diverse conditions across African countries. 	 There was a 
generalised international aid approach to educational planning, 
but there was considerable diversity of forms and styles of 
assistance within the donor community and differences in the 
nature of the scale of recipient needs, and patterns of aid 
provision varied from country to country. 	 In general, the 
African response to donor intervention tended towards the pragmatic, 
but the response in any particular country was conditioned by a 
variety of specific factors, on the donor as well as the 
recipient side, and there was a broad spectrum of responses 
across African countries. 
Against this background, the search for common approaches and 
common experiences can encourage the tendency, noted by Eckstein 
and Noah (1), "to find what one is looking for, to stop when 
one has found it, and to gloss over counterfactual evidence", 
making for an oversimplified view of educational development in 
African countries. 	 In the context of this study, it tends to 
divert attention away from the exceptional nature of the Swazi 
case, which stems from a second, distinctively Swazi, paradox 
described in the next section. 
The Swazi paradox  
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The strength of Swazi resistance to donor intervention and the 
marked degree of protection this afforded the Swazi model of 
education placed Swaziland at the extreme end of the spectrum of 
responses to donor intervention across recipient African countries. 
The particular nature and the extent of the persistence of the 
Swazi approach and the strong pragmatism of the Swazi response to 
donor intervention were shaped by the functioning of a powerful 
traditional monarchy, the continuity of Swazi traditional 
institutions and processes, and the prevailing Swazi view of the 
particularity and autonomy of the Swazi nation. 	 What set Swaziland 
apart from other African countries was the strength and persistence 
of a remarkably homogeneous traditional system headed by a 
powerful centralised monarchy, a system which had broken down 
elsewhere in Africa. 
A number of factors contributed to the exceptionally well protected 
nature of the Swazi traditional system. 	 As in other African 
territories administered by the British, traditional political 
structures had been left virtually intact during the colonial 
administration. 	 What was different from nearly all other African 
countries that had undergone a colonial experience was the fixing 
of Swaziland's boundaries to enclose a single group of people who 
shared a common language and a common tradition. 	 This group 
constituted the Swazi Nation, ruled over by a traditional 
monarchy, and regulated by Swazi traditional law and custom. 
The power and influence of South African interests played a 
significant part in the fixing of Swaziland's boundaries and, 
consequently, in the preservation of the territorial, ethnic, 
and political autonomy of the Swazi Nation. 
It was Sobhuza's use of traditional loyalties and his application 
of traditional structures and techniques that enabled him to gain 
control of the modern system of government (bequeathed as a 
legacy of colonialism) and, by so doing, maintain and expand the 
political power of the monarchy. 
	 The real political power in 
Swaziland was vested in the king, and the modern system of 
government was an extension of and subordinate to his traditional 
powers as king of the Swazi Nation. 	 The monarchy's undisputed 
authority over virtually every aspect of life in Swaziland was 
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exercised through the operation of traditional institutions and 
processes, within a common network of power and patronage and 
allegiance and obligation that radiated from the king, regulated 
by Swazi law and custom and conditioned by reference to kinship, 
clan, and lineage. 
Swaziland's over-all dependence on South Africa played a crucial 
part in the protection of the autonomy of the Swazi monarchy and 
the Swazi traditional system. 	 Swaziland is a small landlocked 
country, almost entirely surrounded by South African territory 
and dependent on South Africa for communication with the rest 
of the world. 	 The Swazi economy is a peripheral economy, 
closely interlinked with, heavily dependent upon, and largely 
controlled by the economy of South Africa. 	 In spite of its 
membership of organisations such as the OAU and SADCC, Swaziland 
is linked with South Africa through close and co-operative 
political ties conditioned by Swazi dependence and powerful 
South African interests. 
The Swazi paradox was that of autonomy in dependency. 	 Extreme. 
dependence on South Africa insulated Swaziland from the variety 
of post colonial influences that shaped events in many other 
African countries. 
	 Swaziland was provided with a form of 
security within which the Swazi monarchy was enabled to give full 
expression to a Swazi traditional system and to safeguard 
Swazi traditional institutions and processes. 	 Extreme dependence 
on South Africa protected the Swazi traditional system, and 
gave Swaziland a marked degree of autonomy in dealing with 
external pressures brought to bear on the planning and development 
of secondary education by a substantial array of donor agencies. 
The planning and development of secondary education, like everything 
else in Swaziland, was shaped by the all pprvasive political 
authority of a traditional monarchy, and this had the effect of 
strengthening the persistence of the Swazi approach to secondary 
education and the pragmatic nature of the Swazi response to 
donor intervention. 
	 Swazi adoption of the principle of education 
as an inalienable right and preparedness to respond to popular 
pressures for the rapid expansion of the existing system of 
secondary education had the undisputed authority of a royal 
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proclamation. 	 The persistence of a largely non-interventionist 
approach to educational planning, and the characteristic lack of 
control over what happened in secondary schools, derived from 
the fact that it was an expression of a Swazi way of doing things, 
deeply rooted in and nurtured by the nature of the traditional 
political process. 
The international aid approach to educational planning operated 
within the modern system of government, but what happened in the 
planning and development of secondary education was largely shaped 
by the operation of traditional institutions and processes and 
by traditional forms of decision making that existed separately 
and worked independently from those ostensibly adopted by 
government and recognised by donors and their 'experts'. 	 The 
operation of Swazi traditional structures and processes constituted 
a single all encompassing frame of reference from which donors 
and their 'experts' were excluded, and which severely limited their 
room for manoeuvre in attempts to bring pressure to bear on the 
planning and development of secondary education. 	 The strength 
and persistence of the Swazi traditional system provided a rare 
degree of autonomy in dealing with these pressures, and heightened 
the Swazi capacity for neutralising the influence aid to education 
was intended to exert and for protecting Swazi aspirations for 
secondary education from the responsible interventionism of 
donor agencies. 
Economic and social change  
The Swazi experience provides further support for the 'age of 
practicality' view that the problems of economic and social change 
were not primarily educational and there was, therefore, little 
to be gained in seeking solutions through educational planning 
and reform. 	 Education, far from being the most important 
element in the development process, had only a limited role to 
play. 
The part played by lack of commitment and support from Government 
and from local communities in restricting donor attempts to gear 
secondary education and training to the production of critical 
skills for economic development, and in particular rural change 
and modernisation, was more marked in Swaziland than in many other 
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African countries, and the chances of implementation considerably 
less. 	 But there was little that education could do that would, 
of itself, bring about rural change and modernisation. 	 As in 
other African countries, any attempt at rural transformation 
would need to start with radical changes in existing social, 
economic, and political structures, and such changes were unlikely 
if they were in conflict with the interests of those in power in 
African societies. 
The particularity of the Swazi experience, and the reason why 
it was an extremely heightened case of a more general phenomenon, 
arises out of the distinctively Swazi features that imposed 
fundamental restrictions on alterations in existing societal 
structures. 	 These features were those that form the two sides 
of the Swazi paradox, the functioning of a powerful traditional 
monarchy and Swaziland's extreme dependence on South Africa. 
The king controlled the traditional rural economy through a 
system of land tenure on Swazi Nation Land (held in trust for 
the nation), operated through the traditional system of appointed 
chiefs and their delegated officials. 	 Changes in the structure 
of traditional agriculture, in particular changes in the land tenure 
system, would involve fundamental alterations in the underlying 
political system. 	 There was never any possibility that a powerful 
centralised monarchy, with unchallenged authority over virtually 
every aspect of life in Swaziland, would sanction political, 
economic, or social changes that might appear to threaten the 
traditional structures on which its power was based. 
The modern sector of the Swazi economy, dominated and largely 
controlled by South African interests, had an enviable record 
of growth and development. 	 The production of Swazi manpower 
from the education and training system played little part in 
economic development, and donor attempts to gear it to the 
production of 'critical skills' were hardly likely to bring 
about any change in this situation. 	 Progress in the modern 
sector had been, and still was, promoted and sustained by the 
operation of foreign capital and the application of expatriate 
skills. 	 The problem, in Swazi terms, was not one of promoting 
economic development but of gaining control of an established 
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and prosperous modern economy. 
	
The dominance of South African 
interests limited Swazi participation in modern sector activity, 
and frustrated Swazi aspirations for rapid localisation at all 
levels in the private sector. 
The monarchy's participation in modern sector activity and its 
identification of national economic interests with those of Tibiyo 
illustrate the nature of the Swazi paradox. 	 Dependence on South 
Africa provided a form of security within which the traditional 
monarchy was enabled to maintain and expand its political power, 
and to progressively establish itself within the modern sector 
of the economy. 	 The monarchy's accumulation of wealth, and the 
power that went with it, was closely linked on the one hand with 
the nature and extent of its political authority, and on the 
other with the availability of South African capital and the 
collaboration of South African interests. 
The establishment and operation of Tibiyo, through mineral rights 
'held in trust for the nation', the appointment of advisers, and 
the king's control over its resources and every aspect of its 
operation, was shaped to a large extent by the application of 
traditional structures and techniques. 	 Its proprietary interest 
in the most fertile tracts of Swazi Nation Land, and the resettlement 
schemes necessitated by the siting of its major development 
projects, was contingent upon the monarchy's control of the 
traditional rural economy. 	 Its annexation of government funds, 
its immunity from taxation and public scrutiny, and its entire 
operation as a state within the state depended upon the king's 
control of the modern system of government. 	 There was never 
any likelihood that the monarchy would sanction changes that 
conflicted with Tibiyo's economic interests, or which appeared to 
challenge the political authority on which its operation was based. 
Tibiyo's alliances with South African capital, its increasing 
involvement in agribusiness, its operational procedures, and its 
reliance on expatriate skills linked the monarchy's economic 
interests with those of the handful of foreign, mainly South 
African based enterprises that dominated and still largely 
controlled the modern agricultural sector. 
	 It had a similar 
vested interest in the development of highly mechanised commercial 
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and industrial agriculture, and in maintaining the conditions 
that made for its profitable and continued operation. 	 An 
alliance of powerful interests, those of the traditional monarchy 
as well as those of modern South African business enterprise, 
was opposed to any attempt to bring about radical change in 
existing social, economic, and political structures. 	 It 
discouraged unauthorised Swazi participation in modern sector 
activity, retarded localisation in the private sector, and 
frustrated donor attempts at rural change and modernisation. 
Any possibility of radical change in existing societal structures 
was ultimately curtailed by Swaziland's extreme dependence 
on South Africa. 	 What happened in the Swazi economy was largely 
controlled by South African interests and South African policies. 
South African interests resisted any proposals for change that 
appeared to challenge their domination and control of the modern 
sector of the Swazi economy, and there was no suggestion that 
South Africa would countenance any change that might reduce 
Swaziland's economic clientage or weaken its own overwhelming 
economic power and influence in the region. 	 There was a strong 
sense in which South Africa, by protecting its own interests 
and perpetuating Swazi dependence, was protecting the interests 
of the Swazi traditional monarchy and assisting in safeguarding 
the conditions on which its political and economic power were 
based. 
There is little indication of any significant change in the Swazi 
situation. 	 Traditionalism is still the dominant force in Swazi 
social, economic, and political life. 	 The power struggles 
following the death of Sobhuza involved the liqoqo, princes of 
the realm, and other members of the ruling Dlamini clan within 
the traditional political system. 	 The extraordinary power 
wielded by the liqoqo was justified in terms of Swazi law and 
custom. 	 Mswati's accession to the throne and recent events 
following his succession (2) indicate the homogeneity of the 
Swazi Nation, and the strength and persistence of Swazi traditional 
forms. 	 Political power still resides in and radiates from the 
king, and the modern government is subordinate to his traditional 
powers as king of the Swazi Nation. 	 The Swazi economy is still 
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heavily dependent upon and largely controlled by the economy of 
South Africa, and political ties are as close and co-operative 
as ever. 
Nor is there any indication of significant change in the aid 
process. 	 In some instances, donor agencies have adopted a more 
accommodating approach and their field representatives and 
'experts' have developed an awareness of the political dimension 
of the Swazi approach to planning and management. 	 But donor 
rationale for aid to education and concern for the most effective 
use of the aid they provide remain virtually unchanged (3). 	 There 
has been no 'indication of any modification in the Swazi approach 
to secondary education, or in Swazi capacity for protecting the 
Swazi model from external pressures brought to bear through 
donor intervention (4). 	 It is in the nature of the Swazi paradox 
that any weakening in the Swazi traditional system, and in its 
marked degree of autonomy in dealing with donor pressures, is 
more likely to be brought about through reduction in South Africa's 
overwhelming economic power and influence in the region than by 
changes from within Swaziland. 
Footnotes 
1 Eckstein M A and Noah N J 	 Dependency Theory in Comparative 
Education, 1985, p 223. 
2 Mathsebula J 
	 Swaziland: Grapes of Wrath, 1987. 
3 See Chapter 4: 
	 The international aid approach, pp 107-110. 
4 See Chapter 10: 	 The demand for secondary education, pp 244-246. 
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Table 1: Schools, enrolments, and teachers 1968, 1973, 1978 and 1982  
	
PRIMARY 	 SECONDARY 
Schools Enrolments Teachers Schools Enrolments Teachers 
1968 	 358 	 62,100 	 1,630 	 31 	 6,200 	 300 
1973 	 395 	 81,694 	 2,112 	 64 	 12,459 	 550 
1978 	 436 	 100,700 	 2,853 	 76 	 20,584 	 1,073 
1982 	 468 	 125,323 	 3,769 	 89 	 26,469 	 1,501 
Source: Compiled from Post Independence Development Plan, 1969, p73; 
Third National Development Plan, 1978/79 - 1982/83, pp182, 185; 
and Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 1978 and 
1982. 
Table 2: Primary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil  
teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982  
Schools 	 Enrolments 	 Teachers 	 Pupil teacher ratios 
1978 
Hhohho 	 110 	 26,072 	 741 	 35 
Lubombo 	 77 	 16,335 	 500 	 33 
Manzini 	 130 	 31,803 	 885 	 36 
Shiselweni 	 119 	 26,430 	 727 	 36 
TOTALS 	 436 	 100,700 	 2,853 	 35 
1982 
Hhohho 	 115 	 32,177 	 944 	 34 
Lubombo 	 89 	 22,704 	 720 	 32 
Manzini 	 144 	 38,688 	 1,160 	 33 
Shiselweni 	 120 	 31,754 	 945 	 34 
TOTALS 
	
468 	 125,323 	 3,769 	 33 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
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Table 3: Primary school enrolments by grade and sex, 1978 and 1982  
1978 	 1982 
Grade 	 Boys 	 Girls 	 Total 	 Boys 	 Girls 	 Total 
1 	 10,324 10,050 20,374 	 13,157 12,313 25,470.  
2 	 8,942 8,576 17,518 	 11,213 10,594 21,807 
3 	 8,263 7,763 16,026 10,590 9,934 20,524 
4 	 7,016 	 6,970 	 13,986 	 8,519 	 8,757 	 17,276 
5 	 5,969 6,235 12,204 7,369 7,760 15,129 
6 	 5,303 5,407 10,710 6,400 6,800 13,200 
7 	 4,788 5,094 9,882 	 5,730 6,167 11,897 
Totals 	 50,605 50,095 100,700 	 62,978 62,325 125,303 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
Table 4: Primary teaching force by qualification and citizenship, 
1978 and 1982  
Graduate Secondary Primary Total Unqualified Total 
trained trained qualified 
1978 
Swazi 	 - 	 5 	 2,089 	 2,094 	 652 	 2,746 
Non Swazi 	 11 	 53 	 36 	 100 	 7 	 107 
Totals 	 11 	 58 	 2,125 	 2,194 (77%) 	 659 (23%) 2,853 
1982 
Swazi 	 2 	 29 	 3,196 	 3,227 	 460 	 3,687 
Non Swazi 	 22 	 36 	 20 	 78 	 4 	 82 
Totals 	 24 	 65 	 3,216 	 3,305 (88%) 	 464 (12%) 3,769 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
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Table 5: Primary Certificate Examination results, 1975 to 1981  
First 	 Second 	 Third 	 Fail 	 Total 	 % pass 
class 	 class 	 class 	 entries 
1975 	 271 	 2,382 	 3,115 	 2,544 	 8,762 	 71 
1976 	 819 	 3,613 	 2,383 	 2,191 	 9,006 	 76 
1977 	 940 	 3,400 	 2,474 	 2,273 	 9,087 	 75 
1978 1,036 3,343 2,501 2,404 9,284 	 74 
1979 	 915 	 3,781 	 2,250 	 2,495 	 9,441 	 74 
1980 1,036 3,893 2,578 2,547 10,054 	 75 
1981 	 1,152 	 4,166 	 2,571 	 2,777 	 10,666 	 74 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 1975 to 1981. 
Table 6: Grade 7 enrolments, Primary Certificate Examination passes, 
and Form 1 entry, 1978 to 1982  
Grade 7 
	
PCE 	 Form 1 
enrolment 	 repeaters 	 entry 	 passes 	 new entrants as % PCE 
1978 	 9,882 	 1,576 (16%) 	 9,284 	 6,880 
1979 	 10,018 	 1,682 (17%) 	 9,441 	 6,946 	 6,716 	 72 
1980 	 10,459 	 1,654 (16%) 10,000 	 7,453 	 6,802 	 72 
1981 	 11,197 	 1,801 (16%) 10,666 	 7,889 	 7,234 	 72 
1982 	 7,562 	 71 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 to 1982 and Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 1978 to 
1981. 
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Table 7: Primary school enrolments, repeaters, promoted, and drop-outs 
Year 
1972 
reconstructed by grade for 1972, 1974, 	 1976, 1978, and 1980 
1 2 3 
Grade 
4 5 6 7 
E 15,864 12,856 12,369 11,142 9,436 7,745 6,911 
2,079 1,224 1,333 1,537 1,444 1,224 2,006 
P 12,612 11,495 10,205 8,861 7,328 6,154 3,900 
D 1,173 137 851 744 664 367 975 
1974 
E 16,496 14,375 13,787 12,306 10,882 9,187 9,077 
R 1,620 916 1,167 1,343 1,231 1,111 1,695 
P 13,792 13,032 11,394 10,038 8,698 7,520 6,039 
D 1,084 427 1,226 925 953 656 1,342 
1976 
E 18,357 15,631 14,435 13,046 11,454 10,162 9,636 
R 1,955 1,369 1,538 1,348 1,317 1,166 1,494 
P 15,195 13,766 11,820 10,712 9,180 8,122 6,815 
D 1,207 496 1,077 986 957 874 1,327 
1978 
E 20,374 17,518 16,026 13,986 12,204 10,710 9,882 
R 2,261 1,566 1,845 1,524 1,449 1,263 1,576 
P 16,654 15,449 12,854 11,462 9,769 8,442 6,880 
D 1,459 503 1,327 1,000 986 1,005 1,426 
1980 
E 23,342 19,630 18,069 15,521 13,400 11,598 10,459 
R 3,186 2,120 2,280 1,877 1,613 1,435 1,654 
P 18,953 17,076 14,508 12,769 10,932 9,543 7,453 
D 1,203 434 1,281 875 855 620 1,352 
Source: Taken from Ministry of Education, Enrolments, Repeaters and 
Drop-outs in Primary and Secondary Schools, 1972-1982, 1982, 
p4. 
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Table 8: Secondary schools, enrolments, number of teachers, and pupil  
teacher ratios by district, 1978 and 1982  
	
Schools 
	 Enrolments 	 Teachers 	 Pupil teacher ratios 
1978 
Hhohho 	 20 	 5,807 	 307 	 19 
Lubombo 	 13 	 2,716 	 149 	 18 
Manzini 	 21 	 6,857 	 353 	 19 
Shiselweni 	 22 	 5,204 	 264 	 20 
TOTALS 	 76 	 20,584 	 1,073 	 19 
1982 
Hhohho 	 25 	 8,408 	 478 	 18 
Lubombo 	 16 	 3,934 	 223 	 18 
Manzini 	 23 	 7,748 	 438 	 18 
Shiselweni 	 25 	 6,379 	 362 	 18 
TOTALS 	 89 	 26,469 	 1,501 	 18 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
Table 9: Secondary school enrolments by form and sex, 1978 and 1982  
1978 	 1982 
Form 
	 Boys 	 Girls 	 Total 	 Boys 	 Girls 	 Total 
1 	 3,158 	 3,325 	 6,483 	 3,979 	 4,005 	 7,984 
2 	 2,869 
	 2,754 	 5,623 	 3,449 
	 3,741 	 7,190 
3 	 2,323 
	 2,190 	 4,513 
	 2,932 	 2,862 
	 5,794 
TOTAL 8,350 8,269 16,619 10,360 10,608 20,968 
4 	 1,248 
	 940 	 2,188 	 1,680 	 1,410 	 3,090 
5 	 1,022 	 666 	 1,688 
	 1,333 	 994 	 2,327 
TOTAL 2,270 
	 1,606 	 3,876 3,013 2,404 5,417 
Total 10,620 
	 9,875 
	 20,495 13,373 	 13,012 	 26,385 
%age 	 52% 	 48% 	 51% 	 49% 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
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Table 10: Secondary teaching force by qualification and citizenship,  
1978 
1978 and 1982 
Diploma Total 
Qualified 	 Unqualified Total 
Graduate 
Trained 	 Untrained 
Swazi 97 41 284 422 281 703 
Non Swazi 96 190 76 362 8 370 
Totals 193 231 360 784 (73%) 289 (27%) 1,073 
1982 
Swazi 174 38 651 863 361 1,224 
Non Swazi 89 138 37 264 13 277 
Totals 263 176 688 1,127 (75%) 374 (25%) 1,501 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 and 1982. 
Table 11: Secondary teaching force: Swazi and non-Swazi, qualified and 
unqualified, 	 1978 to 1982 
1980 1981 1982 1978 1979 
Qualified 
Swazi 422 539 656 779 863 
Non-Swazi 362 337 314 305 264 
Total 784 870 970 1,084 1,127 
Unqualified 
Swazi 281 271 310 338 361 
Non-Swazi 8 11 12 11 13 
Total 289 282 322 349 374 
Total Swazi 703 810 966 1,117 1,224 
Total teaching 
force 
1,073 1,158 1,292 1,433 1,501 
% Swazi 66% 70% 75% 78% 82% 
% Qualified Swazi 39% 47% 51% 54% 57% 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistical Office, Education Statistics, 
1978 to 1982. 
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Table 12: Pupil teacher ratios in secondary schools, 1978 to 1982  
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Pupil teacher  19 19 18 17 18 
Pupil qualified teacher 25 24 23 22 23 
Pupil Swazi teacher 29 27 24 22 22 
Pupil qualified Swazi teacher 49 41 35 32 31 
Source: Taken from Ministry of Education, Report on the Review of the 
Third National Development Plan, 1983, Table 14. 
Note: 	 Calculations and pupil teacher ratios include headmasters. 
Table 13: Planned and actual enrolments in junior secondary classes, 
1976 to 1982 
Form 3 Total Form 1 
Actual 
Form 2 	 Form 3 Total Form 1 
Planned 
Form 2 
1976 6,403 5,236 3,596 15,236 5,842 5,041 3,473 14,356 
1977 6,793 5,857 4,257 16,908 6,479 5,320 4,150 15,949 
1978 7,086 6,236 4,771 18,093 6,483 5,623 4,513 16,619 
1979 7,349 6,514 5,089 18,952 6,996 6,059 4,847 17,902 
1980 7,587 6,759 5,320 19,666 7,082 6,332 5,147 18,561 
1981 7,796 6,980 5,522 20,299 7,665 6,742 5,305 19,712 
1982 8,149 7,176 5,703 21,028 7,984 7,190 5,794 20,968 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education, A Financial and Statistical 
Analysis of Swaziland's Education System with Projections to 
1985, 1977, p40, and Central Statistical Office, Education 
Statistics, 1976 to 1982. 
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Table 14: Planned and actual enrolments in senior secondary classes, 
1976 to 1982 
Total Form 4 
Actual 
Form 5 Total Form 4 
Planned 
Form 5 
1976 1,129 1,378 2,507 1,731 1,257 2,988 
1977 1,230 943 2,173 1,888 1,471 3,359 
1978 1,451 1,012 2,462 2,188 1,688 3,876 
1979 1,629 1,190 2,820 2,311 1,812 4,189 
1980 1,742 1,338 3,081 2,638 1,923 4,637 
1981 1,823 1,433 3,256 2,878 2,152 5,030 
1982 1,893 1,500 3,394 3,090 2,327 5,417 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education, A Financial and Statistical 
Analysis of Swaziland's Education System with Projections to 
1985, 1977, p40 and Central Statistical Office, Education 
Statistics, 1976 to 1982. 
Table 15: Junior Certificate Examination results, 1973 to 1982  
Year First 	 Second 
Class 	 Class 
% First 
& Second 
Class 
Third 
Class 
Fail Total 
Entries 
% First, 
Second & 
Third Class 
1973 22 	 658 31 783 717 2,180 67.1 
1974 79 	 919 34 1,016 900 2,914 69.0 
1975 72 	 901 32 1,417 629 3,019 79.2 
1976 53 	 779 25 1,457 992 3,218 69.8 
1977 79 	 929 25 1,890 1,052 3,950 73.4 
1978 126 	 1,037 27 1,633 1,470 4,226 65.4 
1979 86 	 1,004 23 1,903 1,723 4,716 63.5 
1980 81 	 986 20 2,069 1,994 5,130 61.3 
1981 95 	 1,005 22 1,982 1,703 4,835 64.8 
1982 79 	 1,127 23 2,410 1,594 5,210 69.0 
Source: Compiled from Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1975 to 
1981, and Ministry of Education Examination Section. 
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Table 17: Junior Certificate Examination class 3 passes entering 
Form 4, 1979 
%age total JCE entry 
entering Form 4 
%age class 3 passes 
entering Form 4 
class 3 passes as %age 
total new entrants to 
Form 4 
Source: From Table 16. 
Table 18: Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results, 
1968 to 1982  
Year 	 First 	 Second 	 Third 	 % First, 	 Fourth 	 Fail 	 Total 
Class 	 Class 	 Class 	 Second & 	 Class 	 Entries 
Third Class 
1968 33 	 61 86 75 — 60 240 
1969 35 	 59 117 79 — 57 268 
1970 34 	 68 114 69 — 98 314 
1971 55 	 92 137 76 — 90 374 
1972 54 	 131 244 63 176 79 684 
1973 44 	 84 195 40 307 176 806 
1974 59 	 105 228 38 392 253 1,037 
1975 56 	 111 246 36 450 275 1,138 
1976 58 	 140 278 38 733 42 1,251 
1977 78 	 108 300 40 837 29 1,432 
1978 76 	 148 312 31 1,008 161 1,705 
1979 95 	 165 327 34 1,061 59 1,707 
1980 90 	 208 363 36 1,114 69 1,834 
1981 98 	 164 282 27 1,379 109 2,032 
1982 80 	 209 375 30 (1575) 2,239 
Source: Compiled from Central Statistics Office, Annual Statistical 
Bulletin, 1968 to 1974; Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 
1975 to 1981; Ministry of Education Examination Section. 
to 1982 
1979 1980 1981 1982 
52% 54% 53% 63% 
65% 77% 82% 100(+)% 
48% 57% 61% 64% 
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Table 19: Cambridge Overseas School Certificate examination results  
in selected high schools, 1982  
Centre No. Entries First 
Class 
Second 
Class 
Third 
Class 
Total % First, 
Second & 
Third Class 
400 60 6 15 22 43 71.7 
401 170 0 2 14 16 9.4 
402 37 2 9 20 31 83.8 
404 127 14 33 41 88 69.3 
405 64 3 8 26 37 57.8 
409 29 0 0 1 1 3.5 
410 81 3 21 18 42 51.9 
411 85 1 1 1 3 3.5 
412 71 5 13 18 36 50.7 
414 34 0 5 12 17 50.0 
415 59 0 0 1 1 1.7 
420 43 0 0 2 2 4.7 
428 58 0 1 4 5 8.6 
429 38 0 0 0 0 0.0 
430 46 0 0 4 4 8.7 
432 58 0 0 0 0 0.0 
434 93 0 1 1 2 2.2 
437 34 0 0 0 0 0.0 
438 15 0 0 0 0 0.0 
Source: Ministry of Education Examination Section 
- 274 - 
Table 20: 	 University of Swaziland enrolments, 	 1978/79 to 	 1982/83 
1982/83 Degree programmes 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 
B. 	 Comm. 93 119 110 64 87 
B.A. 	 (Soc. 	 Sc.) 65 48 66 88 100 
LL.B. 29 47 71 73 109 
B.A. 	 + CDE 128 122 125 131 123 
B.Sc. 	 & B.Sc. 	 + CDE 104 119 167 213 242 
B.Sc. 	 (Agric.) 9 24 37 38 62 
B.Ed. 14 24 22 23 22 
Total Degrees 442 503 598 660 745 
Diploma/Certificate 
Programmes 
Accounting & Bus. 	 Stud. 58 58 57 68 93 
Gen. 	 Agric. 64 60 56 69 72 
Agric. 	 Educ. 63 50 44 65 66 
Anim. 	 Prod. 56 52 39 16 - 
Home Economics 59 55 51 59 47 
Cert. 	 in Agric. 40 40 40 40 40 
Total 	 Dip./Cert. 340 315 287 317 318 
TOTAL 782 818 885 977 1063 
Source: Ministry of Education, Report on the Review of the Third 
National Development Plan, 1983, Table 17. 
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Table 21: University of Swaziland output of Swazi degree, diploma, 
and certificate holders 1978/79 to 1981/82 
1981/82 Degree programmes 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 
B. Comm. 4 10 16 15 
B.A. 	 (Soc. 	 Sc.) - - - 15 
LL.B. 3 3 4 7 
B.A. 	 + CDE 14 20 29 26 
B.Sc. 	 & B.Sc.+CDE - - - 6 
B.Sc. 	 (Agric.) 2 3 5 
B.Ed. - 1 - - 
Total Degrees 23 37 54 69 
Diploma/Certificate 
Programmes 
Accounting & Bus. 	 Studies 11 26 26 33 
Gen. Agric. 21 18 14 12 
Agric. Educ. 16 19 6 9 
Anim. Prod. & Health 15 13 4 1 
Home Economics 16 14 13 12 
Cert. in Agriculture 36 39 38 40 
Total Diploma/Certificate 115 129 101 107 
TOTAL 138 166 155 176 
Source: Ministry of Education, Report on the Review of the Third 
National Development Plan, 1983, Table 18. 
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Table 24: Total Government expenditure on education and training, 
estimates 1978/79 (E 	 '000) 
Capital 
Local' 	 Donor Total 
Ministry and activity 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Recurrent 
SCOT 621 128 348 1,097 
Police Comissioner 
Police College 407 407 
Establishments and Training 
SIMPA 281 281 
Management Services 60 25 85 
Post secondary grants 1,323 1,323 
Health 
Training 307 55 818 1,180 
Agriculture 
Home Economics 139 16 155 
Training and extension 
Co-operative training 76 76 
Grants 
Local Administration 
(Home Affairs) 
Adult education (SEBENTA) 174 174 
Special education 339 101 440 
Pre-school education 
TOTAL (A) 3,727 325 1,166 5,218 
Education 
Minister and Ministry 601 122 200 923 
Primary education 3,778 655 525 4,958 
Secondary education 	 3,423 825 3,374 8,622 
Curriculum 	 71 56 78 205 
Adult education 	 12 194 525 731 
Post secondary (University) 	 1,874 124 2,339 4,337 
Teacher training 	 489 138 346 973 
TOTAL (B) 10,248 3,114 7,387 20,749 
TOTAL (A & B) education & 
training 13,975 3,439 8,553 25,967 
(B) as % Total 	 (A & B) 73.33% 90.55% 86.37% 79.91% 
Total Government expenditure 
Total education & training 
61,367 84,513 40,975 186,855 
as % of Government 22.77% 4.07% 20.87% 13.90% 
Ministry of Education 
as % of Government 16.70% 3.68% 18.03% 11.10% 
Source: Ministry of Finance , Estimates 1978/79. 
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Table 25: Total Government expenditure on education and training, 
estimates 1982/83 (E 	 '000) 
Capital 
Local 	 Donor Total 
Ministry and activity 
Deputy Prime Minister 
Recurrent 
SCOT 1,044 95 - 1,139 
Police Commissioner 
Police College 688 - - 688 
Establishments and Training 
SIMPA 648 - - 648 
Management Services 173 - - 173 
Post secondary grants 1,732 - 1,732 
Health 
Institute of Health Sciences 	 377 - - 377 
Agriculture 
Home Economics 247 - - 247 
Training and extension 124 - 124 
Co-operative training 1 400 - 400 
Grants 
TOTAL (A) 5,433 95 - 5,528 
Education 
Minister and Ministry 1,058 100 200 1,298 
Primary education 8,987 1,700 1,133 11,820 
Secondary education 	 6,874 1,483 1,011 9,368 
Curriculum 	 208 - - 208 
Adult education 
	
464 - 464 
Post secondary (University) 	 2,533 100 455 3,088 
Teacher training 	 898 1,233 965 3,096 
Special education 	 25 - - 25 
Pre-school education 	 15 - - 15 
TOTAL (B) 	 21,062 4,616 3,764 29,442 
TOTAL (A & B) education & 
training 26,495 4,711 3,764 34,970 
(B) as % of Total 	 (A & B) 79.49% 97.98% 100% 84.19% 
Total Government expenditure 135,460 54,540 35,187 225,187 
Total education & training 
as % of Government 19.56% 8.64% 10.70% 15.53% 
Ministry of Education as 
% of Government 15.55% 8.46% 10.70% 13.07% 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Estimates 1982/83. 
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Table 28: Capital costs (E '000) education and training as estimated 
in the Third National Development Plan 1978/79 to 1982/83 
%age 1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 Total 
Primary Education 1,205 5,554 5,668 5,908 5,960 24,295 45% 
Secondary Education 5,086 2,164 2,446 2,442 2,525 14,663 27% 
Curriculum Centre 30 425 130 129 98 812 
Agriculture Programme 87 61 71 61 60 340 
Elementary Technology - 224 112 112 112 560 
Teacher Training 494 975 1,074 314 56 2,913 5% 
Radio Education - - 200 228 - 428 
Correspondence Education 75 40 - - - 115 
Swaziland College of Technology 622 120 178 185 195 1,300 
Vocational Training Centres - 206 - - 206 
Rural Education Centres 719 - - - - 719 
Adult Education Centres - 87 41 4 132 
Gcina 34 18 24 30 - 106 
Special Education 101 66 66 12 - 245 
Higher Education 1,845 2,229 896 1,288 793 7,051 13% 
Total 10,298 12,169 10,906 10,709 9,803 53,885 
Source: Third National Development Plan 1978/79 to 1982/83, p200. 
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